

JPRS-NEA-86-003

9 January 1986

## Near East/South Asia Report

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

9 January 1986

## NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

## CONTENTS

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Damascus Meeting of Leftists, Communists (AL-NIDA', 27 Oct 85) .....	1
Briefs	
GCC Railway Plan Shelved	2
New Anglo-Arab Journal	2

## ARAB AFRICA

## EGYPT

Planning Experts Discuss Urgent Economic Tasks (Ibrahim 'Abd-al-'Aziz; AL-SIYASI, 15 Sep 85) .....	3
Administrative Crisis in Egypt Considered ( 'Atif 'Ubayd Interview; AL-QABAS, 23 Oct 85) .....	7
Al-Sharqawi Urges New Foreign Policy Direction ( 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi; AL-AHRAM, 23 Oct 85) .....	11
Egyptian, Palestinian International Positions Considered ( 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Mashat; AL-JUMHURIYAH, 25 Oct 85) ...	18
Detailed Study on Formation of National Front (Rida Hilal; AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, 28 Oct 85) .....	21
New Prime Minister's Philosophy Outlined ( 'Ali Lutfi Interview; AL-AHRAM, 27 Sep 85) .....	35
Prime Minister's Complaints Bureau Launches Activities ( 'Abd-al-Nasir Salamah; AL-AHRAM, 23 Oct 85) .....	49

## MAURITANIA

Mauritanian President Says All Political Prisoners Now Free (Maayouia Ould Taya Interview; Paris International Service, 13 Dec 85) .....	52
--	----

## MOROCCO

Briefs	
Agreement With Libya .....	54

## TUNISIA

Mzali Discusses Relations With Libya, Israeli Raid (Mohamed Mzali Interview; AL-DUSTUR, 21 Oct 85) .....	55
Briefs	
MUP Member Arrested .....	57
Passport Theft Arrest .....	57

## ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

### ISRAEL

Air Force Commander Interviewed on Tunis Raid (Lapidot Interview; BAMAHANE, 9 Oct 85) .....	58
Ariel Sharon Remembers Unit 101 (Hanokh Shinman; BAMAHANE, 2 Oct 85) .....	61

### JORDAN

Finance Minister's Budget Statement (Hanna 'Awdah; Amman Domestic Service, 4 Dec 85) .....	69
---	----

### KUWAIT

Defense Minister on GCC, Food Security (WAKH, 30 Nov 85) .....	80
---	----

### OMAN

Briefs	
Army Communications Agreement Signed .....	82

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

UK TV on PLO, 'Arafat Interview (BBC, 16 Dec 85) .....	83
Kuwaiti Paper Interviews Fatah's Abu Dawud (Muhammad Dawud Interview; AL-ANBA', 9 Dec 85) .....	87



Kuwaiti Daily Publishes Messages by Fatah Dissidents (Samih Abu Kuwayk; AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, 7 Dec 85) .....	91
---	----

## SAUDI ARABIA

Press Views Saudi Military Development (Riyadh Domestic Service, 28 Nov 85) .....	93
'Secret' Arms Deal Talks Reported With Brazil (AL-QABAS, 30 Nov 85) .....	95
Briefs	
UK Construction Firms To Depart	97
Development of Military Industries	97
Factory Output Increase Reported	98
Plane Maintenance Agreement Signed	98
GCC Economic Agreement Approved	98

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Paper Urges Drawing Up of Permanent Constitution (AL-KHALIJ, 10 Dec 85) .....	99
Briefs	
Methanol Plant Planned	101

## SOUTH ASIA

### AFGHANISTAN

Article Details Soviet Control of Rural Population (Jean-Jose Puig; EST & OUEST, Nov 85) .....	102
Refugees Reject Position on DRA (Tehran Domestic Service, 28 Nov 85) .....	107
Fighting Resumes in Panjsher (Tehran Domestic Service, 29 Nov 85) .....	108
Briefs	
Government Forces Reportedly Attacked	109
Weapons, Ammunition Captured	109
Mujahidin Operations Reported	109
Inflicted Losses Reported	110

### IRAN

Tehran Comments on Saddam Husayn's Visit to Moscow (Tehran Domestic Service, 17 Dec 85) .....	111
Commander Speaks on Antismuggling Campaign (Tehran Domestic Service, 4 Dec 85) .....	113

Financial 'Dispute' Hinders Relations With France (AL-QABAS, 7 Dec 85) .....	114
Official Underlines Importance of Port (Tehran Domestic Service, 28 Nov 85) .....	116
Radicals in Key Posts (MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY, 23-29 Nov 85) ..	117
Opposition Paper Comments on Succession (Editorial; London KEYHAN, 5 Dec 85) .....	118
Disagreement Said Arising on Montazeri's Selection (Radio Iran, 13 Dec 85) .....	120
NVOI Notes Suspension of Tudeh Party Officials (National Voice of Iran, 10 Dec 85) .....	122
Formation of 'Free Clergy Society' Reported (Radio Iran, 4 Dec 85) .....	124
Radio Reports Attack on Base (Radio Iran, 22 Nov 85) .....	125
Opposition Paper Writes of Plans for Army (London KEYHAN, 28 Nov 85) .....	126
Briefs	
Arms Talks	128
Magnesium Ore Deposits	128
Copper Mine Discovery	128
Oppositionist Takes Issue	129
Bazaaris Reportedly Protest Recent Tax Increases	129
Executions Reported	129
Hostage Negotiations Reported	130
Wheat Order Canceled	130
Explosion in Karaj	130
Opponents Arrested	130
Clandestine on Lebanese Delegation	131
Arms Supply	131
Microwave Circuits for Military	131
Industrial Exports Reportedly Up	132
Disapproval Over Montazeri	132

## PAKISTAN

Commentary Views Haq-Gandhi Meetings (Editorial; JASARAT, 22 Nov 85) .....	133
Speedier Restoration of Democracy Urged (Editorial; NAWA-E WAQT, 29 Nov 85) .....	135
Commentary Views Role of Political Parties (Editorial; THE MUSLIM, 11 Nov 85) .....	137

Alleged Plans for State of Emergency Opposed (Editorial; HAIDAR, 6 Dec 85) .....	138
Oil Production Situation Reviewed (Editorial; JANG, 9 Dec 85) .....	139

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

DAMASCUS MEETING OF LEFTISTS, COMMUNISTS

Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 27 Oct 85 pp 1, 3

[Text] A delegation of representatives from the Arab national liberation movements present in Damascus made a visit to the office of the Lebanese Communist Party in the Syrian capital. The delegation included comrades from the Iraqi Communist Party, the Grouping of Egyptian Patriots Abroad, PFLO, the Bahraini Popular Liberation Front, the Popular Front in Bahrain, the Jordanian Patriotic Movement, the Democratic Union Party in Sudan, the Communist Party in Saudi Arabia, the Kurdistan Socialist Party, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The delegation was received by Comrades Nadim 'Abd-al-Samad and 'Ali al-'Abd.

All of the members of the delegation spoke at the meeting and, in the name of their organizations, together hailed the courageous operation which the martyr group of Ahmad al-Mir al-Ayyubi and Salim Yamut carried out, leading to the destruction of the agent Lahad radio station in the heart of the so-called security belt which Israel has imposed. The members of the delegation expressed great pride in the courageous operations which the heroes of the Lebanese patriotic resistance front have carried out. They hailed the new kind of operation, which is an important blow at Israel and its agents, and affirmed that the Israeli occupation would be chased out of the last inch of Lebanon under the pressure of such blows. The members of the delegation stressed the importance of this operation and the many other courageous operations because they form the one true method of dealing with the Zionist enemy, liberating the occupied territories and forming an impetus for the patriotic struggle at the Arab level.

As for the occasion itself, the Lebanese Communist Party office in Damascus was visited by a delegation from the Syrian Communist Party command including Comrade Yusuf Faysal, the deputy secretary general, and Politburo members Zuhayr 'Abd-al-Samad, Daniel Ni'mah, Ramu Shaykhu, and 'Umar al-Siba'i. The delegation was delighted with the courageous operation and the Syrian comrades expressed their pride in the courage of storming the agent Lahad radio. They hailed this qualitative operation which forms an important escalation in the struggle against the Israeli occupation forces and their agents.

/6091

CSO: 4404/163

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

GCC RAILWAY PLAN SHELVED--Plans for a Trans-Gulf Railway linking member states of the GCC have been shelved for the time being for cost reasons, an official said yesterday. A feasibility study, commissioned by the GCC, showed initial cost at about \$4 billion (BD1.5 billion). The study was discussed by GCC transport ministers at a meeting in Riyadh last week. They recommended more research before a final decision was taken, the GCC official said. [Text] [Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 17 Dec 85 p 1 GF] /6662

NEW ANGLO-ARAB JOURNAL--London, Dec 16 (KUNA)--A joint Anglo-Arab publication to be launched in January 1986 will provide data information on the six GCC countries as well as Iraq, it was reported here Monday. The Gulf organization for industrial consulting, a research organization funded by the seven states and based in Doha, Qatar, has signed an agreement with the publishers "Lyme Book of Newcastle-Under-Lyme", in the English midlands, to produce a quarterly English language journal ARAB GULF INDUSTRY. The journal will include translations of research articles, field studies and interviews with top officials as well as information on companies, organisations and specific industries in the Gulf. "The material is drawn from the resources of this organisation whose Arabic language quarterly research journal, AL-TA'AWUN AL-SINA'I, has become an important forum for industrial dialogue in the Arab Gulf states and the Arab world as a whole", a spokesman for Lyme books said. This Gulf body hopes, through this English language journal, to extend the dialogue to industrial developing nations all over the world", the spokesman added. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman have reached a high level of urban and social development in the past 10 years, he added. Now with the oil boom over, these countries are looking to create a regional industrial base to make full use of their energy resources, the spokesman concluded. [Text] [Kuwait KUNA in English 1245 GMT 16 Dec 85 LD] /6662

CSO: 4400/72



EGYPT

# PLANNING EXPERTS DISCUSS URGENT ECONOMIC TASKS

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 15 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Ibrahim 'Abd-al-'Aziz: "Urgent Economic Tasks Face New Government"]

[Text] What is the planning experts' viewpoint concerning the priorities to be considered first by the new government and the way to achieve a stable economy which will move society out of the recession phase? Furthermore, what is the way to deal with the question of prices--through unconventional policies integrated with economic measures?

AL-SIYASI presented these and other questions to a number of planning experts and listened to their proposals.

## Expansion of Credit

Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Majid al-Khulwi (an expert at the National planning Institute) said:

The new government must adopt economic measures leading to an upturn in the national economy and the transcendence of the recession phase, which the national economy is going through, through credit expansion, support and follow-up of investments to assure the quick success of investments according to a timetable, and the adoption of a price policy in the rationalization and usage of resources. The employment policy must remain as it is without freezing the employment structure, since the private sector absorbs the labor surplus.

In the field of foreign trade, we must attempt to increase export of products assigned for export by firms specializing in production for export, and by looking for foreign partnership ensuring export markets through joint investments.

In the industrial sector, we must keep away from the assembly industries in the fields of electronics, automobile and other industries and instead concentrate in complete production, in Egypt.



Attention must also be paid to the mining industries for ceramics, china, cement and phosphates.

#### Import Rationalization

Dr Ahmad Baraniyah (an expert at the Agricultural Planning Center of the Planning Institute) said:

We must not view economic problems separately; instead a comprehensive treatment must be accomplished. Here, the second 5-year plan must be emphasized and we must prepare the relevant legislation and follow up its total implementation after it has been approved.

In the field of foreign trade, we must concern ourselves in the coming period with import rationalization of luxury and leisure goods and the necessity of removing the conflict between encouraging domestic production and importing competing merchandise from abroad. Furthermore, we must pay attention to education and culture and establish a foundation for education in Egypt, to restore her cultural position and provide readers with books, in order to give the coming generations something new.

#### Wages and Production

Sayyid Abu-al-Layl (an expert at the Specialized National Councils) said:

The government must start finding prompt solutions for several urgent problems. The most important of these:

- 1-To handle the issue of prices through unconventional policies integrated with economic measures within the framework of accomplishing a balance between wages, productivity and prices, so that the balance is on an economic basis as much as possible.
- 2-To review the credit policy by giving banks more flexibility in the field of commercial credit and participation in the development programs.
- 3-To increase the search for new and permanent sources of foreign currencies to replace the present temporary sources such as tourism and export.
- 4-The private sector suffers from recession, and its bank deposits increase, indicating its movement away from investment. We must look for a way to involve the private sector to participate in the development.

5-We must support investments within the framework of preparing the conditions to achieve greater effectiveness in the policy of an open-door production economy. Indicators point to the decline in the number of investment projects approved, especially in the free zone areas. The conditions at Port Sa'id must be reviewed, so that it becomes an example of open-door production.

#### Dealing with Price Escalation

Dr 'Ala al-Hakim (an expert at the Regional Planning Center of the Planning Institute) said:

First, we must provide the broad segment of the people with their basic requirement of food, clothing and housing in an adequate manner and deal with the issue of price escalation, especially for food items. We must also work to achieve a balance between wages and prices and not tamper with subsidies, which might harm the working class segment of society.

Problems which hinder development must be solved within a comprehensive framework and not treated individually because successful development is integrated in all aspects, without one dominating another.

Greater attention must also be paid to regional planning when building new cities and the role of regional planning in development plans must be increased. The role of local areas in decision-making should be increased. We must solve the problems of big cities, develop the countryside, and convert the villages to production zones, as they were in the past, after they have become a consumption zone. Education must be tied to the planning program and to the requirement of the country for various fields of specialization. We must work to stabilize decisions affecting economic fields, especially to encourage investments and tourism.

#### Rationalization of Loans Usage

Dr 'Imad Mustafa (an expert at the Planning Institute) said:

The new government's programs give priority to several problems. The most salients are:

1-To arrest the decline in the balance of payments through an increase in expected exports, and to limit dispensable consumption import items and concentrate only on basic import requirements.

2-To rationalize the usage of loans in the essential sectors of society and reduce the role of foreign lending sources in limiting the usage of these loans.

3-To control hard currency prices and establish a definite policy to eliminate this problem, which has affected the economy for a long time.

4-To attend to urgent problems, which are increasing in complexity with time, such as the problem of agricultural land shortage, and housing and utility problems.

13135/13012

CSO: 4504/015

EGYPT

#### ADMINISTRATIVE CRISIS IN EGYPT CONSIDERED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 23 Oct 85 p 10

[Interview with Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Administrative Development, Dr 'Atif 'Ubayd; in Cairo, date not specified]

[Text] Doctor 'Atif 'Ubayd, minister of administrative development, stated that retirement and departure of personnel to private enterprise have severely reduced the number of high-level managers in Egypt. The crisis, he said, is not likely to be soon resolved except by appealing to those qualified and experienced professionals now working abroad to return to Egypt, by clearing the path for them to take over the management of the economy, providing them an increase in benefits that will guarantee a suitable standard of living and convincing them to remain in Egypt to face the challenges of the job.

Dr 'Ubayd noted that using traditional solutions to alleviate the crisis will only lead the economy from bad to worse and from crisis to crisis; Egypt now needs to think and act in non-traditional ways. Dr. 'Ubayd said in a comprehensive interview with AL-QABAS:

One possible recourse would be to transfer the responsibility of education to the private sector, a measure that would certainly improve conditions for the teachers, and to transfer security and cleaning services now under government administration to private companies, thereby reducing the number of employees in the Egyptian bureaucracy by 30 percent.

He added that if the government would apply modern administrative standards and procedures, Egypt's already existing production base would allow her a definite level of economic independence.

He substantiated his statements with the following statistics:

The net worth of the state's assets--and these include companies in the public sector, economic institutions, and joint ventures--is 97.4 billion Egyptian pounds, a value almost matched by the private sector. The yearly return on government assets, however, is no greater than 35.6 million pounds, that is, 36 piastres for every 100 pounds--less than one-half percent.

The private sector, too, faces other problems and its yearly return on assets is currently well below the international average.

## The Four Problems

Dr 'Ubayd stated that the return on government assets is so declining that it no longer can contribute to accumulating interest necessary for reinvestment, encouraging projects and financing development. It has become standard practice for the government to fall back on foreign loans to finance new projects.

Dr 'Ubayd said that Egypt could increase its return if it could overcome four major problems:

First: the social price paid for products. Economic units have been forced to sell their products to the citizens at prices below cost in compliance with the government's stated social priorities. Although such social prices have been accepted and in equilibrium for 15 years, now the costs are much greater, and the prices cover less than the traditional obligations.

Second: the crisis of foreign funding. The problem, in Dr 'Ubayd's opinion, is not in supplying foreign currency because it is available, whether through local banks or through loans and foreign financiers. The problem is rather that of repayment of loans. Egypt's resources are limited, and foreign currency available in cash is in short supply. At the same time, demand is increasing its prices are rising, and the cost of repayment, whose rates once fluctuated at an average of 20 to 30 percent, has now risen 100 percent.

Third: the multiplicity of laws regulating the market. In Egypt today there are six independent laws: public sector law, economic institutions law; private sector law; corporate law; investment law; and finally, new development projects law.

Says the minister: It seems inconceivable to me that any market could maximize its efficiency under such legislative diversity, where very basic rights and responsibilities directly conflict with one another.

## The Greatest Problem of Them All

Finally: the severe problem of administration. Egypt, despite her wealth of administrative and technical professionals, is lacking a current base of managers to fill the high-level positions, professionals who distinguish themselves in their ability to make decisions and take risks, display initiative, adapt to changes, and utilize these to the fullest to improve the management of the country's economy. But, at the moment, the proper conditions do not exist for the creation of and training of such a professional team.

History also reflects this problem; out of the total number of large companies in Egypt before the revolution, which was not more than 95, 78 were owned and managed by foreigners. That means that Egypt entered its age of nationalization with a group of managers trained in the Western Liberal school of thought.

In no way does the minister underestimate the competency of these professionals, a large portion of whom worked abroad and achieved success. Those who left to work for the private sector were also successful. Those who remained in

government service are moving swiftly towards retirement age, leaving a large gap in the upper-level management positions.

What To Do?!

According to Minister 'Ubayd, Egypt has three inter-related alternatives:

The first is that we try to repatriate as many professionals as possible. Other countries that have had similar problems and shared similar goals, such as Korea, Turkey, Greece, and China, have adopted this measure.

The minister cited Greece as an example, saying that between 1974 and 1980, Greece repatriated almost 20,000 administrative leaders; and since its adoption of a liberal policy, China, too, has repatriated 18,000 professionals.

The second option is both modification of financial legislations to allow for appropriate compensation of the managers with benefits commensurate to the work involved, as well as standardization of legislations regulating the market.

The third option is to form a group of institutions--wholly integrated with various projects--responsible for providing the administrators with both theoretical and practical training. The site for the training center could be selected from any of the iron and steel companies, al-Mahallah al-Kubra, the aluminum complex, petroleum projects, the Suez canal, al-Salihyah, or elsewhere. Any of these would be suitable to be institutes to turn out promising administrators.

#### The Umbrella of Success

Answering questions about possibility for success of managers coming home from abroad or being trained within Egypt given these continuing acute problems of price setting, foreign financing, and the inconsistency of the laws, Dr 'Ubayd declared:

A review of legislations regulating the market must necessarily accompany the narrowing of the administrative gap. Either we must implement deregulation in price setting or create an alternate system.

If we could address the three problems which are under Egyptian control, we could certainly also make headway into regulating foreign currency which, up until this point, we have not been able to control effectively. But we will be able to regulate it in the future.

We shall not take any step to implement these ideas until they have been presented for discussion to the labor organizations, businessmen and political parties.

In Dr 'Ubayd's opinion, such choices as are now being made will set a trend for Egypt's history of dealing with the rights and responsibilities of her people; it is important that everyone be convinced of such ideas before their implementation.



## Egypt's Bureaucratic Diet

In this interview with AL-QABAS the minister addressed two other problems, the first of which relates to the large surplus of manpower in the government, and the second to free education.

On the first problem he stated: There is an enormous oversupply of employees in government administration. Right now the number of government employees totals 3.2 million, of which 640,000 are security or cleaning staff, 700,000 are clerical workers, and 750,000 are teachers.

We must give some thought to the future development of these three groups, as well as to how gradually to ease the burden they put on the government. In short, the Egyptian bureaucracy has become obese and has got to go on a very strict diet.

I would recommend that the government give all cleaning and security responsibilities over to companies in the private sector, and to allow for a complete integration of the workforce into these new companies. I have no doubt that private administration of the now idle workforce would prove to be far more effective than the government has been.

For clerical employees, I would suggest a re-training and re-qualifying program for both professional and production activities.

The issue of the teaching force is related to the problem of free education.

### An Ambiguous Equation

The problem of the teaching force poses an ambiguous and insolvable equation, for which we must find a non-mathematical solution.

One side of the equation claims that the government should be committed to free education on all levels. But the education budget is swelling so much that it threatens the very capabilities of the country. Educational services are sinking to the lowest levels by any pedagogic standards, and "free" education is no longer a reality because of the high cost of private tutors, foreign textbooks, and so on.

Dr 'Ubayd added that the low salaries and infrequent promotions of teachers also reflect the general lack of resources and that as it now stands there is no real hope of improving job conditions in any tangible way.

"Given all this, I believe we must consider non-traditional ideas to alleviate the situation, such as encouraging the private sector and the cooperative sector to take a larger and more active role, for instance, they could expand to build private schools, as well as special language, technical, and industrial schools. Such a transfer of responsibilities would allow a larger number of teachers to relocate to the new sector, where their salaries would be higher. From another perspective, it would ease the burden on the government and increase the possibility of improving conditions for government-hired teachers.

Dr 'Ubayd concluded by saying that this idea would also be discussed, given that it, again, constitutes an historical choice for Egypt.

EGYPT

AL-SHARQAWI URGES NEW FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTION

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Oct 85 p 12

[Article by 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi: "Free Thoughts Instead of a Dead End"]

[Text] The only solution before us is self-reliance. Reliance on Arab regimes is a dead end, or at best a useless reliance on a wall that wants to be demolished and can only be reerected by the power of the peoples who must regain their rights from the usurpers in order to assess the checks and balances.

The only way the Arab regimes can redeem themselves is to institute popular rule and establish democracy, for this is the true and sincere application of the Islamic Shari'ah. Most of these regimes claim that they apply the Shari'ah while they try to foment trouble in Egypt on the pretext of demanding the application of the Shari'ah.

Neither I nor anyone else knows by what kind of vengeance these Arab regimes are driven to act the way they do toward Egypt! Is it because it disgraces some Arab rulers before their people? Indeed! Then let them try democracy! Let them try a small measure of democracy. Or are they afraid to lose their thrones? But they will not remain in the seat of power against the will of their people and at the expense of human rights! Most of these Arab rulers did not share Egypt's plight. They did not send one word of support for its successful efforts to save the lives of over 400 passengers on the Italian ship. They did not send a single word of condolence nor back any announcement when Egypt was subjected to American piracy, forcing its defenseless civilian airliner to land at an American military base in the Mediterranean, although all civilized countries supported Egypt's position.

Moreover, Egyptian public opinion was outraged at this American blackmail and the affront to our national pride and to international law. President Mubarak, in the name of ancient civilization, in the name of Arab pride, and in the name of the honor and dignity of the greatest Arab people, protested this hideous American crime and asked for an apology to the Egyptian people. But the Arab regimes remained silent as though this matter were of no concern to them! Egyptian students moved to express their anger in demonstrations which witnessed the burning of the Israeli and American flags. Anger got out of hand when some students from 'Ayn Shams University attacked a university building and others went overboard in their shouting. It was very painful

for us to hear about these demonstrations only on foreign radio broadcasts, some of which are not known for their veracity while others are known for their exaggeration, with every announcer distorting the news more than the previous one until the truth is almost lost! It is painful to realize that we did not hear the truth on the radio and TV in Egypt! Concealing the facts from the people is what undermines stability because this gives free rein to lies and makes people lose their trust in their mass media. This is a backward stage which we have crossed and escaped with the hope that we will not experience its mistakes once again! The Egyptian people are fully confident that their mass media provide them with the complete facts, thus rejecting rumors and feeling no need to search for the truth in foreign broadcasts. The people have the right to know!

It is not strange that some foreign newspapers belonging to the CIA and world Zionism, such as NEWSWEEK, which is Israel's voice in America, should revile Egypt. But it is indeed strange that some newspapers belonging to friendly fraternal regimes should take to reviling Egypt and taking malicious joy in its misfortune!

It is no secret that several parties in the Western world and in the Arab world itself want to take aim at the Egyptian experience, and at President Husni Mubarak as well, because his firm decisive stands which reflect our people's aspirations conflict sharply with the interests and ambitions of those Arab and international parties. Those circles want to deal a blow to Egypt and to Mubarak by various wily means, including the use of mercenaries to manifest religious and political extremism, fear and intimidation, the exacerbation of the economic crisis, the impoverishment of Egypt, and the spreading of drugs! This is what prompted the national forces to join hands and rally around Husni Mubarak, regardless of affiliation, as an urgent national duty.

We will not tire of calling for solidarity in a strong front under Husni Mubarak's banner in order to realize our people's aspirations, to solve their economic problems, and to safeguard their independence, security, right to education, culture, health, affluence, and brotherhood with other peoples.

Our only salvation is this kind of solidarity. Our only salvation is self-reliance in developing production in order to manage without others and not to feel disgraced because we are unable to feed ourselves although we used to feed others.

If we direct our efforts to production and growth, we will be able to meet our food and clothing needs.

As for the Arab brothers, I do not know, and neither do the astrologers, why they are intent on weakening and impoverishing Egypt! May God enlighten and guide them! If in our weakness they find strength and in our impoverishment they find riches, we can understand their shameful deeds. But it is quite the opposite. Their deeds strip them of all weapons and encourage their enemies, undermining their position and leaving them naked to face the gales of violent incidents. Have they become rich without Egypt? Indeed not. They are poorer and more miserable than homeless orphans! Their behavior

toward us makes them a sorry example of ingratitude and presents them to the world and history as despicable ingrates. When I speak of Arab brothers, I refer only to some rulers because the people are helpless and are the ones who have compassion! But those who bully their older brothers are certain Arab rulers. It is high time we speak openly with one another. The day of reckoning has come. Egypt must expose the position of all Arab rulers who fit this category. It must bring out a book for them to read: "And it will be said unto him: read thy book. Thy soul sufficeth as reckoner against thee this day."

#### Price of Blood

There is not one Arab country which is not indebted to Egypt, as all fair-minded civilized people will concede. But Egypt's refusal to flaunt its benevolence has led some people to forget Egypt's kindness to them, thus inducing misunderstanding and abuse. This ungrateful group is biting Egypt's hand which reached out to it to help it become human.

Let those ungrateful Arab rulers remember that Egypt sent its best people to Arab countries to teach and educate them. It sent its workers, engineers, and farmers to build up the land. Egypt sent its doctors to fight disease in these countries and look after the health of their peoples. Egypt took food out of its people's mouths to feed the hungry. It was not long ago when our students, even the very young among them, used to deprive themselves of their daily allowance to give it to the Arab poor! Some ruling families remember this kindness without complexes or sensitivity!

And it was Egypt which sent out its best men to give their lives in the defense of Palestinian rights in four wars. Every single village in Egypt has offered young martyrs in defense of Palestine.

Egypt was the one to give shelter and assistance without a price and without interfering in anyone's affairs or anyone's decision. May God preserve Yasir 'Arafat's life, for he did not forget this even during the rift.

It was Egypt which sacrificed its children's lives and its happiness as a price for the mad opulence enjoyed by the oil playboys in the wake of the 1973 war which restored Arab pride after defeat.

Egypt, through its people's sacrifice, caused the price of oil to go up, thus allowing the oil princes to gain, at the cost of Egyptian blood, billions of dollars which they are now spending shamelessly on pleasure, impudence, and parties or on conspiracies, mercenaries, self-indulgence, and the acquisition of palaces all over the world. They also spend it in bars, disreputable nightclubs, and gambling casinos, thus giving a stark example of impudence, corruption, and reckless spending and making themselves the laughing stock of the entire world, including those mercenaries and pimps who get rich through their corruption, suspect men and women, and the effete.

Some of them squander millions of dollars in Egypt on some mercenaries allegedly for building mosques, for supporting the abrogation of Camp David,



and for backing the representatives of some currents which they incite under flashy misleading slogans of religious and political extremism.

Those radical mercenaries have not criticized a single ruler in any Arab or Islamic country that finances and uses them.

Why is it that not a single voice has been raised to ask some of the wealthy Arab people and Arab rulers how they spend their money and what they do with the leftover wealth in a nation whose people are torn by need. There is no other nation on earth poorer and more destitute than the Arab nation and the Islamic nation.

Or do those who trade in religion use double standards for Islam and the application of the Shari'ah?

As for those who trade in political ideology, we know them for what they are! We have read their loathsome, abusive accusations of the honorable people of this country. We have read their insolent charges and invectives against our magnanimous citizens. We have read their distortions of everything noble and bright in our lives and of our exploits, including the October war epic which dazzled the world. We have read their calumnies about the bold unbiased Egyptian foreign policy, accusing it of subordination to Israel and America. We have read the glorification of Asad as a hero, and of Saddam Husayn before him. And we have read their praise of al-Qadhdhafi as a prophet who came before his time and as the last of the hawks! I do not know what they think today of the other Arab hawks, the likes of Saddam Husayn. Could it be that he has lost the auction in the slave market? And what do they think of Asad's positions toward Israel and America compared to his positions toward Iraq and Jordan? And how do they regard the human rights violations committed by their only hawk and prophet in his country, the barbaric violence against and physical liquidation of his enemies, and his squandering of the Libyan people's money on sabotage and terrorism against his opponents? And what do they think about his oil sales to America at a time when all the other oil-producing Arab countries, led by the late King Faysal, may he rest in peace, boycotted the United States and organized a boycott campaign against all the supporters of Israel? And what do the mercenaries, who trade in political and religious ideologies, think of the way some Arab rulers and wealthy people are managing Arab money?

And where are the oil revenues which have grown because of the sacrifices Egypt has offered? Was Egyptian blood, which flowed in the defense of Arab honor and Palestinian rights, shed so that billions of dollars could flow into the treasuries of the Arab oil playboys, most of whom transferred them to Zionist banks in Europe and America?

Shame on You

We are not asking for the price of blood, for all your wealth cannot compensate for the blood of one martyr! We are, however, asking for the rights of the Egyptian people who sacrificed their wealth and their standard of living to protect you, only to be abused and reviled by some of your insolent people!

We are not asking you not to deposit money you gained through our sacrifices in Zionist banks, where it is converted into weapons aimed at our hearts and your hearts, into an instrument of destruction against us and you, and into a tool that threatens you, forcing you to follow a policy which your people reject.

Do you refuse to invest your money in our country and in Arab development projects, depositing it instead in Zionist banks? Why do you refuse to invest your money in development projects for your and our peoples? Why do you not invest it in Egypt, as some of your distinguished people do, for this will bring you honest profits which are better and more honorable than the money you get from Zionist banks in Europe and America?

Who do you not invest your money to development projects in Egypt?

Your participation in Egyptian development projects will not be gratitude. It will indeed bring you profits beyond your imagination and will enhance your standing in history. It will also wash away your ingratitude.

If you had paid Egypt for all the gains you have realized through the blood of its people, you would have settled a part of your indebtedness to it, which is a duty, not a favor. How much has Egypt spent on you? It has spent tens of billions from the people's daily bread to defend Arab and Palestinian rights. Had it not sacrificed all the martyrs and all the money that it did in the wars, it would have been one of the richest and most advanced countries in the world and Israel's occupation of your countries would have been more pervasive. Israel would have trampled on your freedom while you were amusing yourselves.

This ingratitude of yours inflames your people more than it enrages our people. All your attempts to trifle with our internal security and unity and your endeavors at undermining our strong and enlightened nation front, which is under formation, and at fragmentation through the mercenaries you hire will not do you any good and will not keep you on your thrones. These are machinations which can only benefit the intelligence services of the enemies with whom some of you cooperate against the interests of your peoples. Our Arab peoples feel the bonds of friendship and solidarity. They stand united in the defense of their common destiny and goals. They censure you for your position toward Egypt and your ingratitude as much as they censure you for investing the money you gained through Egyptian blood in Zionist banks in Europe and America! Do not think that the crumbs you hand the Egyptians who offer services to your people are a fair compensation for their efforts. The salaries Egyptians receive in your countries are the lowest anywhere! An American or European doing the same job and having the same qualifications works fewer hours and is paid more than twice as much as an Egyptian. A Palestinian or a Syrian is paid more than an Egyptian, notwithstanding your admission that the Egyptian is indispensable and more productive! I do not know the reason for such discrimination. Is it an inferiority complex or is it a phobia?



## Repent

You will have no security without a strong, rich, and able Egypt. So turn to God in sincere repentance. Turn the page of the disgraceful past; look where fear and submission to oneupsmanship have led you. What have you gained from doing away with the Arab War Industrialization Organization? O how useful it would have been to have been allowed to continue production. It would have freed you of the need to seek foreign weapons. Arab weapons developed by your mental power would have deterred anyone contemplating aggression against us. It would have given the Arabs prestige and consequently world respect instead of ridicule because of the behavior of some of their rich people and contempt for the tyranny and stumbling of some of their rulers.

What have you gained from the folly of blockading Egypt economically and from your attempts to starve the people of Egypt? The Egyptian people have not starved nor have they dropped to their knees, but you have hurt them! You have not liberated Jerusalem by boycotting Egypt, but Israel has occupied new Arab territory while you were waiting.

Iran and Iraq went to war, draining Arab money while you trembled!

What have you gained from your folly with Egypt? You have not restored the rights of the Palestinian people, but Syria and Israel are exterminating the Palestinians while you are made to pay. You pay Syria for no other reason than your fear of its terrorism.

As for us, we have chosen the civilized way to deal with you and this is what we get! You moved the Arab League out of Egypt and you froze Egypt's membership in it. You severed your diplomatic relations with Egypt. What good has such irresponsible behavior done except everlasting shame and disgrace before history and your people? Hear this: your only salvation is respect for the will of your people and freedom for them. Set up a democratic rule in your country instead of conspiring against democracy in Egypt and pushing the mercenaries who trade in politics and religion into positions which may lead to adventurism or entanglement which only tanks can settle, thus causing Egypt to lose its democracy. You stand to gain nothing. So respect human rights in your country and "guard yourselves against a chastisement which cannot fall exclusively on those of you who are wrongdoers." Learn how to disagree in a way befitting our common refined civilization. Instead of constant conflict, aim to agree before the common enemy so as to safeguard our common destiny. The only redemption for any of us is through a national front inside our country and strong Arab national fronts.

Yasir 'Arafat and Saddam Husayn were the most eager members of the Baghdad summit to issue a resolution to boycott Egypt and to sever relations with it. They succeeded in urging the moderates to shift position after they scoffed at the call to institute a boycott.

Hence, the Arab world has been separated from Egypt, becoming like a stranger in a far-off land. Mercy be upon it! It has left its loved ones and neither they nor we have reaped any benefits!

Perhaps events have proved to Saddam Husayn and Yasir 'Arafat that they have made a fatal mistake. So would they not correct their mistake? Admitting one's mistakes and working to correct them are what real courage is all about.

Egypt does not ruin its friendships by seeking gratitude. But it does not allow anyone to deny its kindness or to violate its rights. Gratitude is not the praise Egypt is receiving from these two men. It is to right the wrong they have done, may God forgive them!

As for us Egyptians, we must know how to rely on ourselves. Egypt is rich and full of rich people. But those people misuse their wealth and squander it on pleasure just like some of the shameless wealthy Arabs. Let us issue laws for confiscating the properties of drug dealers and users and let us earmark this money for development. England, the mother of democracy, and its conservative government have done something similar to counteract the drug epidemic and the economic crisis.

The national front elements must meet to agree on urgent solutions to our economic problems, away from upsmanship and overbidding.

The only solution available to us Arabs is strong solidarity and arms self-sufficiency under a front led by the leader of the Arab world, democratic Egypt.

Egypt's leadership is neither a glory nor an honor. It is hard work and suffering and an affliction from God as well as a visitation.

Our only hope is solidarity and self-reliance. It is better than a dead end.

12502/12947  
CSO: 4504/82

EGYPT

EGYPTIAN, PALESTINIAN INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS CONSIDERED

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 25 Oct 85 p 5

[Commentary by Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Mashat: "Egypt, the Arabs, and the United States of America"]

[Text] The events that exploded recently in the Middle East, the effects of which will not cease after a great many questions, touch not only on the future of the Palestinian problem or the struggle in the Middle East, but also on Egyptian relations with the Arab states and Arab relations with Egypt and the United States of America, particularly in light of the current Arab disunity and the clear strategic weakness resulting from the disunity, the lack of attention to national interests, and the triumph of the violent interests of each area without consideration of the interests of the other areas.

New Circumstances and Old Slogans

The young Arab generations face new circumstances in the world and the Arab nation, and we do not find clear and sufficiently satisfactory responses. They see the clear divisions in the Arab system, they see the Arabs fighting, they suffer from Israeli obstinacy, terrorism and expansionism, they see the American quarrelsomeness and piracy, and they ask about the embassies and national companies and their role in the face of all of this.

In the face of these new manifestations, some of us are still holding on to what we are accustomed to and the slogans with which were raised and perhaps grew old, without an effort to choose them within the frame of the current conditions. There is no doubt that the talk about pan-Arabism and Arab solidarity must awaken more than a question about the truth of all of this. Furthermore, the talk about the Arab organizations, chief of which is the Arab League, must awaken a question not about the desirability of its existence, for it is important, but about the effectiveness of its role, which is nonexistent. Furthermore, the talk about the Arab summit must awaken a question about whether, where, or how it will convene, since some of the Arab states have conspired with the superpowers against each other.

There is no doubt that what is happening over the entire Arab world requires the sensible among us to urge an effort to modify these slogans and

organizations in keeping with these conditions. I have not come to the point that some have about this, talking about the end of Arabism or the lack of a need for the pan-Arab organizations, such as the Arab League. But without doubt, I wish for them to see that these slogans and organizations cannot be effective unless development takes place collectively so as to progress to a level of involvement with the new circumstances.

#### America and the Logic of the Tribal Shaykh

In their involvement with the crisis in the Middle East, particularly the Arab-Israeli struggle, the Arabs have thrown themselves into the American military camp without remembering that we live in a dualistic international system in which the other superpower, namely, the Soviet Union, can play a role in creating a balance with the United States.

The Arabs conduct the crisis by a logic of waiting rather than of initiative, even though it is their crisis, not someone else's. The Arabs always wait for the initiative from the Americans and wait for American domestic developments and their results for the Arabs. They act like this, moreover, looking to the American president as if he were the tribal shaykh who has the keys to solve the problem, who distributes reward and punishment, and who organizes relations between the core of the tribe and its various parts.

While the Arabs are waiting for American policy to produce initiatives, no one is waiting for them. The states strive, first and foremost, to achieve their national interests, without consideration for anything else. It seems to me, in view of the strong centralization of power in the Arab states and the lack of popular participation in most of them, and the fact that their political systems rest on denial of the citizens' rights, that the Arab states do not understand the difference between their gain and their loss or that the United States is not equivalent to a tribal shaykh. It has viewed the Arabs as if they are second-class citizens who do not have rights but who do have obligations towards the American will.

#### The Arabs and the Palestinians

From the beginning, the Palestinians have understood these disgraceful facts of Arab and international politics, and they have understood the disgraceful nature of the Arab regimes. Therefore, some of the Palestinian organizations have seen that the liberation of Palestine begins with the liberation of the Arab capitals from the feudal authorities linked with the major capitals. The Palestinian dilemma today is essentially an Arab dilemma before being an American or Israeli dilemma. It is embodied in the fact that, with the exception of Egypt, the policy of no Arab state has changed toward the Palestinian dimension. At a time in which the Palestinians have accepted steps toward a peaceful solution to their struggle with Israel, the United States and Israel have retrogressed, with no Arab country trying to move these steps onward, with the exception of Egypt and Jordan, both of whom are the only ones to try repeatedly to find a place for the Palestinians in the negotiation process and to defend the character and existence of the Palestinians.

It appears that the alternatives today are confined to a narrow range that has no precedent. The Arabs are neither ashamed nor respectful of the Palestinians. Tunisia is a clear example of this, and Syria another. Moreover, Israel does not attach much importance to any Palestinian role, beginning from a logic of American rejection. What is left to the Palestinians? The road to individual and collective use of force is the only road open to the Palestinians. Blocked in the Arab world and strangled internationally by Israel and the United States and the effort to eliminate them physically by means of American arms in Israeli hands, they are compelled to change to violence and the use of force to remain alive in the regional and international arena.

#### Egypt and the Role Expected of It

There is no doubt that Egypt must move continually in the direction of closing the above gaps by means of the long and competent diplomatic experience for which it is well known. Recent developments require new consideration of movement toward the Arabs and toward the two superpowers and Europe, and even toward the third-world nations. Egyptian policy must aim, primarily and above all, to preserve Palestinian participation in settlement of the problem. The Palestinians are the essence of the problem, which cannot be resolved without them. Egypt is the state that can embrace, without claims or restraint, Palestinian demands. Egypt, inasmuch as it has international weight, can renew the attack with the two superpowers, and it must concentrate its efforts with the third world states.

Within all of this, Egypt must seize the initiative in the Arab world and arouse it from the deadening Arab quiescence. Arab national interest, exposed to danger, cannot await [an end to] Arab foolishness and lack of understanding and awareness. Further, Arab interest does not lead to a full and total rupture with the United States of America.

12780/13046  
CSO 4504/71



9 January 1986

## EGYPT

## DETAILED STUDY ON FORMATION OF NATIONAL FRONT

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 28 Oct 85 pp 48-54

[Article by Rida Hilal: "The National Front: Of Whom and Why?"]

[Text] To call for the creation of a national front made up of national forces and parties is still the big domestic political event which the force of recent foreign events has failed to impair.

Perhaps the reason for this is the presence of more than one objective "crisis/goal" condition for the existence of the front. On the other hand, an agreement among the "parties of the front," if reached, will lead to redrawing the party map and to altering the dynamics of political life in Egypt.

Nonetheless, the current proposal to form the front does not identify the essential "objective" of the front. Nor does it identify the "parties" of which it will be comprised. It can be said in behalf of as well as against this proposal that it is a loose suggestion subject to debate and praise or censure until the parties reach a common decision.

## How It Happened

The recent call for the creation of a national front came at the initiative of the well-known writer, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, on the pages of AL-AHRAM newspaper (6 July 1985) when he said: "It is necessary to create an able national front comprised of all national forces, all political parties, all the educated people who represent popular forces of various opinions and inclinations, and all Muslims and Christians alike to extricate the nation, themselves, and their children from the terror of strife."

The following week (13 July 1985) al-Sharqawi mentioned that the objective of the front was to "reach a common ground," adding: "All forces, regardless of their differences, agree that the nation has a right to live in peace and security before all enemies. They also agree on the need to guarantee people the right to enjoy a good life and suitable housing and agree on the government's obligation to preserve the dignity of all citizens and to guarantee them a good education, in addition to guaranteeing their right to justice, equality, and democratic freedom."



Al-Sharqawi invited the Wafd Party to undertake the formation of the front. His second choice, if the Wafd turned down the task, was Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani's group, as he called it. He urged all parties and social and political forces to prod their members everywhere to oppose those he described as provocateurs in the name of religion.

Al-Sharqawi added in a subsequent week: "The national front does not mean forming a coalition government or giving up cabinet seats for others" (AL-AHRAM, 20 July 1985). He then justified his invitation to the Wafd Party to form the front by saying that he did not invite the National Party because it is the ruling party. Therefore, he turned to the opposition parties and chose the Wafd Party because it has the most seats in the elected People's Assembly, is the oldest party after the National Party, and had experience in forming a national front in 1936 (AL-AH AM, 27 July 1985). To satisfy the other parties, al-Sharqawi delegated to the Labor Party [SLP] and the Grouping Party [NPUG] the task of calling for a unified Arab front.

### Stormy Dialogue

The first reaction to the initiative to form a national front came from the Wafd Party. An official Wafd spokesman explained that Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, in the speech he delivered during the commemoration ceremonies honoring Sa'd Zaghlul and al-Nahhas [Pasha] (23 August 1983), called for the creation of a national front. Siraj-al-Din believes that the "serious problems facing the government in the form of economic and political crises, housing, education and public sector problems, high prices, and poor public utilities cannot be remedied by any 'partisan' government because such a government fears partisan upmanship and political maneuvering." Therefore, the Wafd Party's initial position on the formation of a national front can be described as positive. Beyond that, however, the party has not touched this matter in any way and has had nothing at all, good or bad, to say about it.

The Grouping Party, in an article in AL-AHALI newspaper signed by its editor, Husayn 'Abd-al-Razzaq, rejected "the front al-Sharqawi was advocating because al-Sharqawi refused to define the enemy or the parties of the front and because the front's objectives have not been made clear." The party called for a "front against subjection, corruption, and parasitism for the salvation of national independence, the realization of democracy, and the elimination of one-party supremacy, and for putting a stop to the decline in the standard of living." He added: "And the Grouping Party is ready to work with any party or force that accepts even one of these objectives" (AL-AHALI, 28 August 1985).

Al-Sharqawi's reply to AL-AHALI was a surprise that turned the dialogue into a storm. In an article in AL-AHRAM (7 September 1985) under the headline "Do Not Believe Them at All," he said that the opinion expressed by AL-AHALI's editor-in-chief, did not reflect the views of the newspaper or the party and he added: "The left is made up of huge and broad forces at the grassroots that are not confined to one party. The newspaper does

not represent the left of the party." He went on to say: "The Grouping represents a part of the left and this part includes mercenaries who trade in beliefs just as some of the Muslim fundamentalists who trade in religion." As for his newspaper, according to al-Sharqawi, it is published with "foreign subsidies, not all of which come from leftist treasuries, but perhaps most of which comes from rightist oil treasuries."

AL-AHALI's reply in the 11 September issue came in an article signed by Mr Lutfi Wakid who emphasized that AL-AHALI's article about the call for a national front was written at the direction of the NPUG's general secretariat and central secretariat and that it was an accurate reflection of the party's position on this issue based on the general secretariat's debates.

In a subsequent development, Mr Mahmud Tawfiq, secretary general of the Egyptian AAPSO committee, in an article (AL-AHRAM 14 September 1985) entitled "The Egyptian Left and the National Front," described the Grouping as the left's foolhardy party, saying that "the national left opposes the policies and positions of the left's foolhardy party and its newspaper, particularly as it pertains to the national front issue."

The greatest irony that became manifest through the gales of that stormy dialogue was the statement made by a ranking NPUG official--whom we will interview in a future issue--that AL-AHALI's call for a front against parasitism, subjection, and corruption was within the framework of attack and counter-attack, that the party was ready to enter into a front with any party, and that the decision of the Egyptian AAPSO committee on what the committee's secretary, Mahmud Tawfiq, said reflected his personal opinion.

#### Partisan Scenario

The SLP's viewpoint was explained by Mamduh Qinawi, member of the party's supreme executive committee. It is summed up in the view that the task of setting up a front must not be entrusted to one party (the Wafd). It must be delegated to a preparatory committee representing all parties and tendencies on an equal footing, with a secretariat rather than a chairmanship that dominates from one side or another. The leading party member emphasized that the front's mission is "national salvation and not the rescue of any other situation."

On another level, SLP leader Eng Ibrahim Shukri told AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI that he was going to call for a national front for the sake of democracy at a later date.

Concerning the Muslim Brotherhood's viewpoint, Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani told AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI that he "agreed to participate in the front with conditions" and that he approved of the Wafd representing the Muslim Brotherhood in the front. He also said that the Islamic groups had agreed to be represented by him in the front.

Meanwhile, Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il, the Brotherhood's top-ranking person, told AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI that the Brotherhood was assiduously seeking to get out of the Wafd.

As for the National Party position, the party leadership had not announced, as of the date of this article, any signs of rejection or acceptance. The National Party had turned down a previous invitation by al-Sharqawi in 1983 on the pretext that it was a majority party and therefore did not need to join a front. AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI's information says that Dr Yusuf Wali used the same pretext in his talk with an opposition party personality although he did not refuse to join the front.

Observers conclude that the current position regarding the national front can be summed up in the fact that all parties feel a need for the front at this time and that the scenario of events and the reservations of the parties have given a different impression. The Wafd, despite its reservations, grabbed the invitation, then waited for the outcome of the imbroglio in the left's greater circle. The SLP demanded the formation of a front preparatory committee as a condition for its participation. The NPUG, its rejection of al-Sharqawi's front notwithstanding, did not reject the idea of a front. The Liberal Party is ready any time and the National Party is awaiting the outcome of the squabble between the various parties and also waiting to determine what concessions it will make at the policy level and at the partisan level as well. But what prevents the formation of the front?

Interview with Dr Wahid Ra'fat, Wafd Party Deputy Leader

[Question] Our first question is how much progress has the call for a national front made in Wafd Party Circles?

[Answer] Let me explain first that I shall express my personal opinion, which does not necessarily reflect the position of the Wafd Party. The Wafd Party has not yet studied this matter adequately. It has not held a special session to discuss it in the party's supreme body, perhaps because the behavior of the other parties does not encourage the examination of this matter in the aftermath of such division and of the great difference between the viewpoint of brother 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi and the NPUG, for example, and the brickbats and accusations which cannot please anyone. The idea itself is still vague despite the large number of articles by Mr al-Sharqawi.

[Question]. What is the purpose of the front in your opinion?

[Answer] The idea of the front did not come from the unknown. There is a purpose behind it. Egypt at present, and more than any other time since the 1952 revolution, is facing many problems in its various economic, financial, social, and political affairs. We are in a situation which we must not ignore or hide from the youth and upcoming generations until the year 2000. Although the late Anwar al-Sadat talked about prosperity, prosperity is way out of reach in Egypt. Conversely, many of us believe

that the future is grim and dark and that we must try as much as possible to gather ourselves in one united front around our position and search through teamwork for a solution to our problems, forgetting for a year, or for half a year or several months, all personal and partisan considerations. We import 70 percent of our wheat and our debts total \$31 billion, according to an IMF report. Add to that the problems of unemployment, education, unlimited imports, lower production, and the landlord-tenant relationship with respect to arable land and real estate.

Problems have piled up into hills or rather high mountains. The idea brother 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi put forth is the way out of this dilemma. The way out of this dilemma is not to abrogate Camp David as some people imagine. The way out of this dilemma requires the solution of all these problems. Those who demand the abrogation of Camp David are in fact demanding the abrogation of the peace treaty. Is this a safe policy at the present time?

The most important things in my view are the thorny economic issues which cannot be solved by any one party alone, assuming that what Dr 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Nimr said--a fact we do not deny--that the ruling party has the capabilities. But one hand cannot clap alone. Moreover, the other parties have other capabilities which must not be denied to the country. Our future must not be decided by one party alone, even if such a party has the capabilities.

Furthermore, it is impossible for any one party to solve these problems because the other parties will band together against it and stir up a storm against any solution in which they do not participate. This is a fact in all countries and not Egypt alone. The opposition may go overboard in its opposition and sometimes may go by the adage, "If you are not in it, make it vanish." So long as it is absent from rule, it cannot appreciate it as much as those who hold the reins of power, for the one who has his hand in the fire is not like the one who has his hand in cold water. Accordingly, it is imperative to invite the parties to participate in the solution of these problems because such a move places the public interest above any party interests, including that of the ruling party, even if it has the capabilities.

[Question] Who are the parties or the forces that form the front?

[Answer] The al-Sharqawi front is, in my opinion, a jelly-like front because Mr al-Sharqawi did not identify its parties, saying it was not limited to parties but rather included all national forces. Does that mean that it includes the Islamic extremist groups? I admit to the existence of one moderate group, the Muslim Brotherhood, represented by a big brother, Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani. But in addition to this group there are 20 other religious ones. The intelligence service says that there are over 60 religious groups. Are these the intended groups? Do we invite the moderate and extremist groups?

Do we invite the Nasirist forces? And what do these Nasirist forces represent? All these parties claim a connection with Nasirism: the



National Party, the Grouping, the Labor, and the Liberal Parties. Furthermore, the Nasirist forces are split, and what is their purpose anyway? Is it to revive the Nasir era? Are we concerned with the revival of the al-Sadat era or the Nasir era or the prerevolutionary era, or are we preoccupied at present with real problems? Hence, the front, in such an undefined jelly-like framework, will not get anywhere. The best example is what happened in Sudan where parties and unions, which constitute the ruling council, have not agreed up to now on any position because some of the unions have radical leftist, not to say communist, elements. I am not against communism, for it is a political doctrine. So, do we want a front of all forces without defining what these forces are?

[Question] Then is there some wavering in identifying the parties of the front?

[Answer] Yes, there is wavering and a lack of clarity. The Egyptian constitution is clear. For the first time, the 1980 amendment of the 1971 constitution stipulated in Article V that the Egyptian political system is a multi-party system. Prior to that, al-Sadat announced in the opening parliamentary session in February 1976 the transformation of platforms into political parties. The parties are constitutional institutions and everyone must understand that. They are not adversaries of the government, but rather complement the system of rule.

[Question] Does this mean that you limit the front's components to the existing political parties?

[Answer] I personally believe that the front will not yield any results unless we confine it to the political parties.

[Question] But there are political forces in the street who do not have parties.

[Answer] The existing parties are able to form the front without the forces in the street. The street forces include extremist tendencies such as the fundamentalist religious groups and irregular political tendencies. The group which can be dealt with is the Muslim Brotherhood. It is represented by eight deputies within the Wafd Party. This is the first time that the Brotherhood has been represented in parliament by this number.

[Question] Do you mean that the Brotherhood will join the front through the Wafd Party?

[Answer] I think so because provisions of the parties law prohibit it from forming a party. This will remain so until this law is amended to allow the Brotherhood to form a political party.

[Question] Shifting from the front's objective and parties, what form do you think the front will take?



[Answer] The idea of the front, as put forth by brother 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, is that it will be on the periphery of the constitutional institutions. However, its link to these institutions has not been defined. If the purpose behind it is to create an advisory council, we have the Shura Council, the specialized national councils, the unions, and the societies.

[Question] Mr al-Sharqawi wrote that the front will have a council whose resolutions will be binding.

[Answer] This is a constitutional mistake which no country can accept. It is not possible to recognize a front created on the periphery of the constitutional institutions that imposes its will on these institutions. This is a flagrant constitutional violation. The front must work within the constitutional framework.

[Question] Is this to be achieved through a coalition government?

[Answer] I do not say a coalition cabinet. A coalition cabinet means the distribution of cabinet portfolios among the political parties. The Wafd has been opposed to a coalition cabinet ever since the 1928 experience. What I am calling for is a "national salvation cabinet," which is different from a coalition cabinet. We do not want to be in power and do not seek power because we have been excluded for 30 years.

[Question] What do you mean by a national salvation cabinet?

[Answer] I mean that each political party must be represented in the cabinet by one minister, if even a minister of state, a minister who does not have a ministry but who takes part in discussing and solving problems and who is his party's ambassador to the cabinet and the cabinet's ambassador to his party. He conveys to the cabinet his party's opinions and solutions and keeps his party apprised of the cabinet's activities.

The object behind a national salvation cabinet is participation in governing for a specific purpose, which is to solve problems. Participation may be for 1 or 2 years, until the mission is fulfilled. It can be like a "higher policies committee" or a "mini-cabinet" in which the parties can participate. In other words, the policies committee may be transformed into a "national committee" which, besides the ruling party ministers, will include representatives from the political parties that agree to participate in the front.

[Question] How will the voting be conducted?

[Answer] The votes in the national salvation front will be weighed but not counted. The intent is not to demonstrate a majority or a minority. The aim is to arrive at an agreement of consent on the solution to any problem. The national salvation cabinet will include, besides the government (the prime minister and his deputies), a party representative (a representative from each party which agrees to participate). Every

problem will be discussed within the cabinet until an agreement on a radical solution is reached. There will be differences of opinion, but an agreement will be reached on a common position. A national salvation cabinet is something like a "panel of doctors" who gather around a patient's bed to come up with a treatment by giving individual opinions and then agree on a course of action through conviction.

A national salvation cabinet is like a mini-cabinet within a larger cabinet. Every opinion agreed upon will be referred to the larger cabinet for ratification as a solution, then to the People's Assembly if legislation is required.

With this logic, there is no fear of anyone losing a cabinet position; the ministers remain ministers. The purpose is to include the parties in solving problems. But to form an amorphous front without a constitutional or legal status but which can issue binding recommendations is an impossible proposition.

[Question] Does this mean that every party that joins the front must abandon its party platform?

[Answer] This is the difference between a national salvation cabinet and a coalition cabinet. In a coalition cabinet, a party can join the cabinet without sacrificing its party platform. In a national salvation cabinet, however, a party sacrifices its platform when it joins the cabinet. A party representative, when he joins the national salvation cabinet, sheds his party garb. For example, when debating a matter like the subsidies issue, the Wafd Party is of the opinion that subsidies must be canceled gradually over a period of 5 years, while another party believes that salaries must be raised and subsidies must be canceled and a third party believes that in-kind subsidies must be converted into money subsidies, and so on. In a national salvation cabinet, all opinions are discussed until a specific opinion is agreed upon.

Of course it is difficult to ask any party to give up its party platform on which it ran for elections. But so long as we are talking about "salvaging what can be salvaged," we must forget about party platforms.

I say that a national salvation cabinet will not solve all problems, but if we succeed in solving one-fifth of our problems it will be an accomplishment. I say to you in conclusion that the 18-19 January 1977 demonstrations showed that the ruling party cannot singlehandedly solve any major problem such as subsidies, free education, or relations with the United States and Israel after the opposition parties attacks the government because it has raised prices.

#### Dialogue About the Front

'Umar al-Talmasani, General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood

Although he is bed-ridden, he did not refuse our request for an interview, saying before and after the interview that his house is always open. The

interview, brief as it was, took place in a climate of al-Ta'i's hospitality and a preacher's forbearance in a house, as modest in location and furniture as that of the simplest Egyptian, overlooking al-Zahir Bibrus al-Bandagdari Mosque. The man did not want to overplay his simplicity and ascetic way of life.

Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani--God grant him long life--did not accuse anyone of infidelity nor did he speak ill of anyone. Rather, he defended the existence of a communist party and, on the other hand, censured the parties for their divisiveness and the exchange of insults among them. He condemned violence and criticized "the green march" and the Cairo University demonstration which was staged in reply to the Israeli aggression against Tunis. Following is the text of the interview:

[Question] What do you think about the recent call for a national front?

[Answer] I cannot perceive any benefit from a front formed by existing parties because the basic idea behind a front is to agree on specific principles among all parties for them to defend and seek to achieve. But, as you can see, the present situation, in which the SLP vilifies the NPUG and the NPUG vilifies the Wafd Party which in turn vilifies the National Party, is a sad picture, particularly since we are experiencing many crises. I have conditions for joining this front, foremost of which is that the parties refrain from tearing themselves apart. The parties have chosen to promote the principles of hatred among the different groups of people while their only concern is supposed to be the interest of the people.

I see no objection to the front if the parties agree to put aside the kind of bickering we read about in our party newspapers, after which we must agree on specific principles for all of us to defend.

The second condition is that the front be effective and influential, not just a superficial front, in the sense that it must go to the street to inspect the conditions of the people (the congregation) so that we may express their point of view.

The third condition is for the front to meet with the president of the republic once a month to submit to him monthly reports and to discuss matters it deems of benefit to the people. This does not mean that the front must be an advisory body, but there has to be a moral commitment to the front's opinions. Opinions expressed by the front must be viewed by the president, the cabinet, and the People's Assembly as the people's viewpoint.

The fourth condition is that intelligence agencies stay away from the front because our goal is the discussion of issues, not sabotage or terrorism. Otherwise, the front will be a name without substance.

[Question] Which parties, in your opinion, should the front include?

[Answer] Each party would meet to elect one or two representatives to the front and the front members would ask their parties for a truce period to discuss the country's problems.

[Question] Who will represent the Muslim Brotherhood?

[Answer] When we entered the People's Assembly, we told Fu'ad Pasha that the Wafdist is a Wafdist and the Brotherhood is a Brotherhood. The Wafd was a legitimate conviction through which we entered the People's Assembly and we will never change our principles.

[Question] Does this mean that the Wafd will not represent the Brotherhood in the front?

[Answer] There is no objection, maybe yes, maybe no. We demand the application of the Islamic Shari'ah. I have heard of Wafdist movements to oppose the application of the Shari'ah. I do not approve of those who oppose the application of the Shari'ah. I told Rif'at al-Mahjub in the People's Assembly, when he invited me to it in on a session, that the Shari'ah must be applied slowly and gradually. He always cited this opinion of mine.

[Question] Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il is supposed to have said that the Brotherhood was trying to break away from the Wafd. Is this true?

[Answer] Ask me about the Brotherhood. Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il expresses a personal opinion on general issues. This is a commendable practice in the Brotherhood which allows each person to express his opinion freely as he deems fit. But as for the Brotherhood's opinion, hear it from me, and as a responsible member, I say there is not split, no conflict.

[Question] I ask you again, do you approve of the Wafd representing you in the front?

[Answer] If it is responsible and committee.

[Question] Does that mean that you confine the front's parties to political parties?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Are there forces who are not represented in a party?

[Answer] You mean the Islamic groups and the Nasirists?

[Question] As an example.

[Answer] They include members from the Islamic groups such as Shaykh Hafiz Salamah and a shaykh from Hulwan by the name of 'Abd-al-Hamid.

I have been asked whether I would allow the creation of a Nasirist party in Egypt. I replied that I would even allow the creation of an Egyptian communist party. There is no limit to personal freedom. Unfortunately, we use the word democracy and democracy is nothing but restrictions. I

wish we used the word freedom in Islam. There is a vast difference between Western democracy and freedom in Islam.

[Question] What do you mean by freedom in Islam?

[Answer] The concept of freedom in Islam means that there are rights only the Creator could prescribe for mankind to enjoy. Democracy was contrived by people and each group of people follows in its country the form that suits it best and this is called democracy. This is nonsense.

Freedom in Islam is to do what you please within the bounds of the interests of others.

[Question] Does that mean you reject the concept of Western democracy?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Even though you filed a suit to form a party, and the multi-party system is the basis of Western democracy?

[Answer] I was compelled, and when compelled, a person resorts to difficult choices. All legal channels of expression were closed in the Brotherhood's face. I view the Brotherhood as an international group and the political parties as local groups. What a difference between local groups and international groups!

[Question] But you sought to form a Muslim Brotherhood party!

[Answer] I am in fact working to this end. I have different opinions on Islam. When I commit myself to and support a certain opinion, I use it as a basis for forming a party, but on condition that you will never hear a single improper word against a party or a leader, including the Communists.

[Question] Let me rephrase the question. From the Islamic point of view, you reject the multi-party system because it is the basis of Western democracy. Nonetheless, you are seeking to form a political party. Is this not a contradiction of your own opinions?

[Answer] Under our law, necessity permits the impermissible. If I form a party, it will be under compulsion because the only way I can get to the people and the People's Assembly is through a party.

There is a difference between doing something under compulsion and doing something by choice. Any action you take under compulsion will be abandoned at the first opportunity because you are forced to do it. The Brotherhood is an international group which speaks to the whole world and works for the good of the whole world, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Therefore, a party is not an end, but I am forced to form one. Nonetheless, I say that the parties, the ethics law, and the press laws were tailor-made for the National Party to exclude the Brotherhood.



I reiterate that the Brotherhood is an international group for Muslims as well as non-Muslims, and the relationship between me and Pope Shanudah, the Coptic leader, is extremely friendly and amicable.

[Question] What do you think about the religious groups which have proliferated recently?

[Answer] Ask me about myself. Do not ask me about others.

[Question] I am not asking you about people, I am asking you about an existing phenomenon.

[Answer] The expression religious group is a loose one. These are groups that spread Islam and the Islamic Call. And whereas some of them resort to violence, the Brotherhood does not use violence, terrorism, and sabotage because these actions can only benefit the enemies of this country. If I go out on a march from a mosque and hire people--who are found in all the countries of the world--to infiltrate it, what good would I have done? The march will turn into vandalism and the country will end up getting hurt.

[Question] Does that mean that you did not approve of Shaykh Hafizz Salamah's march?

[Answer] No, I did not approve of it at all and I expressed these feelings on the first day. Shaykh Salamah said that some friends advised him against the march so as not to give the hired people a chance to infiltrate it. I had given him this advice, saying that he would not be able to control it. The same thing goes for the recent demonstration following the Israeli aggression on Tunis. Had the Brotherhood not kept it under control, it would have turned into a battle.

[Question] Do these groups accept Mr 'Uman al-Talmasani as their representative in the front.

[Answer] This question must not be directed to me, but to them, and none of them will tell you no. We have nothing but love and good feelings for each other. However, my health does not allow me to participate because if I accept this job I will have to be faithful to it and to work hard. I do not have the strength any more and have lost my ability to read.

National Front Lexicon: The Front in Egyptian Political Movement Experience

The Egyptian political movement came to know the "national front" with the start of political organizations in Egypt near the end of the 19th century.

Although the national front concept was associated in political literature with the party phenomenon in view of the fact that a front is an agreement among a number of political parties on a specific goal, Egypt came to know "the front" before it knew the "political party." Indeed, the first Egyptian political party, the "Old National Party," came into existence

from a front between two organizations (the army organization and the Hulwan Society) under the leadership of 'Urabi. Its name reflected this fact for it was known as the people's party or the farmers' party. The party's communique (4 February 1979) reflected this same fact as well when it said: "The National Party is a non-religious political party composed of men of various ideologies and creeds and all Christians and Jews. Anyone who tills Egyptian soil and speaks its language is part of the party, irrespective of ideology. It realizes that all the people are brothers and have equal rights in politics and law."

This front, which was composed of al-Jahadiyah princes and aides, led the national struggle against the khedive until it clashed with him in September 1882.

Then Mustafa Kamil founded the National Party in 1907. Kamil said in the preface of his book, "The Eastern Question": The Khedive is the head of the National Party because he is the head of the nation and the National Party is the whole nation." In the speech he delivered during the party's dedication ceremony, he said: "A country deprived of its independence and under foreign control can only have one political party, which is the National Party, the party of freedom...the party of independence."

The National Party led the national struggle until the 1919 revolution when the Wafd emerged as an alternative to the national movement leadership.

Likewise, when the Wafd Party came into existence, it was closer to a front than a political party for its rise was based on the Egyptian delegation which was formed on 23 February 1918 by the popular agency to demand Egypt's independence. This delegation was headed by Sa'd Zaghlul Pasha and a number of personalities representing various political forces in Egypt (the Ummah Party, the National Party, the Prince 'Umar Tusun Followers, and the Copts), including Isma'il Sidqi Pasha, Mahmud Bey Abul-Nasr, Hafiz 'Afifi Bey, Mustafa al-Nahas, Sinut Hanna Bey, Georgy Khayyat and Hamad al-Basil Pasha. In a speech on 2 July 1924, Sa'd Zaghlul said: "I am not a head of a party but rather an agent of a nation." In the 1925 elections, he said: "The Wafd is running for elections not as a party but rather as an agent of the Egyptian nation." Thus, Sa'd Zaghlul was called "the leader," his home was called "the nation's home," and his wife was called "the mother of the Egyptians."

Historical evidence attests to the fact that the political party in Egypt, as was the case in a large number of African and Asian countries, began as a national front "to demand the nation's independence." It did not begin in a parliamentary framework with the aim of seeking power as was the case in the Western democracies.

After Egypt attained its formal independence in accordance with the 28 February 1922 declaration and the parliamentary experience began on the basis of the 1923 constitution, the Egyptian political movement came to know the front in the sense of a party coalition (among several parties) and a popular coalition (among several popular forces).

Historians cite three examples of this kind of front:

--The 1925 coalition between the Wafd Party, the National Party, and the Constitutional Liberals Party for the restoration of the constitution and repeal of the 1925 elections (two-tier elections).

--The 1935 national front among all the existing parties (the Wafd-the National-the Constitutional Liberals).

--The 1946 national front which was formed following the Labor and Student National Committee demonstrations demanding the abrogation of the 1936 treaty between Egypt and England. A negotiating delegation was formed from the Constitutional Liberals Party, the Sa'dists, the Wafdist Bloc, and some independents. The Wafd Party and the National Party did not join this delegation.

We will talk about these fronts in detail in future articles.

12502/9190

CSO: 4504/83

EGYPT

#### NEW PRIME MINISTER'S PHILOSOPHY OUTLINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 27 Sep 85 pp 1, 3, 7

[Interview with Prime Minister 'Ali Lutfi by Ibrahim Nafi': "Tour in New Prime Minister's Mind; 'Ali Lutfi in First Comprehensive Interview Since He Assumed Premiership: We Must Face Mistakes of Economic Policies Courageously; Palliative Approach Realizes Cheap Popularity to Which We Must Not Resort and Our Only Option Is Solution to Fundamental Problems;" date and place not specified

[Text] I met him when he was minister of finance in Dr Mustafa Khalil's cabinet. His most prominent qualities were strength, seriousness, and strictness in collecting society's dues in taxes for the benefit of the people's toiling majority.

I met him again a few days ago as prime minister and discovered that a feeling of challenge has been added to his basic qualities--a feeling emanating from his awareness of the heavy responsibility he shoulders and from his wish to do something big with which he contributes, through his cabinet, to finding fundamental solutions to many of the problems under which the citizens are straining.

As for me, the special challenge was to penetrate the boundaries of his private thoughts to discover the new prime minister's thinking on the main issues which time permits discussing.

As a result of an interview lasting 75 minutes which I wrenched from his loaded appointment list, I can discern some aspects of the new prime minister's thinking and say: He is a serious man who combines in his personality the theoretical knowledge of a university professor with the practical experience of an ex-minister, of a former expert in the economic consultation sector, and of a party official who headed the National Party's Economic Committee and whose position gave him the opportunity to put his finger on many faulty and deficient spots.

#### Nobody Can Tell You Like an Expert

The man knows everything about the problems of the Egyptian bureaucracy. He was perhaps personally burnt by its fire during his work as an adviser in the area of economic consultation.

The man has experienced all the problems of the 1980's, and he has the sincere desire to tackle the mistakes and eliminate the flaws.

The man feels closely all of the citizens' hardships and problems with the Egyptian administration, with the problem of earning a living, and with his aspiration for a better life. He has a daring heart, he is not reluctant to present what he believes to be sound and true, and he does not waver in his struggle to implement the programs and reforms he believes in. He is certainly an obstinate personality who does not submit to failure easily and who never despairs of continuing the struggle to achieve his objectives.

When I began the interview with him, he said to me: "I am responsible for everything I will say. Therefore, I ask you and public opinion to bring me to account later on for what I say now. I want people to watch me so that they may find out if I change my present ideas, and I want the others to bring me to account if I do tomorrow the opposite of what I say today."

The truth is that the word "watch" has a special significance to the new prime minister. He believes that many of our problems are due to the absence of watching or to the lack of serious watching in most cases.

There is on his desk a small notebook in which he writes in his own hand the date for the completion of any public work, for the end of a phase in a project, and for the execution of a required task and of any promise by a public official to end a problem on a certain date so that every official may be brought to account for fulfilling his promises. His primary weapon in this is an iron memory, a small notebook for following up, and a strong desire to achieve something big.

Because my interview with the prime minister was lengthy, I will be content with this brief personal glimpse of the man so that the dialogue with his ideas, projections, and programs for Egypt in the coming phase may begin.

In returning to the "roots" of the Egyptian economic problem as an essential insight to the scientific solution that governs his thinking, Dr 'Ali Lutfi cited the fundamental facts which bequeathed us all the accumulated problems from which we are suffering, including the four wars which we waged and which cost us more than 100 billion pounds, not to mention the martyrs whose dear blood cannot be priced and the reconstruction costs which strained our backs and obstructed the development of our utilities for a long time and which came in the wake of enormous military spending.

But the new prime minister's thinking does not stop at the "fateful roots" imposed by Egypt's Arabism and by Egypt's responsibility in the Arab area. It goes beyond to underline another fundamental cause behind our economic problem:

"We must face courageously mistakes that were made in past economic policies that led to the instability of those policies.

"If the 'state's economy' must be inevitably influenced by international factors and changes, then it is logical that we should not disregard the



effects of the international prices which rose abnormally in the 1970's in the wake of the October war and the burdens with which those prices saddled a country that imports more than it exports."

#### Four Phenomena

If the "scientific solution" to the Egyptian economic problem requires "diagnosing the problem" after defining "its roots," then Dr 'Ali Lutfi's thinking offers an accurate diagnosis of several flaws:

- "A flaw in the economic balance, because we consume more than we produce.
- "A flaw in saving and investment, because we invest more than we save.
- "A flaw in the state's exports and imports, because we import more than we export.
- "A flaw between cultivable land and population, if we consider the individual's share was 1 feddan during Muhammad 'Ali's rule 180 years ago, and that this share has now decreased, despite all the efforts exerted to build dams and reclaim land, to one-seventh of a feddan. This, in my opinion, is a serious flaw."

#### Where Is the Problem?

Despite all kinds of "flaws" from which the Egyptian economy suffers, these flaws could have had a less severe effect on the people's suffering with the living conditions and with the service facilities because there are other positive factors that have not yet been exploited to the desired degree--factors which represent to the economics professor a big question mark when he speaks about them:

"We have an impressive working force that proceeds daily to its work in agriculture, industry, and the services and whose annual investments in the public and private sectors exceed 700 million pounds a year. Moreover, we cultivate 6 million feddans, meaning that we have the land, the manpower, and the investments. So where is the problem? When I retreat with myself and think about Egypt as an economics professor, I imagine that there is something wrong in exploiting this available number of production elements. It is true that efforts have been exerted, that results have been achieved, and that the people have begun to feel these results. For example, there has been an improvement in traffic flow because of the construction of a large number of tunnels and bridges. Telephone services have improved, especially in Cairo and Alexandria, and the businessmen have felt the degree of improvement in international communications. But I want to be precise and careful in my words, and I do not at all claim that we have ended all the problems."

When Dr 'Ali Lutfi puts matters aright in this manner, then he must inevitably follow this by familiarizing the people with his thinking as to the cure which, he believes, can be achieved in one of two ways, of which only the second can provide a "safe option":

"The first is what we may call the palliative approach, which is an extremely dangerous approach that can lead to applause and popularity which, in my opinion, is a cheap popularity to which we must not resort.

"The second is a fundamental approach to which the new government has committed itself in tackling the problems. It suffices as an example in this regard to note that the palliative approach is used in tackling the sewerage problem. The 100-day project to repair the sewerage networks did not succeed in saving those networks which were more than 70 years old in Cairo and more than 75 years old in Alexandria. No renewals or replacements, which are required for a fundamental solution, were made on the networks, and the problem thus disappeared for a period only to reappear sharply. The new cabinet does not want to tackle problems which such an approach."

What governs the new prime minister's thinking is the "scientific approach" alone--an approach which begins, in the prime minister's words, with studying the problem and determining its dimensions and the consequences emanating from it and ends with charting the possible alternatives to find the solution to the fundamental problem.

If there is a "fundamental solution" that can be found, then this solution does not represent, in the prime minister's thinking, the "end of the road." The solution represents only the "beginning of an action" which must be taken along parallel lines, the first and most important of which is, in the prime minister's opinion:

"The Egyptian citizen's feeling of belonging and the popular participation and intrinsic efforts emanating from this feeling represent a basic element in the solution, in addition to the efforts of the government which cannot solve any problem alone. The government draws up the plans and the policies, and then every citizen has a role with which he contributes inasmuch as his feeling of belonging urges him to contribute."

It is true that the issue of belonging is extremely significant. But if the indisputable rule says that belonging emanates fundamentally from the feeling of achieving of an individual or a personal interest, in addition to public performance, then what goes on in the new prime minister's mind to revive the feeling of belonging?

### Three Main Axes

Even though Dr 'Ali Lutfi agrees with me on the soundness of the rule concerning individual interests, he views the issue from another angle which he believes we have neglected for a long time, namely, the negativism with which we have been afflicted and which has caused us to lose popular participation.

To find this lost participation, the prime minister believes that it is necessary to work along several axes:

We must abolish all the exceptions "so that every citizen may feel that he belongs to this homeland and participates in building it and so that he may, consequently, begin safeguarding the public money."

The government must begin with itself "so that it may be the model for the citizens in rationalizing spending and eliminating extravagance and waste.

"Before all this, in the prime minister's opinion, the masses must be told frankly of all the problems and the true conditions."

Such a visualization of the feeling of belonging, in addition to the individual incentive which cannot be disregarded, can actually play an effective role in implementing the government's plans and policies. It may be convenient now to move to another area in the new prime minister's thinking--an area occupied by his conception of the solutions for specific problems. Let us ask, for example, how we can deal with the small supply of foreign currency and how we can reduce spending.

One thing that Dr 'Ali Lutfi asserts is that we need foreign currency for basic uses. But at the same time, he defines several means to deal with the shortage of foreign currency.

According to the prime minister:

"In the present phase, we can achieve a further rationalization in use. Some controls have actually been issued to regulate travel abroad. What is important is that the rationalization should not affect production. I should not ban or reduce the importation of a capital commodity, meaning machinery, equipment, semiprocessed goods, or raw materials needed for industry. We also cannot ban the importation of basic foodstuffs such as wheat and flour. If there are nonessential goods which are produced locally in adequate quantities and at a reasonable price, then we say that there is no need for imports and we thus may rationalize spending.

"There are steps that can be taken to develop our foreign currency resources. Some of them are long-range steps that need time to produce results. In the short run, I believe that we should turn to the remittances made by Egyptians abroad which can help solve the problem to a large degree. I imagine that there are 3 million Egyptians working abroad. The average annual savings of each of them amount to 300 dollars, i.e., their savings amount to nearly 1 billion dollars, of which no more than one-third comes to Egypt. Why shouldn't we attract the remaining two-thirds?"

Stability...Serious Factor

There is a fundamental objective which, if achieved, can actually double Egypt's foreign currency resources which constitute an "influential factor" in tackling the economic problem.

But how?

The answer is complete in the new prime minister's thinking, with specific courses of action:

"First, we work to achieve stability in our economic policies to assure Egyptians working abroad that there is a climate in which this money in

Egypt may be received with the utmost safety. The first features of this new plan that we are preparing is that we will impose no restrictions on the incoming money and will give this money full freedom of movement and their owners the right to take it out of the country again.

"Second, we prepare feasibility studies for projects that serve the Egyptian economy and need foreign currency and then submit these studies to our sons who work abroad and explain to them the projects' profitability. In this case, they will certainly participate in these projects. I say that we are not concerned if their money does not come to us in cash. But we do want this money in the form of participation in projects, because this means the real development of the Egyptian economy.

"Third, we encourage the private sector and give it a strong boost. This was the first decision made in the first session held by the new cabinet so that we may assure our sons who work abroad that there is complete stability in our economic policies and that we encourage productive investment and give it full opportunity. We agreed to discuss in the cabinet's next session all the means through which the Egyptian private sector, whether working at home or abroad, can be encouraged. The decrees pertaining to this policy of encouragement will be issued within a month, God willing."

If achieving stability in economic policy and making this policy's features clear is the "good conducive element" leading to the development of our foreign currency resources, then can we achieve the desired clarity in our economic policies with the issuance of conflicting decrees to regulate imports and our economic and banking life? There is also a subsequent question that imposes itself: How can the Egyptian economy regain others' confidence in it? What, for example, is the government's policy concerning the free zones, and how can these zones be transformed into first-class industrial zones which fundamentally channel production toward the outside world?

#### Within Narrowest Limits

It is Dr 'Ali Lutfi's view that special free zones "must not be established except within the narrowest limits and only when there is an urgent need for them, such as an oil project in a certain area or a project in a port, i.e., when the nature of a project requires that the project be in a special free zone."

As for the public free zones, of which we have four--in Cairo, al-'Amiriyah, Port Said, and Suez--the new prime minister gives them his vote but makes a reservation concerning an important fault, namely, that all utilities and services should have been secured for these zones from the start. But it seems that because we were in a hurry to achieve an open-door economy, we expanded the establishment of such zones before providing them with all the requirements. "It is our duty now to make up for what these zones lack, so that we may give them a full boost and actually turn them into export-oriented industrial zones. But to set up commodity storage projects in these zones and then to allow these commodities to enter the country under the



pressure of need are unacceptable, because the normal situation for such zones is to work for exports and to turn them into a foreign currency source and not into a means of draining foreign currency. I will declare here clearly that we welcome any industrial project in the free zones and that we will give such projects all our facilities and assistance so that they may work for Egypt."

Now that we are confronting the reality with such frankness and openness, it must be said that it has been noticed recently that there is a degree of restraint from investment in Egypt. This has perhaps come as a result of the fact that some banks expanded their credit facilities without guarantees, of the lack of clear vision on the part of the investors, or of obstacles that make the investor ultimately run away when he reaches his wit's end. What means does the prime minister see to encourage investment in Egypt and to create new and beneficial spheres?

What is established in the prime minister's mind with utter clarity is that investment cannot take place in a void, but that it can be achieved in a certain society with a certain climate. It can be achieved with stable economic policies, laws, and regulations, and this is what is being done now. There are other influential factors which, Dr Lutfi believes, it is important to take into consideration:

- Establish certain incentives for investors, including tax and customs exemptions.
- Secure as much land as possible in the new cities for the investors to set up their projects far from Cairo's bottlenecks and its high land prices.
- Simplify the bureaucratic procedures in the departments that issue approvals for such projects, be they the Investment Authority, in case there is a foreign partner in the project, or the other authorities and ministries concerned, so that the investor may get his approval easily. All this must be coupled, in the prime minister's opinion, with an important fact of which we must not lose sight for a single moment, namely, that the investor "has a personal interest and does not come for the sake of the others. We must welcome him within the framework of the state's general plan and policy and acknowledge his right to moderate profits that encourage him to invest. For example, it is not right, in my estimate, to impose a low price on the private sector's production, because such a step will inevitably force the investor to run away."

#### Productive and Consumer-Oriented

It may be necessary at this point of the issue of investment in Egypt to cast a glance at Dr 'Ali Lutfi's mind to find out what the productive open-door economy and the consumption open-door economy mean to him, since the thin thread separating the two has not yet been adequately defined, not to mention the conflicting transactions created by the varying concepts.

The prime minister is eager to explain two points in this regard, and I agree with him on the necessity of an explanation:



"First, some may have understood the open-door economy to be confined to the private sector only. I say that when the public sector develops, then this becomes a part of the open-door economic policy. Even though development of the public sector represents to me a major issue that merits a detailed interview, I will say very briefly that this sector must be freed of the centralization of decision-making and of the need to refer to the ministry and the authority for every decision. It must be given the opportunity to replace and renew its machinery and equipment--an opportunity it was denied for a long time during the war years. Moreover, the subsidy must, in my opinion, come at the final link of the transaction when the commodity is sold to the consumer. I must not impose a compulsory price on the public-sector company, thus causing it to lose and causing its financing structure to be flawed.

"Second, the productive open-door economy does not mean that I should confine myself to the production of goods such as iron, cement, or fertilizers. No. When a project is set up for the production of consumer goods, then this also is a productive open-door economic policy. This is an issue that is not sufficiently clear to the people. If we say, for example, that we have an investment project for the production of refrigerators, then isn't this project a productive open-door economy? It is true that the plant produces a consumer commodity. But then isn't consumption the ultimate goal of production? Consumption is the basic move behind every activity. The mistake made at the outset of the open-door economic policy in the 1970's was that we greatly increased the importation of luxury goods and called this the consumer open-door economy. Such importation is undesirable in the current phase, and it has nothing to do with the open-door economic policy."

#### Opening up to Tourism

The explanation Dr 'Ali Lutfi offered of his view for encouraging tourism in Egypt also falls within the concept and framework of open-door economic policies.

Does Dr 'Ali Lutfi believe that there is truly tourism in Egypt and that tourism has its tangible place on the investment map, a place with which it may be said that tourism has gotten its share? It was necessary to move closer to the man's thinking about this source that is rich with foreign currency and that gives meagerly to Egypt despite Egypt's enormous tourism potential which most tourist countries lack.

There is, of course, tourism in Egypt. But when the number of tourists is within 1 million a year, then this is, in the new prime minister's viewpoint, a totally unreasonable and unacceptable figures, especially when we note that 41 million tourists visit Spain each year, although Spain's population does not exceed 39 million, i.e., the number of tourists is bigger than the population. In Italy, the figure is close to 30 million tourists a year. "I believe that America and Florida [as published] receive the same number each year. This is happening even though all the mainstays of tourism are available in Egypt, including a temperate climate, historical sites that exist in no other part of the world, and prices that are relatively much

lower than the prices in other countries. Despite all this, we find an excess of hotel capacity. Let us speak frankly. It is true that the plan's target in the tourism sector has not been achieved. I believe that my colleague Dr Fu'ad Sultan is an economist who will give the tourism sector a strong boost. He has begun to study the problem of the money-losing public-sector hotels that are run by Egyptian management and study the means to turn them into profitable hotels. We must find the ideal answers to all the questions the president raised in Aswan as to why Egyptian management is not as good as, or even better than, foreign management."

#### Prices Are Issue of All

It is certain that this entire tour in the prime minister's thinking on the dimensions of the economic problem with all its tributaries and challenges and with all the possible courses to eliminate its influence on daily life must lead us to the issue that concerns all, namely, the issue of wages and prices and of the strain-producing contrast between them.

Insofar as prices are concerned, the economics professor who heads the cabinet does not dwell long on the conventional local and international causes that lead to higher prices but goes beyond to underline an important fact concluded by past studies conducted by the university--the fact that one-third of Egyptian society represents people with limited incomes who alone suffer the hardship of rising prices. This is in contrast with other groups with high incomes, not to say wages, who benefit from rising prices. A professional may raise his fees by 30 percent if the prices rise by 10 percent, and a craftsman may double his fees for the smallest increase in prices. Under the pressure of the need for such a craftsman's services and because of the emigration of some craftsmen to the Arab countries, people are compelled to pay what he demands. "It may be said that the classes we describe as those with a limited income may have incomes from sources other than wages. A government or public-sector employee or a retiree may have some cultivable land or may own several shares in a project or a number of investment certificates. But I know that the overwhelming majority of these people who represent one-third of Egyptian society suffer from the hardship of high prices."

If Dr 'Ali Lutfi were heard expressing opinions on tackling high prices before assuming the premiership, and if a question were raised now by public opinion as to the extent of his readiness to implement those opinions, then Dr Lutfi's clear viewpoint would be: "Those are my personal opinions, and I cannot now compel all my colleagues the ministers to accept them. There is the Council of Ministers, the Policies Committee, the National Party, and the People's Assembly. Some of the tendencies I expressed require the promulgation of laws. I will say that I will present the opinions I expressed before assuming responsibility before all these institutions and that we will discuss and debate them democratically so that we may choose the best means to control prices in the shortest time possible."

## Steps on Path

This democratic approach which governs Dr 'Ali Lutfi's steps does not prevent him from crystallizing in his mind several courses of action which he takes to the study channels. "The distribution outlets must be increased in number, with the right to choose the outlet sites reserved for the government. Dr Yusuf Wali issued a decree calling for delivery of the entire production of the Ministry of Agriculture and of the companies under its control to the Ministry of Supply and for abolishing the auctions that contribute to raising prices by a large degree, especially in essential commodities such as fruits and vegetables of which nearly 200 tons are now delivered to the Ministry of Supply each day. We agreed to increase this quantity of 300 tons and to impose strict control on the markets under the canopy of a voluntary price that does not lead to concealing the goods.

"The tendency is to set up sound consumer cooperatives and not cooperatives similar to the currently existing ones in which the management cost is high and the service standard is low. I hope that there will be real cooperation through which the citizens get to own the cooperatives and through which the commodity moves from the producer to the actual consumer directly and without any middlemen. What I mean is that we can raise the service to a level that is better than the admirable service level in the supermarkets which have spread recently.

"It is very important to eliminate the loss and waste in all the production and distribution phases. Some studies have proven, for example, that more than 30-40 percent of the tomato crop is lost to us because of poor packaging and transportation. This reflects necessarily on tomato prices and available quantities, and it compels us to import goods for hard currency. Thus, the interconnection between the problems becomes obvious.

"It is also of maximum importance to use modern technology in agriculture. Experimentation in the use of this technology in Egypt has begun with the so-called agricultural vehicles which yield eight times the conventional production. It is true that each costs 4,000 pounds, but they produce abundantly and solve a big problem. There is also no alternative to increasing land reclamation from 150,000 feddans to at least 200,000 feddans a year to be added to the productive cultivable land. Thank God that the previous cabinet was alert to the problem of cultivable-soil removal and the problem of construction on cultivable land and banned these practices."

Insofar as wages are concerned, the new prime minister acknowledges that the wage level is low. But he does not see it as sharply low as some portray it to be. "When we mention the salary of a university graduate or of a general director, we note the salary solely without mentioning the other cash benefits, such as overtime pay, expense accounts, professional allowances, awards, incentives, and grants given more than once a year. But after all this, I still say frankly that the wages are low. I will also say frankly that any minister of finance can double the wages overnight by putting the money printing press into operation for 2 hours. But this would be tantamount to sabotaging the Egyptian economy which is like a building with an escalator

and a lift. Should the wages jump on the escalator, the prices beat them by taking the lift. There will also be an increase in the purchasing power not countered by an increase in production. Therefore, raising the wages is a demand to which there is no objection, provided that the raise is calculated, gradual, and compatible with the increase in production."

#### Tax Rates Are Enough...But

"A confrontation like this with the wage and price issue leads automatically to another issue related to it, namely, how to achieve a fair tax that does not increase the price burden, that diminishes wages only by a reasonable degree, and that curtails what I view as the most dangerous and serious problem, meaning the forms of tax evasion whose methods are mastered only by those who benefit from high prices?"

The situation may seem very reassuring to the common people when Dr 'Ali Lutfi says that the current tax rates in Egypt are reasonable and that they are neither too low nor exaggerated but that the major problem lies, in his opinion, in tax evasion.

"I had to grapple with this evasion when I was minister of finance. When we compare the yield on taxes with the national product, taking into consideration the exemptions, we find that this yield is meager. It is completely obvious that those with large incomes evade the payment of taxes, either totally by failing to submit tax statements--with some of them perhaps never entering the tax offices and not even knowing what their addresses are--or partially by submitting statements concealing some of their income and exaggerating their expenses.

"The effective means to cure tax evasion are not absent from the prime minister's mind:

- Taking steps by the government to steer away from excessive spending which generates in the citizen the feeling of a lack of responsibility and which makes tax evasion attractive to him because the government does not spend the tax money well.
- Completing the on-the-spot survey of the tax community, which is something I started in 1980.
- Introducing comprehensive development into the Tax Agency to include within its framework the use of computers and the systems of keeping files on microfilm.
- Spreading awareness among the citizens by way of all the information media and through an enlightenment campaign that entrenches in the citizens' minds the concept that the taxes they pay end up in benefits for their children.

"There is no doubt that the services represent one of the most important aspects of the tangible yield for which the taxpayer looks before anything else. Therefore, the question is: How can the government tackle with



practical solutions that the president spelled out in his letter of designation to the ministers, including the achievement of a greater accomplishment in popular economy housing in particular and the introduction of necessary development in education?"

#### Economical Housing Is Basis

The new prime minister fully believes that the problem of housing in Egypt lies in economical housing. "This is definitely a good beginning toward a cure. The solution begins, in my assessment, by securing the construction materials, including cement, iron, lumber, and glass. We will study how to boost our production of these basic materials. Along a parallel line, we are studying with Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah how the armed forces can help us by supplying the trained labor in which we are experiencing a shortage and whose wages are high. I have seen for myself in the 6 October City how disciplined is the labor trained by the armed forces. Before we do this, it is necessary to secure the lands supplied with utilities."

However, Dr 'Ali Lutfi's thinking turns with strong interest to tackling the many deficient aspects that have surfaced in the housing cooperatives. "It is my assessment that it has become necessary to introduce them into the computer, to examine their memberships, and to examine the cases where a member has obtained more than one apartment by taking advantage of the cooperative loans and using the name of more than one member of his family to get such loans."

In viewing the reality of education in Egypt, Dr 'Ali Lutfi does not imagine that we have serious education when 50 or 60 students are crowded in a classroom. "When we find schools operating in two shifts and some in three shifts, nobody can be pleased with this. It is my opinion that we must universalize the system of a full day of study and that we must have an athletic and cultural program and a program for gardening, for example. Education is not just stuffing the student's minds with data."

#### Ministerial Harmony a Must

We may perhaps say that the first step in any cabinet's success in achieving all these tasks, not to mention the success of every cabinet member which is attributed to the entire cabinet, is the presence of what is called ministerial harmony. A clear vision of how the ministers are to work as a harmonious team becomes a must here.

Dr 'Ali Lutfi fully agrees with me on the need to achieve this ministerial harmony. Consequently, he has translated this into something like a covenant or a code on which he agreed with his minister colleagues in the first session the cabinet held. This covenant includes 16 points, foremost of which are cooperation and coordination between all the ministers so that they may work as a complete team. The prime minister was successful when the first utterance he made to his colleagues, to whom and to whose history he is tied by a firm acquaintance, was:



"I am not the boss of the ministers. I am the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and I head the council's session once a month."

Then there was agreement that differences of opinion and viewpoint are likely. But when we agree on an opinion after discussing it democratically, then the minority should respect the majority's opinion and only a united voice must issue from the cabinet.

#### Party and Government

Finally, the tour in the new prime minister's mind may become complete with a pause focusing on the public's questions concerning his visualization of the relationship between his cabinet and the National Party and his view of the opposition parties and of their constitutional role. The political view can thus complement the economic view in confronting those who say that 'Ali Lutfi's cabinet represents a partisan government, meaning that this cabinet is governed by the restricted view that is confined to the party's interests only. Dr 'Ali Lutfi asserted that his is the government of the 49 million people, regardless of how different their creeds and opinions are, as long as we have accepted the irrevocable democratic system. "I even believe in the need to attain the highest levels of democracy. Regarding the relationship with the constitutional institutions, I say in my capacity as the prime minister that it is a very good relationship.

"My colleagues and I will try to attend the largest number possible of the sessions of the People's Assembly and of the Consultative Council in order to entrench the relationship between the government and the legislative authority."

Regarding the relationship with the party, the prime minister, who was chairman of one of the party's committees, believes that the party has to play a major role in the coming phase in studying the problems and in proposing alternative solutions. "I will be as careful as possible to attend the meetings of the party's committees and the political club will again meet once every 2 weeks to discuss the problems so that there may be complete cohesion between the party and the government."

As for his view of the opposition, it is founded on accepting tolerantly the criticism the opposition voices. "I will never be annoyed with criticism, regardless of what kind it is. This is a new task to which I invite my colleagues, the chairmen of the parties, and the chief editors of the partisan papers. I will meet with them on numerous occasions because I respect counteropinions." However, the new prime minister warns, and his warning is in place, against wasting time between the attempts of some opposition parties to pursue mistakes and the attempts of a party that has gained power democratically to answer the opposition. The man believes that there is a more beneficial approach that must prevail in Egypt's democratic system--an approach whereby cooperation is established between the ruling party and the opposition parties immediately upon conclusion of the elections. This does not mean that the government should approve everything. But it means precisely an objective criticism of the policies and revelations of corruption,

supported by documents, especially if an issue concerns the reputation or integrity of individuals. Every citizen is entitled to preserve his dignity which we must safeguard and protect out of a belief that a man is innocent until proven guilty. "If the opposition happens to have at any time studies and research dealing with a national issue, then I welcome the opening of an objective dialogue with the opposition on such an issue. My belief in debating counteropinions is bound by no limits."

8494/13046  
CSO 4504/41

EGYPT

## PRIME MINISTER'S COMPLAINTS BUREAU LAUNCHES ACTIVITIES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by 'Abd-al-Nasir Salamah: "Bureau at Premiership To End Investors' Problems; How Are 48 Complaints Discussed in 28 Hours?"]

[Text] The new bureau formed by the prime minister and attached to his office has begun its task of receiving the investors' complaints. Within 2 days, the bureau received 48 complaints. Bureau officials put an immediate end to some problems and referred the others to the prime minister for a decision.

To start with, Prime Minister Dr 'Ali Lutfi said that we work constantly to encourage the private sector and give it a strong boost. This is why he held several meetings with businessmen in Cairo and Alexandria, with the Union of the Chambers of Commerce, with egg and poultry producers, and with prominent merchants to encourage Egypt's private sector.

Rif'at Mutawa', director of the new bureau, said that all these meetings had to be crowned with the creation of the cabinet's complaints bureau, which is under his supervision, so that it may provide a decisive end to all the investors' complaints in Egypt because we are always committed to caring for the producers in the public and private sectors by facilitating their affairs. The creation of the bureau is a step in facilitating the investors' affairs. It may be an important step because its objective is to invite the investors to embark on more projects. The bureau is also a serious step toward solving these problems because the bureau's workers are researchers engaged in developing the procedures when such procedures do not keep pace with the times. They submit proposals for development and after these proposals are presented to the authorities concerned, they take the legal course to bring about change.

### "Requests Bureau"

As to whether this bureau is another example of the complaints bureau of the Investment Authority, Rif'at Mutawa' said:

The bureau is primarily a requests bureau. Its workers are researchers who specialize in all fields in which investors engage and they are experienced in this sphere. This is why we study every request independently and exert efforts to overcome the obstacles about which each investor complains by contacting the authority concerned, be it a ministry or another agency. This is why the bureau has been put under the prime minister's control.

As for the complaints and requests received by the bureau, they amounted to 22 on the first day and 26 on the second day, all complaining either about general problems, such as telephones, water, utilities, and bank interest rates, for example, or about special problems concerning investors, such as customs fees, electricity, marketing, and other areas. We exert efforts to solve every problem in the shortest time possible. But if the complaints pertain to general problems, we exert efforts to issue decrees to end such problems after presenting the complaints to the prime minister.

Rif'at Mutawa' added that despite his heavy workload, the prime minister devotes some of his time each day to discussing these requests with the bureau's management and to formulating complete solutions for them so as to make things easier for the investors. The bureau works each day from 0800 to 1300 to receive complaints either by telephone on numbers 553791, 547370, 547376, and 547377 or to have them delivered by hand to its offices at the premier's premises. Big facilities have been arranged to receive the investors.

#### What Do Investors Say?

At the premier's complaints bureau, 'Ali Mahmud Riham, owner of an investment project, said in his complaint: I am listed in the exporters register and I was the biggest exporter of bees honey in the Middle East for 4 years. My prices were nearly 600 dollars per ton higher than the prices established by the Price-setting Committee. I opened in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia markets that had not existed before. I set up in Egypt a plant for the production of honey processed by evaporation so that it may not congeal because the Arab citizen believes that sugar is used in congealed honey. This is the secret of my success. My exports have yielded half a million pounds, I always observe the country's interest because I represent Egypt commercially in foreign trade. I could have concealed this money in any country and could have sold it on the free market without having to pay taxes for it. But I rejected this and I have paid all the taxes, customs fees, and other fees I owe. My problem is that after I exported 40 tons of honey to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1981, Iraq hit some naval targets in the Gulf and maritime traffic was interrupted. The last ship loaded with goods sailed back to Cyprus and was delayed there for nearly 5 months after which the goods were delivered damaged to the merchants in Kuwait who refused to collect them and who demanded that I repay them their money in dollars, amounting to nearly 12,000 pounds. At the time, the dollar was priced at 83 piasters but the merchants now want their dollars at the current price of 135 piasters a dollar. So I have come to the premier's bureau to solve my problem. Otherwise, I will have to pay 9,000 pounds more than I should, not to mention the fact that the merchants have sued me and that the litigation has cost me nearly 7,000 dollars so far.

Mahmud 'Abd-al-Rahim, the prime minister's information adviser, said: All the requests and complaints we received in the past 2 days have been presented to the prime minister on the spot so that they may be ended immediately. The most important characteristic of these complaints so far is that they are private complaints. For example, an investment firm for the production of canned goods complained that the taxes on canned goods are high and demanded that it be treated in the same way as the public-sector companies.

In another case, the owner of a private-sector investment firm for the production of eggs requested that water be supplied to his project at state expense. A number of investors also requested meetings with the prime minister to present to him ideas on new projects.

#### "Interest in Other Offices"

Al-Sayyid Yusuf al-'Abd, first secretary of the People's Assembly's Proposals and Complaints Committee, said that the creation of the investors' complaints bureau at the cabinet adds a new dimension to the prime minister's profound interest in discussing a fundamental issue connected with the future development of a sector whose contribution has become indispensable in the current phase. He added that for this experiment to achieve its main objective in all spheres, the prime minister must codify the procedures stipulated in the constitution for filling complaints so that it may become possible to take advantage of the complaint offices in the ministries, agencies, and authorities and so that the complaints may not become a burden on the executive agencies. This requires that the other complaint offices be bolstered with energetic scientific capabilities and their workers granted the right to find out the truth by all means of investigation so that when numerous complaints come from other sectors the prime minister is not compelled to set up for them special complaint offices in the cabinet and so that the complaints offices of the ministries, authorities, and agencies may not be turned into a mere administration for the referral of complaints until the party complained about is reached. These offices will thus lose their significance and will become a factor in shaking the citizens' confidence in them. These offices should also be given the power to propose the decision on the problems or complaints presented to them.

The first secretary of the Proposals and Complaints Committee wondered: Why isn't open house day restored to every executive official so that he may be able to familiarize himself with the true nature of the problems, thus helping to make the right decision?

8494/7051

CSO: 4504/63



MAURITANIA

MAURITANIAN PRESIDENT SAYS ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS NOW FREE

LD132234 Paris International Service in French 1245 GMT 13 Dec 85

/Interview with Mauritanian President Maayouia Ould Taya with unidentified correspondent; date and place not given--recorded/

/Text/ President Maayouia Ould Taya of Mauritania arrived only yesterday in Paris. Before coming to France, he had to preside over the ceremonies marking the first anniversary of his coming to power. On this occasion, Colonel Ould Taya announced an amnesty covering several political prisoners. First, I asked him why, in his opinion, is the French-African summit important, before asking his questions on political prisoners:

/Ould Taya/ The French-African summit is a summit for consultations. It is therefore an excellent occasion for me to meet a great many African heads of state, as well as President Mitterrand, to discuss with them problems concerning Africa, each of our countries, and even important international problems.

/Unidentified correspondent/ You have spoken about the Sahara with the president?

/Ould Taya/ It had talks with the president on relations between France and Mauritania, and so how would it have been possible to mention Western Sahara? First and foremost there were the problems concerning cooperation between France and Mauritania.

/Correspondent/ Mr President, are there still political prisoners in Mauritania?

/Ould Taya/ No, there are no political prisoners left in prisons. Two days ago we freed the last five, who were convicted for crime against the internal and external security of the state. This is proof of our good will.

/Correspondent/ And as far as former President Ould Haidala is concerned?

/Ould Taya/ He is well treated; he is under arrest in a villa inside the country.

/Correspondent/ How have relations developed with Morocco, Algeria and Libya in the past year?

/Ould Taya/ Relations are good with Algeria since we have proceeded from the accord of concord and fraternity. With Morocco, you know that we resumed diplomatic relations in 1985; our relations are developing favorably. Our relations are tangibly improving with Morocco. They are developing with Algeria. With Libya, our relations are now very correct.

/12228

CSO: 4500/47

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

AGREEMENT WITH LIBYA--Rabat--Morocco and SPLAJ signed today at noon at the Bank of Morocco in Rabat an agreement aimed at establishing a new system for payment between the two countries in order to facilitate the exchange operations and consolidate the commercial exchanges between them. The agreement was signed from the Moroccan side by Mr Ahmed Benani, the governor of the Bank of Morocco, and from the Libyan side by Mr Rajab Abdallah al-Misallati, the governor of the Central Bank of Libya. The signing took place with the attendance of Mr Abdelouahed Radi, the secretary general of the Arab African Union. [Excerpt] [Rabat MAP in Arabic 1530 GMT 21 Nov 85]

/9604

CSO: 4500/37

TUNISIA

MZALI DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH LIBYA, ISRAELI RAID

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 21 Oct 85 p 6

[Interview with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali by Shawqi Mallasi: "Mohamed Mzali: Al-Qadhdhafi's Radios Urge Army To Rebel"]

[Text] Hours before his departure for the Italian capital, Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali paid a visit to South Tunisia, during which he met with a number of journalists who heard from him a detailed disclosure about the latest developments in Tunisia and about Tunisia's crisis with Colonel al-Qadhdhafi. On the plane heading south, colleague Shawqi Mallasi had the opportunity to interview the prime minister, who kindly answered AL-DUSTUR's questions in this concentrated and brief interview:

[Question] You pointed out in your latest press conference that Tunisia has made a decision to rely on itself. Does this mean that Tunisia will actually follow this course?

[Answer] Tunisia will continue to rely on itself, and it will try harder than ever before to make this reliance complete. We exert ceaseless efforts to achieve this goal.

[Question] You also noted that you reject the reports of some experts. Does this mean the World Bank and the IMF experts?

[Answer] Those meant are some experts who make theoretical reports which at times lack a knowledge of the country's reality, since some reports cover purely economic considerations and lack the social or political dimension, and since they may result in trouble for some governments.

[Question] You have linked the green revolution with defending the country and said that this revolution is the oil that cannot be depleted. We beg you to give us some explanations on this issue.

[Answer] Oil wealth is a gift from God. But it is not a lasting gift. We rely on agriculture and agricultural investment and on the level of the Tunisian cadres and workers. This is why we are reclaiming vast areas of land, and by creating a kind of wealth through which we can enable people to settle on their fathers' lands, we can achieve self-sufficiency and can also produce for export. This wealth will last and will be a source of stability, sufficiency, and prosperity.

[Question] Don't you find a connection between al-Qadhdhafi's plots against Tunisia and the Israeli raid?

[Answer] The Israeli raid has caused Tunisian public opinion, which was pained and was unanimous on the need to be alert and to confront all manifestations of Libyan aggression, to focus its efforts on confronting Israeli aggression. Regrettably, Libyan aggression persists in the meantime. The proof of this is that the Libyan radios continue to urge the army and other Tunisians to rebel and rise up against the regime. If we were united, Israel would not dare attack any Arab country. But Libyan policy has weakened the Arab ranks.

[Question] How true are the reports that Libya has modern radar that enables it to detect the Israeli aircraft half an hour before they reached Tunisia?

[Answer] I have no information on this issue. This may be true. However, what is known is that the Italian military authorities declared that the Israelis jammed the Italian radar.

As for the Libyans, they of course have their radar, and I don't know what happened to it.

[Question] Al-Qadhdhafi is rejected by the Libyan people, and he holds hostile positions toward Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, and other Arab countries. What are the forces that help him stay in power?

[Answer] Al-Qadhdhafi's rule is a despotic rule. There is no democracy in Libya, and al-Qadhdhafi's regime relies on intimidation and the logic of force.

[Question] Is there a foreign force supporting him?

[Answer] I don't know. However, his behavior and his attempts to divide the Arab nation and to plant chaos in its ranks help, of course, the Arab nation's enemies, regardless of whether he wants to or not.

[Question] In light of your experience with Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's regime, what can you tell your Sudanese brothers?

[Answer] I greet my brothers in Sudan, and I beseech God to help them solve their social and economic problems. I know that the Sudanese people are a proud people rich with patriotism. This is an asset that is likely to protect them from all foreign attempts.

8494/13046  
CSO: 4504/69



TUNISIA

BRIEFS

MUP MEMBER ARRESTED--The Popular Unity Movement (MUP) issued a communique in which it revealed that Abderrahman Abid, a member of the movement's political bureau, had been arrested as of last Tuesday. The movement's sources say that they do not know the reasons for his arrest. [Text] [Tunis AL-SABAH in Arabic 15 Nov 85 p 2] /7358

PASSPORT THEFT ARREST--AL-ANWAR has learned that the Moroccan police recently arrested a young Tunisian man who was carrying two Tunisian passports. He confessed that he had stolen three other Tunisian passports and had intended to falsify them. He also confessed that he "works" within a network that specializes in falsifying passports. The arrested man is 29 years old, is married, and lives in the suburb of Bardo. [Text] [Tunis AL-ANWAR AL-TUNISIYYAH in Arabic 10 Nov 85 p 5] /7358

CSO: 4504/111

ISRAEL

AIR FORCE COMMANDER INTERVIEWED ON TUNIS RAID

Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew 9 Oct 85 pp 5, 6

[Interview with Brigadier Lapidot, Air Force Commander: "I Do Not Believe There Can Be a Counterattack Like Our Operation;" date and place not specified]

[Question] How were the pilots selected for the operation?

[Answer] We do not have a special selection process for these missions. When a squadron is assigned a mission, its pilots carry it out. Within the squadron, there are pilots who have more and less seniority. We take into account the expertise of the pilots with the various weapons systems. Not all the pilots of the squadron are necessarily skilled in all kinds of weapons. The pilots chosen for this mission did not have special training but were, rather, ones with a lot of combat experience. This time they did not endanger themselves in order to provide experience for young pilots.

[Question] Did you train according to any particular pattern?

[Answer] We made all the necessary preparations to assure as successful an operation as possible.

[Question] There was no day of training?

[Answer] There were many preparations in many areas. The mission was very successful from a technical point of view. Efficiency was very high, and there were no problems or mishaps. All this did not happen by chance but as the result of very serious planning.

[Question] Doesn't a mission like this reveal a system? And could we not use an operation like this in another situation such as a war?

[Answer] A certain amount of exposure goes on in every military action. The dilemma for those who make operational decisions is which combat methods and systems to choose so as not to reveal very sensitive and important things. In the area of basic decisions, the question is whether carrying out a mission is justified in light of the fact that there will be some kind of exposure like this afterwards. This dilemma always exists during relatively

quiet times and less in wartime. At times, the value of certain missions during quiet periods is even greater than similar missions in wartime. In those cases, the soul searching is not very intense. Those who make the decisions do so after considering every angle. In this case, I hope that in the final analysis, not too much will be revealed.

[Question] Were there options for escape?

[Answer] That is part of the basic science of combat. We have two important principles in planning operations. The first is that we do not leave combatants in the area. If it happens that a pilot has to abandon his plane, we do everything to get him home as soon as possible. The second principle is really the secret of good planning and involves analyzing all kinds of foreseeable and imaginable developments and coming up with appropriate answers for every possible development.

[Question] Did you run into any opposition at the time of the mission?

[Answer] Generally, no.

[Question] Are we safe from similar kinds of surprise attacks?

[Answer] In my estimation, they cannot carry out the kind of operations that we can. You cannot compare the Israeli Air Force with other air forces in our region, either from the point of view of strike capacity or in terms of defense of the nation's skies. Still, we cannot absolutely promise that there will never be any infiltration from the air.

[Question] Was there radio communication with the forces?

[Answer] Communication with participating forces is an established principle in every operation. And in this mission, too, we were in communication with the forces.

[Question] What were the main difficulties for the mission?

[Answer] What stood out in this operation was the distance from home--1,300 miles. That is the longest range for an Israeli air attack, more than twice the distance of the operation which destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor. This fact creates complicated operational problems. An example of this is fueling of the planes. The flight is very long, and there must be refueling in the air. This is a delicate and not at all simple operation with a potential for mishaps which may cause a foul-up in the action and even force the plane to return home without fuel. Second, flying planes for such an extended period has the potential of problems with the plane's systems. The plane is an extensive system of delicate and complex subsystems. Third is the length of time for pilots in the air. A combat pilot is not accustomed to carrying out such extensive battle objectives. Such a flight represents a big effort. The people are likely to be in a less than a maximally alert state. Fourth are problems of control. Difficulties grow proportionally to the square of the distance.

[Question] Perhaps you can draw a bit of a comparison between the attack on Baghdad and that on Tunis?

[Answer] I can compare several objective parameters. The distance of the flight to Tunis was more than twice the distance to Baghdad. In the current flight, the planes flew over the sea, whereas the flight to Baghdad was over enemy territory. The reactor in Baghdad was heavily guarded by a system of ground-to-air missiles, which were in an advanced state of readiness. This was not the case in Tunis.

9348/13046

CSO: 4423/29

ISRAEL

ARIEL SHARON REMEMBERS UNIT 101

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 2 Oct 85 pp 19-21

[Article by Hanokh Shinman: "101 Now: Sharon Remembers"]

[Text] The week that Minister Sharon proposed attacking terrorist units in Jordan was also the 32d anniversary of several of the most famous reprisals of Unit 101, which Sharon established and commanded. Hanokh Shinman sat in Sharon's office for 3½ hours and listened to him recalling episodes from that period, during which his star began to rise. It was very clear that it would be difficult for him to relate impassively to what he sees as obvious similarities between then and now.

In August 1953, Arik Sharon, then 24 years old, left the university, donned an army uniform once again, and accepted command of a new unit established by the IDF--Unit 101. The unit, which numbered no more than 45 men, carried out a few dozen missions. Despite this, and despite the fact that it existed for only 5 months (in January it was dismantled and became part of the paratroops), its powerful influence on the IDF, which was in its formative years, is unquestionable. Some see it as the catalyst for the revolution in the IDF's principles of combat.

BAMAHANE went to Sharon to hear what he had to say today about what happened then. When it comes to 101, his senses sharpen. Thirty-two years later, he remembers the period in exquisite detail, dwells on minutiae, reconstructs fleeting thoughts. One is used to speaking of the present and the future with Sharon. For 3 hours we spoke of the past while keeping in mind its clear and direct connection with the present.

The office of Sharon, minister of commerce and industry, is located in Flass House on Agron Street in Jerusalem. At the time of the Mandate, this beautiful building was the most elegant hotel in Jerusalem. Sarah, the minister's secretary, cleaned up for a long time before the interview. "After all, you are going to talk about the 101." The time was 3:30 pm, the heat that raged outside was not noticeable in the air-conditioned room. There was a photograph of Sharon in his youth on one wall.

After stretching out on the huge director's chair, he began to recount his version of the story of 101. It is hard to say that he spoke with caution.



His words poured out in a torrent of freshness and vitality. Through his perspective, the picture was painted in vivid colors. He went over things 4 or 5 times to make sure that he was completely understood.

Unit 101 was presented as an ideal model, the peak of perfection. He vigorously resisted any attempt to refute this myth. "The same principles which guided me then still guide me today," he declared.

Sharon admitted that the IDF did not start in 1953 when he established Unit 101. "The IDF was a big army during the Independence War, but it entered a difficult period immediately after." He described the groundwork which paved the way for the unit. "From 1949-1953 there was a very big wave of Palestinian Arab terrorist activity. Arab terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It is not an outgrowth of the war in Lebanon. Arab terrorism is already 100 years old."

Sharon began to speak of this in a subdued tone of voice, then gradually raised his voice, and when he reached the climax he slammed his fist on the table. "In 1953," Sharon said, "there were more than 3,000 penetrations which, at that time, were called infiltrations. We are speaking of hundreds of Jews killed, the majority citizens." Sharon continued to stand by these numbers, even when I cited sources which say that there were hundreds of penetrations during the years 1949-1953 and only 124 Israeli casualties and not all of them deaths. "The problem," said Sharon, "lay in the capability of the terrorists to enter from Jordan in one day, carry out a murderous strike the evening of the second day, and, that night, to cross the border back to an area under Jordanian control. The IDF was unable to respond to this problem. There was no defensive solution to the Green Line, which measured hundreds of kilometers. Even today, if the border were the Green Line, we would be unable to seal it hermetically."

Sharon described the failures in the attempts to stop the wave of terror. "The response to the killings involved presenting protests to the United Nations and to the committees on arms control. This was useless. Defensive measures were also adopted, ending in failure. There were no units able to carry out appropriate retaliatory actions." The solution to the problem of penetration, in Sharon's opinion, was deterrence and only deterrence. This is also the approach he supports today.

The official proposal to establish an attack force to carry out deterrent actions came from Col Mishal Shaham, commander of the Jerusalem brigade. Sharon was in the middle of study leave from the army. He was preparing for exams between the 1st and 2d years in History and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Shaham persuaded him to establish and lead the strike force.

Arik agreed immediately. "I had no hesitation. When it came to security, my upbringing had taught me that nothing was as important, including university studies, no matter how strong my desire to learn was. And I want to point out that I enjoyed the life of a student very much after long, hard years of filling various positions in the army." The commando unit that

he established was called "Unit 101" after the famous American paratroop unit.

I asked Sharon what would have happened if Shaham had not asked him to establish the unit.

"It was no accident that Shaham turned to me. He knew that I was not sitting around studying without a care but that I was following the deteriorating situation. I saw the danger in the growing terrorist activity as it accumulated successes. Shaham knew, from many conversations we had had, that I had the feeling that the situation could be overturned. He knew that I felt I was the right person to organize missions and actions which would stop the Arab terror. So if they had not called on me at that time, they would have done so later. And even if they had not called me at all, I do not think I could have continued to watch from the sidelines. I would have found a way on my own."

Under Arik's command, the 101, composed by and large of kibbutz and moshav members, carried out successful retaliatory actions against Arab objectives, usually villages from which the infiltrators came. For a long time, this would be the most famous unit in the IDF, a myth representing devotion to a goal, readiness to sacrifice, not leaving wounded on the battlefield, and the saying, "Follow me." These principles of battle were to be passed on to paratroopers as a permanent legacy.

What was Sharon after? What was the goal of the unit? "It was clear to me that there had to be a unit which those who assign military objectives could count on to carry out those objectives completely and successfully. This would eliminate those episodes where soldiers would go out and fire a few rounds from a distance and go back home. Instead, someone would take charge and carry out the operation."

Sharon imbued the unit with two principles. One--after every murder there must be a retaliatory action. Two--no returning without carrying out the mission. Sharon exemplified another goal in establishing the 101. "I am a follower of the system that says that every army must have a small elite unit. As soon as there is such a unit, all the other units will work to raise their standards. If you look closely, you will see that the accomplishments of the special unit later become standard fare for the rest of the army and that the special unit progressed even further."

In fact, the accomplishments of the 101 have since become part of the entire IDF. Even after the 101 was dismantled, the IDF set up patrols which filled the role of the 101 and developed high standards as well.

"Nowadays, you can recruit any number of people for a special unit. Unit 101 usually consisted of 25 men and towards the end 45, including administration. Even that small a group was hard for me to recruit. They were mostly people I knew from the Independence War, from the moshav, or some who had the reputation of being very brave."

The fighters of Unit 101 trained intensively, carried out night patrols across the border, and gained a great deal of self-confidence. They received nicknames like "the suicide unit," "Arik's gang," and "the wild animals." Sharon says that these names have no relationship to reality but without a doubt capture the image of the unit in the eyes of the soldiers in other units. They were seen as fighters ready for anything but wild-looking in their outward appearance. They wore sandals, grew long hair and beards, and did not pay a lot of attention to dress. Sharon says that were he commanding the unit now, he would be strict about etiquette and discipline. According to him, except for the issue of appearance, his soldiers were no less disciplined than soldiers of other elite units today. "We did not retain anyone in the unit who disregarded discipline."

At the time the unit was established, these viewpoints on defense were not yet crystallized. This was also true for procedures in battle. Secrecy surrounded the IDF, and there were no public debates about proper combat procedures in antiterrorist operations. What the IDF did was accepted as given. But internal differences of opinion erupted with regard to some of the operations of the 101.

Three weeks after the establishment of the 101, they carried out an attack on the refugee camp al-Brayj in the Gaza Strip. One of the fighters, Pelah, says that he was opposed to entering the refugee camp, because it went against all the values he had been raised with and in which he believed and because he worried about a reaction involving an infiltration of terrorists into an immigrant camp.

Pelah announced that he would not go on the mission. Sharon did not let an argument get going and did not propose the question: Who is willing to go and who is not? Pelah went with the section of the unit which did not enter the camp. The result of the mission was 50 dead and 50 wounded among the enemy. Even Me'ir Har Tziyon, the 101's most famous fighter, who was known for his extremist views, asked himself, "Is this the enemy? This screaming, wailing crowd?"

The biggest and most important operation that the 101 took part in was "Operation Shoshana," a retaliatory action for the murder of a mother and her two children in Yahud. The 101, together with Davidi's paratroopers under Sharon's command, attacked the village of Kibiya, 2 kilometers from Israel's eastern border.

Sharon speaks nostalgically of the hours before the operation. "I remember that hour in the forest of Ben-Shemen near Moshav Bet Shemen. I had finished briefings with all the forces, and I remember Davidi reading to the soldiers from the newspaper AL HAMISHMAR a description of the murder of the mother Shoshana and her two children. The Arabs had thrown a grenade into their bedroom. I do not recall the soldiers shaking their fists. Perhaps Davidi remembers. I remember them quiet, heads bent, somewhat anxious. Evening fell in the woods, and the shadows of the pine trees grew long. I sat leaning against the trunk of a pine tree. I was having trouble writing down the operation commands that I had to give to the General Staff.

I had already given the soldiers their orders, but I had a hard time getting them down on paper. We were used to action and not writing. But the General Staff wanted a copy of the orders before the operation. When I came time to get going and I had not completed the orders, I wrote on the unfinished orders: "I was unfortunately unable to finish the administrative section and will complete it after the mission."

The force attacked Kibiya at nightfall. The soldiers entered dozens of homes, fired on the roofs, asked in Arabic and English whether there was anyone inside. When there was no answer, they blew them up. Sharon reported 12 dead. The Jordanians reported 69 dead, mostly civilians. Most of those killed hid in cellars and were buried under the rubble. The attack on Kibiya echoed loudly in the world. Prime Minister and Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion made the following official announcement: "We have conducted a detailed investigation and have found that not a single army unit was away from camp on the night of the attack on Kibiya. The border settlements in Israel received arms from the government and were trained to defend their lives. Their patience gave out, and they attacked."

Did Sharon deviate from the orders he received in the attack on Kibiya? Sharon: "Nothing was done beyond the orders. Someday, when all the facts are known, it will be clear that I carried out less than the full instructions given me. Our superiors knew exactly the quantity of explosives we were carrying, down to the last kilo."

The operation raised two questions. Was it right to choose a civilian target and was the check that was done in the houses sufficient? Sharon says, "We are speaking of a nighttime operation in enemy territory, a large Arab village which served as a base for murderers. We came across 10-12 dead. That is what we saw in the trenches or in the place where we met reinforcements who tried to reach the village. From the blockages, it was reported that there was a great exodus of people from the village. We spent several hours in the village, and it appeared completely empty. Every room where explosives were planted was checked. I remember one case where a boy was removed after the charge was set in place. In another case that comes to mind, crying was heard after the fuse was lit. Shlomo Gruber, a sabotage officer, entered and brought out a little girl from the building.

"In my opinion, all steps were taken which a military unit ought to take in enemy territory. In a note I received from Head of Operations Moshe Dayan, he wrote, 'There is no one like you.' No one complained about the propriety of the mission. It was a great victory after years of defeat. It was a turning point, for the IDF saw for the first time that it could carry out an operation and succeed. I remember my first meeting with Ben-Gurion after the Kibiya operation. I remember precisely what he said in relation to the fuss the world was making. 'It does not matter what the world says about this. What is important is what the Arabs who live near us think.' Ben-Gurion knew that the operation made the Arabs think twice about their ability to kill without being punished."



Uri Milstein writes in his book on the paratroopers that, were the political climate of that time what it is today, an investigation might have been ordered for the Kibiya episode.

Sharon: "I suggest that we stop picking at ourselves constantly. The most important thing is to carry out the objective. As for the civilians who were killed, I have thought about them many times. It was not our fault. You do not tie the hands of an army with defense objectives simply because of the fear that some innocent person will be hurt. If they are so innocent, they should not be harboring murderers. Exaggerated caution destroys the motivation of an army."

The problem of purity at arms which was first raised in Unit 101 did not end there. Discussion of this question has been with the IDF all along. Perhaps it is no accident that public discussion grew louder during the war in Lebanon, when the commander of 101 became the defense minister.

"It will take many years before we overcome this process which has spread among us in recent years. It is time to stop selling this concept of purity at arms. I do not acknowledge it. There is nothing to it. It is time to stop standing around with signs soaked in crocodile tears," says Sharon. "All attempts to pit our right to live here in Israel against the tragedy of hurting civilians is a mistake. First we have to survive."

Uri Milstein writes in his book that "Sharon became defense minister in 1953 and not in 1982." What gave Sharon his strength then is still the source of his strength now. He is not stopped by the means. He blazes a new trail and does not concern himself with small matters. He goes after the big ones. Sharon obeys himself, his goals, and his principles. For this reason, his path is laden with controversy. This was how he commanded Unit 101.

Milstein writes further that Sharon used to report about a "quiet trip across the border," but he revealed his true reason to Me'ir Har-Tziyon. "If you get there and you happen to run into a guard and the circumstances permit, take care of him." He was known for the liberal interpretations he assigned to the orders he received. Milstein: "Lt Commander Sharon had an appetite for combat, leadership talent, and the ability to read a situation. The IDF was interested in this and not yet aware of the danger of commanders giving orders an extreme interpretation."

Sharon does not agree. He feels that as commander of the 101, he was obedient to those who appointed him but was rebellious about conventions and givens. "It was a rebelliousness in relation to the thought that it is impossible to attain certain objectives. This was not a unit of lawbreakers as some have described it over the years.

"It is difficult in any army in the world to establish special units. Their existence in the face of the usual military guidelines is not simple. I was not afraid to express my opinions. I struggled over them with the General Staff and turned to the defense minister when necessary. In those days, you could not run to the media whenever you did not like something. I always



went through normal channels. When they disagreed with me, I did not regard that opposition as the end of the line. I ran into every kind of opposition that a commander of a special unit could. I certainly initiated certain operations and fought over them. After all, I was not a storekeeper. Did I give up because I was afraid that making waves would keep me from advancing my career in the future? I say, definitely no. Certainly, it did cause delays at times, occasionally for years, but I had the strength to struggle in a legitimate way. I did not calculate whether my actions would help or hurt me in the future. I looked at everything as it was at that moment."

In Sharon's opinion, the IDF's objective during the period of the 101 was not to engage in advanced strategy but rather to enter an Arab village and carry out necessary operations. "There was no difference between this and strategic conceptions." Still, he argues that Unit 101 gave a big boost to strategic thought. He vigorously rejects the attempt to attribute to the 101 the style of shooting from the hip. "Whoever examines the preparations will find that I believed in the most detailed preparations. There was no other way to carry out retaliatory actions."

The last chapter in the story of the 101 concerns its merging with the paratroops. Sharon, the commander of the smaller unit, was appointed by Moshe Dayan as commander of the paratroop brigade instead of Yehuda Harari, who had led the brigade till the merger.

Sharon describes it. "I have a picture in which you see me standing and talking to soldiers after I received command of the regiment. You see the fence behind me and the soldiers with their heads lowered. It was a staff camp near Jerusalem. The paratroopers loved Yehuda Harari, and they took my appointment hard. I knew Harari well and had heard of his service in the British Army. He was known as a courageous and gifted fighter. The paratroop unit was unique and had chosen a difficult and dangerous path. They used antiquated parachuting equipment, underwent tough training, and were very united. The fact that a unit was coming from outside apparently to take control of them undoubtedly hurt. A few officers left, but the majority remained.

I believe that the merger was the right step to take, but I am not sure that the General Staff carried it out in a way that was conducive to good feelings. At first, I encountered serious problems. It was not easy to come to a roll call and find the regiment standing at ease, against the rules, and yelling out curses. I understood the pain. I do not think that they behaved properly in relation to Harari. They could have prevented the bitterness. It did not affect my relationship with Harari. We remained good friends. In a short time, the bitterness vanished, and the paratroopers came together again as a single, exceptional unit similar to the 101."

According to Sharon, relations between the members of the unit were friendly. "I do not want to offend anyone else, but the greatness of the 101 came from the personalities of its members." Relations between commanders and fighters were also friendly, but "when it came time to get to work," says Sharon,

"everyone knew his place." The fighters felt a great affection for their commander.

Despite the excellent relations and the mythology, no clique of "graduates of Unit 101" emerged. They do not have reunions. The reason may be that the unit did not last that long and, therefore, did not allow for deep relationships. It can be said, however, that what was created was a "101 system," to which many adhered who never served in the unit but who identified with what it symbolized. Strongest representatives of that system include Sharon, Rafa'el Eytan, and Moteh Gur. And many in the IDF today adhere to that system.

9348/13046  
CSO: 4423/29

JORDAN

## FINANCE MINISTER'S BUDGET STATEMENT

JN041437 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1223 GMT 4 Dec 85

[Statement on state general budget for 1986 fiscal year read by Finance Minister Dr Hanna 'Awdah at House of Representatives session in Amman on 4 December 1985; carried within "Newsreel" program--recorded]

[Text] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

Mr Speaker, honorable representatives: Acting on the principles and bases contained in the royal letter of designation and asserted in the speech from the throne opening the second ordinary session of the 10th parliament, and in accordance with the statement of policy on which the government has won confidence, the state general budget bill for 1986 fiscal which I have the honor to present to your esteemed chamber has come as scheduled under the constitution to chart the government's work program for the next year.

Today, as we experience the Kingdom's celebrations of the 50th birthday of His Exalted Majesty King Husayn, we pledge to his majesty that we remain loyal to his historic mission and inspired leadership as we proceed toward a brighter future in Jordan's triumphant march, God willing.

Since 1986 marks the first year of the third 5-year 1986-1990 development plan, the government has made it a point to achieve [word indistinct] and harmony between the draft state general budget for the next year and the aspirations, programs, and plans of the first year in the 5-year plan. The preparation of the state general budget has taken place in an international atmosphere marked by changes and vicissitudes. Some signs of this atmosphere point to a relaxation in the strangulating economic and financial crises that have swept nations, both rich and poor, since the beginning of this decade, and others point to a return of economic recession.

At a time when there has been a drop in the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar, in the interest rate on most world currency [deposits], and in the prices of the major products of developing countries, including oil, and also an increase in the rate of growth in many of the industrial and developing countries over the levels that prevailed during the early eighties, which has strengthened hope for movement from the recession impasse to a resurgence, the major industrial powers' continuous behavior in obstructing the flow of foreign trade, and, consequently, their ability to meet the obligations of their heavy foreign debts.

In the midst of this unsteady and uncertain economic atmosphere, countries have differed in their ability to cope with daily changes in the international arena. The Arab countries, and especially the oil-rich ones, have been affected by successive international economic developments. They have suffered directly and indirectly from the drop in oil demand and oil prices and also from the continuation of the Iraq-Iran war, which has entered its 6th year.

The challenges facing Jordan's march are not confined to the economic storms blowing from abroad. In fact, these challenges stem from two facts which attend this march: first, Jordan's geographic position in the forefront of the confrontation against the Zionist enemy and its intuitional interaction with the central Arab issue, a fact that has created additional burdens for this country in its effort to strongly defend the Arab mainland, identity, and structure and to entrench the Palestinian people on their national soil and to enable them to confront Israel's oppression and persecution which are aimed at emptying and carving up the land; and second, the limited available resources in comparison with Jordan's development, social, and cultural aspirations to achieve the desired qualitative leap at the expected speed.

Despite these facts and the open-door economic policy it has pursued with the world in general and the Arab states in particular, Jordan has been able to cope with the many international and regional economic vicissitudes and to absorb much of the chock thanks to the solid structure and flexibility of its national economy, which has given it the ability to move freely and adjust to developments, and also thanks to the success of the Jordanian experiment in running its economy and preserving its credibility and strength.

Initial figures on the growth rate of the gross national product indicate an increase in fixed prices amounting to 5 percent in 1985. At a time when the value of imports have maintained their 1984 level, the value of exports has increased by more than 10 percent. This will reflect positively on the balance of trade in 1985. The deficit in the current account of the balance of payments dropped in 1985. Official transfers have increased and the remittances of Jordanians working abroad have maintained the levels of previous years.

Furthermore, the Jordanian dinar has maintained a fairly steady exchange rate at a time when most currencies have weakened. Foreign debt payments remained linked to the total exports of commodities and services within acceptable and reassuring limits. The Kingdom's foreign currency assets have improved tangibly. The government has succeeded in keeping public expenditures at the lowest level possible, taking into consideration the great effect of government expenditure on internal economic activity. The government has also succeeded in achieving an increase in local revenues over the 1985 figures.

I feel dutybound here to praise the citizen's special role and cooperation in enabling the government to achieve tangible growth rates in local revenues despite the fact that the sums paid to Jordan as part of the Arab aid are still below the level fixed at the Baghdad summit because of the failure of some

Arab states in fulfilling their obligations and the ability of some of them to pay only a part of these obligations. Despite all these positive signs about the national economy, the labor market has suffered structural flaws because of the recent internal and regional conditions which led to unemployment, which is now increasing, especially among new graduates. This is evident from the increasing number of people looking for work.

Mr Speaker, honorable representatives: Allow me to outline the main objectives and bases which the government has adopted in drafting the state general budget for 1986 fiscal year.

First, supporting our brave Armed Forces, the power of the homeland and the shield of the nation, and providing them with all the requirements of power and might to enable them to perform their historical pan-Arab mission and to protect our national gains; supporting and developing the public security and civil defense organs to enable them to maintain peace and order in the Kingdom; and implementing and spreading the Popular Army programs.

Second, confronting Israeli actions to Judaize and empty Arab territory and entrenching our kinfolk in their national struggle and backing their steadfastness.

Third, continuing efforts to achieve Arab economic integration--one of the pillars of Arab solidarity--and extending a sincere hand of cooperation to all Arab brothers.

Fourth, maintaining the Kingdom's notable international status and solid economic credibility by maintaining our distinguished economic performance and paying our financial obligations on time.

Fifth, maintaining a balance between the production and services sectors and achieving the highest degree of self-dependence by meeting local needs and increasing the possibilities of foreign marketing for our national products in order to reduce the deficit in our balance of trade.

Sixth, entrenching the principle of individual enterprise and fair competition in order to give the private sector its leading role in creativity, production, and investment and to also support and protect this sector.

Seventh, completing basic structure projects and asserting fair distribution of development gains among the various sectors and regions in the Kingdom and tackling pockets of poverty and illiteracy wherever they may be.

Eighth, achieving a balance between current expenditures and local revenues by curtailing public expenditures as much as possible and promoting local revenues and improving the means of obtaining them.

Mr. Speaker, honorable representatives: International, Arab, and local economic developments have forced us to adapt to the new situation. The



government has defined the most important problems which face the economic sectors and took a number of measures, some of which were devoted to solving urgent, current issues and others were devoted to amending organizational and financial legislation with the aim of finding deep-rooted solutions to problems which hinder progress in order to move from the stage of adaptation to that of advancement.

The first government move was to affirm the basic role of the private sector in the direct process of production. We are certain that the private sector--both individuals and organizations--will rise to the great responsibility assigned to it and will interact with the nation's cares and interests, taking into consideration the public interest in endeavoring to achieve personal gains. Thanks to internal stability and flexible economic policies, Jordan is enjoying a suitable climate for investments which allows investing local capital and drawing on the savings of Jordanians working abroad, as well as attracting foreign and Arab capital and investing it in feasible channels of investment which are in harmony with goals of economic and social development. Jordan has a strong basis which qualifies it to become a regional center providing surrounding Arab areas with skilled manpower and expertise.

In order to entrench this climate, the government is bent on developing and modernizing economic and financial legislation, as well as administrative instructions, concerning savings, investment, and production. These measures include developing the performance of the administrative body, raising the efficiency of public establishments, and spreading the use of modern technology and advanced scientific methods in various activities, particularly in conducting the work of the government apparatus and its dealings with the public.

Aware of the seriousness of forced unemployment, the government is earnestly working to confront it and tackle it comprehensively on the national level with the cooperation of the private sector so that all these steps and measures will lead to absorbing the greatest number of unemployed persons from various sources and so that the ratio of unemployment will remain within safe limits.

Out of its belief in the importance of relations between the homeland and expatriates, the government was careful to expand various channels with the expatriates, extend bridges between them and the homeland, and regard their first conference, held in Amman earlier this year, as a good sign that, God willing, will be repeated every year.

Mr Speaker, honorable representatives: The draft budget, which we are presenting to your esteemed council, contains several government policies for the coming year--policies which constitute an extension of its policies for the current year--the most important of which are:

1. Agriculture.

Food security is regarded as one of the basic pillars in preserving our independence and economic progress. Therefore, the government took special care

with this sector. The aim is to ensure better use of local resources and local elements of production in order to achieve the best measure of self-sufficiency and increase investment returns in this sector. The government has made numerous decisions in this field, the most important of which are:

- a. Exempting farmers who honored their commitments to the specialized agricultural credit corporations from interest on their loans for the year 1985.
- b. Giving direct support to local production of grains, fodder, and other agricultural produce by purchasing them at previously fixed good prices, maintaining a strategic storage of these products, and continuing to subsidize bread by allocating the sum of 11 million dinars in next year's budget for this purpose.
- c. Revising the capital of the company for grading and canning agricultural products and removing the difficulties facing it to enable it to achieve its objectives.
- d. Implementing agricultural patterns in the Al-Shafa and Jordan Valley regions in order to achieve a balance between meeting the needs of the local market and exports to ensure good income for the farmer and the national economy.
- e. Reclaiming and developing agricultural land in the eastern and southern regions by leasing estate lands to the private sector at nominal rents to carry out projects for growing grain and fodder and breeding cattle.
- f. Carrying out the Al-Zarqa' Basin Development Project for the purpose of conserving soil and environment, modernizing agricultural methods, growing fruit trees, planting forest trees, and also improving agriculture in the highlands through direct investment, guidance, training, and research.
- g. Taking the necessary measures to carry out a general survey of all areas in the Kingdom in order to determine the types of soil available and the use of land for agriculture and other purposes.

## 2. Industry

The government has taken great steps to promote local industry. It gave protection to certain sponsored industries, whose production complies with Jordanian specifications. It is serious about applying these conditions so protection will not be at the expense of the consumer with regard the price and quality of goods.

The government has also encouraged exports by providing installations and financial credits and simplifying exportation procedures. At a time when the government is increasing the marketing of products of local industries through the principle of equal deals and the conclusion of bilateral agreements with various countries, it hopes that the commercial sector will play its role in marketing these products.

In the field of mining industries, which constitutes the backbone of our national exports and increases the Kingdom's revenues in foreign currencies, the main industries, such as phosphates, potash, fertilizers, and cement, have recorded high rates of production and exportation. However, in view of the drop in international prices, several Jordanian industries are facing financial difficulties, which has prompted the government to immediately study their conditions and take the necessary measures to help them surmount these difficulties by revising their capital and providing the necessary funds for them.

In the field of reorganizing and consolidating the industrial sector, the government has encouraged the merger of integral and similar firms in order to improve their efficiency, benefit from the savings of macroeconomics, employ modern technologies, and prevent duplication.

### 3. Water

The government pays great attention to water as a vital and basic element for continued existence and development. It gives water projects top priority in view of their connection with people and with the economic and social sectors. A number of decisions relating to the use, regulation, and conservation of water have been made, including:

- a. Gathering, developing, and modernizing all available studies on water and completing studies on other areas in order to draft a water budget for a water policy going beyond the year 2000. This policy shall define the use of water for agricultural, industrial, and domestic purposes.
- b. Carrying out detailed studies for building a network of dams in various parts of the country and publicizing modern irrigation methods.
- c. Carrying out sewage projects and building water purification plants in several parts of the Kingdom, beginning with areas of very dense population within the framework of public safety and preventive medicine.
- d. Operating the Dayr 'Alla-Amman project for pumping drinking water to the Greater Amman area and increasing Amman's water resources.
- e. Checking the water networks inside the main cities in order to modernize them and raise their efficiency to limit water dissipation.

### 4. Energy

The most important aspect of this sector is that the Kingdom is importing all its requirements for energy, which amounted to one fifth of our imports, something which prompted the government to take the necessary measures to reduce the volume of these imports. The most important of these measures are:

- a. Continuing national programs of oil exploration in Hamzah and other areas and opening the door for foreign companies to work in this field.

b. Completing the study of preserving energy in major industries and implementing recommendations of this study, which provides for saving a great amount of fuel, and implementing programs for rationing energy. Preliminary figures indicate an obvious drop in fuel and electricity consumption in 1985.

c. Accelerating studies concerning exploitation of shale oil and starting the second phase concerning industrial experiments and alternative sources of energy, like solar energy, wind energy, subterranean sources of energy, and coal. Methods of transporting fuel and gas will be studied in order to ensure public safety. Light derivatives of oil will be transported from the refinery to residential areas through pipes. Stations supplying natural gas will be established in central and northern regions. It must be mentioned that 25 million dinars went to subsidize fuel consumption. The sum of 5 million dinars has been allotted for this purpose for 1986 because of the drop in the U.S. dollar and speculations about a possible drop in oil prices.

In the field of electricity, intensive work has been going on to complete the implementation of rural electrification. It is expected that electricity will reach 93 percent of the populated areas by the end of this year. All the Kingdom's towns have electricity. The government has started to light the main roads within Greater Amman. In accordance with his majesty's instructions, the government exempted municipalities and village and local councils from paying the price of lighting streets and square within their areas.

## 5. Construction

The government paid special attention to this sector because of its connection with all other sectors, the high amount of its surplus value [as heard], and its possibilities for savings and local manpower. Therefore, the government worked for the support and protection of the Jordanian contractor and for preferring him to foreign contractors. The government will work for unifying the systems for tenders in the state organs and bodies. All returns accrued from selling real estate, as well as 50 percent of rents outside Amman and 35 percent of rents within the Amman governorate, have been exempted from income tax. The transfer of items of property financed by organizations and bodies which do not place interest on their loans will be exempted from registration fees. Real estate companies will be encouraged so they may develop the land and provide it with utilities with the aim of selling these lands after dividing and registering them. The budget bill was careful to consider a number of important highways and rural roads.

In the field of housing, the Department of Urban Development was merged with the Housing Corporation with the aim of establishing housing projects in all parts of the Kingdom. Necessary measures were taken to complete the Abu Nusayr project by the end of 1986. There will be expansion in housing for all workers and low income groups. The amount of 9.3 million dinars is earmarked in the draft budget for this purpose.

## 6. Transportation

In view of Jordan's central position in the heart of the Arab world and its importance in the transit routes among the Arab states, the government laid



special emphasis on this sector so that it may play its required role in an effective way both at home and abroad. The government has allowed trucks to increase their ordinary loads by reasonable amounts and has reduced customs rates on trucks which are registered outside Jordan and which belong to Jordanians. The ports corporation is establishing a special jetty for importing and exporting oil and chemical products. It is considering establishing a number of specialized jetties to import coal for the Aqaba thermal power station. Measures were taken to raise the efficiency of railway transportation and modernize railway workshops. Jordanian airports will be supplied with more sophisticated equipment in order to meet security requirements for Jordan's airspace.

## 7. Tourism

In view of the Kingdom's attractive tourist resources and the importance of the tourism sector as a primary industry in the development process and in supporting the balance of payments, the government has begun a comprehensive study of this sector with the aim of learning about the conditions of its tourism bodies, overcoming the difficulties facing them, and realizing better profits from the current investment in tourism. Emphasis will be laid on internal tourism as an alternative to tourism abroad so as to reduce hard currency spending and activate tourism marketing abroad, especially in the Arab region both separately and within joint Arab programs.

Here I would like to point out the central role of the private sector in this regard and its policy of promoting tourism inside the country instead of exporting tourism. The private sector is also required to improve services and support efforts to serve foreign tourists.

On its part, the government is working to give the necessary assistance and encouragement in this field through the law of encouraging investments. The government will implement more works of renovation and improvement in main tourist sites and will complete the infrastructure of the tourist industry. The sum of 1 million dinars has been allocated in the draft budget for this purpose.

## 8. Other Services

In the field of public health, the budget includes allocations for increasing the number of clinics and health centers in order to cover most populated centers and to expand existing hospitals.

Our students are the hope for our future. Therefore, the government has exerted its utmost to provide funds for building model schools in all parts of the Kingdom through the contribution of the Treasury and loans for educational projects. An examination for admission to the secondary schools has been created with the aim of realizing a balance between vocational and academic training. The creation of a ministry for higher education is a means for guiding higher education in accordance with the needs of society and the people's current and future aspirations.



In order to encourage assimilation of knowledge and enhance the use of scientific methods and technological advances in various activities, computers were exempted from customs duty and have been used in educational establishments. In order to provide means of recreation and physical training for our youths, suitable amounts of capital have been allocated for establishing sport fields and stadiums. Emphasis was laid on culture as a line which we endeavor to uphold among various groups. Intensive work is going on to develop telephone and telecommunications lines, as well as post offices, in order to improve their performance.

In accordance with his majesty's instructions, there has been expansion in decentralization by creating new changes in administrative divisions in accordance with population distribution. In order to provide a decent life, which is imposed by the duties of cooperation and solidarity among the members of the Jordanian family, a national fund for assistance has been created to which the government contributes 1.5 million dinars in next year's budget in addition to contributions from national organizations.

The government will continue to back charity organizations and to contribute toward implementing their projects and centers, particularly centers for the handicapped. The government is concerned with supporting the Ministry of Awqaf, Religious Affairs, and Holy Places in order to cover its current expenditures and to enable it to renovate and maintain its mosques, buildings, and real estate, particularly the tombs of Muslim martyrs and the prophet's associates. The draft budget includes 8.2 million dinars for this purpose.

#### 9. Joint Arab Action

Jordan has adopted a pan-Arab policy, whose groundwork was laid by his majesty the king--a policy epitomized by a continued sincere call for clearing the Arab atmosphere in order to make great strides toward Arab solidarity. As a practical translation of this sincere policy, the government concluded bilateral agreements with many Arab countries to support the process of integration and set up joint companies with Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Oman. A Jordanian-Egyptian-Iraqi company was also registered under the name of The Arab Bridge Shipping Company which will link the capitals of the three countries to the port of Aqaba and the port of Qabus in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Every Arab country has the right to join it. There are also plans for Egypt to join the Jordanian-Iraqi company for land transportation. Joint committees between Jordan and Syria were also reactivated to continue the joint Arab march.

Mr Speaker, honorable representatives: The 1986 general budget includes allocations required for capital projects [as heard], whose allocations were not paid during the previous 2 years because the government had decided to adopt the principle of noncirculation of such allocations. It also did not include internal and external loans in revenues, as previously was the case. In addition to that, the draft budgets of public establishments were also included in one document to be presented by the government to your honorable

House along with the state's general budget. The main features of the draft general budget for the year of 1986 can be summed up as follows:

a. The 1986 budget is estimated at 923.7 million dinars which is 12.08 percent higher than the 1985 budget.

b. The size of the first part [as heard]: Revenues are estimated at 787.9 million dinars for 1986.

1. Local revenues are estimated at 497.9 million dinars for 1986 which is 14.6 percent higher than it was in 1985.

2. Financial aid is estimated at 253 million dinars for 1986 which is higher than it was in 1985 by 29.08 percent.

3. Interest on restored loans is 36.9 million dinars for 1986 which is 218 percent higher than it was in 1985.

b. [As heard] Expenditures are estimated at 825.5 million dinars for 1986.

1. Current expenditures are estimated at 563.8 million dinars for 1986 which is 4 percent higher than in 1985.

2. Capital expenditures are 261.7 million dinars for 1986 which is 43 percent higher than in 1985.

3. The size of the second part [as heard]: Loans and aid are 98.2 million dinars for 1986 which is 4.7 percent higher than it was in 1985. The deficit in the draft budget is estimated at 37.6 million dinars which constitutes 4.8 percent of the total revenues of the first part. This deficit will be covered by controlling expenditures and improving revenues, as well as by internal and external loans. It is noteworthy that local revenues will cover 88.3 percent of the current expenditures estimated for 1986, compared with 80.2 in the year of 1985.

The allocations included in the budget bill are distributed among the most important sectors as follows:

The defense and security sector: 243.7 million dinars.

The economic sector: 260.3 million dinars.

The social and cultural sectors: 250.3 million dinars.

The administration and finance sectors: 169.4 million dinars.

The 1986 budget bill includes 44.4 million dinars as a subsidy for establishments [as heard]. This sum includes 16.9 million dinars as a subsidy for their current expenditures and 31.5 million dinars for their capital expenditures.

The budgets for public establishments are estimated at more than 500 million dinars. By adding this amount to the general budget, general expenditures will reach about 1,424 million dinars in 1986.

Mr Speaker, honorable representatives: The pan-Arab duty urges us to express our thanks and gratitude to fraternal Saudi Arabia for its continued financial support for Jordan. We also thank fraternal Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar for the support they gave as a part of their financial commitment made during the Baghdad summit despite the financial difficulties which they are facing and which we hope they will bypass in the coming year.

Mr Speaker, honorable representatives: We are confident that constructive dialogue and calm discussion with your esteemed chamber on the draft state general budget for the 1986 fiscal year will be of great help to the government in implementing its working program to achieve Jordan's objectives of wellbeing and strength under His Majesty King Husayn.

Peace be upon you.

/6662

CSO: 4400/68

KUWAIT

DEFENSE MINISTER ON GCC, FOOD SECURITY

GF301956 Manama WAKH in English 1620 GMT 30 Nov 85

[Text] Kuwait, 30 Nov (WAKH)--Kuwait's Defence Minister Shaykh Salim Sabah al-Salim has said upgrading defence capabilities and fulfillment of food security were the pivotal elements in the new defence strategy for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

In an interview published Saturday in the Kuwaiti daily AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM Shaykh Salim made no secret that forces of the six GCC member countries were coordinating military exercises and working to unify programs of their military academies.

"We can safely say that the GCC armies now form a joint force undergoing a common training system," the minister said.

Shaykh Salim, meanwhile, said special emphasis has been attached to the achievement of food security in the region which he described as "a strategic necessity of greater significance of several military considerations."  
[sentence as received]

The six GCC states, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia are largely dependent on imported food to meet domestic demand. Saudi Arabia and Oman, however, have recently achieved a measures of self-sufficiency.

The GCC joint defence strategy which was endorsed by the last summit in Oman early this month also envisaged upgrading the Gulf nationals' productivity and development of educational and media programs to increase the sense of responsibility of individuals, he said.

Shaykh Salim did not believe Kuwait was in need for submarines, but rather to light vessels of strong firepower which would be used for defensive purposes such as chasing an intruder force. [sentence as received]

Asked if there is a GCC naval force, the minister replied affirmatively, saying the new-born force has carried out a number of joint maneuvers on defensive techniques.

Shaykh Salim said the successful implementation of conscription in Kuwait and the existence of batches of reservists have made it unnecessary for the country to have a popular army.

On the Gulf war, Shaykh Salim said Iran and Iraq continued to stick to their separate terms for an end of the conflict, adding, however, that the GCC countries were saving no efforts to bridge the gap between the two warring nations. He cited "positive GCC moves" towards that end after the GCC summit in Oman earlier this month.

/6662

CSO: 4400/70



OMAN

BRIEFS

ARMY COMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENT SIGNED--An agreement was signed yesterday with the Marconi firm for international communications at the office of his highness the deputy prime minister for security and defense affairs to expand and improve the communications network in the sultan's armed forces. Under the agreement, Marconi will install special equipment which will greatly expand communications within the sultan's armed forces, including the provision of integrated mobile radio systems covering all parts of Oman, telephone switchboards, equipment for detecting message routes, and other modern communications facilities which will serve the sultan's armed forces. [Excerpts] [Oman 'UMAN in Arabic 14 Dec 85 p 1 GF] /6662

CSO: 4400/70

9 January 1986

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

## UK TV ON PLO, 'ARAFAT INTERVIEW

LD171054 [Editorial Report] London BBC television in its 16 December "Panorama" program at 2125 GMT broadcasts a 40-minute program: "Arafat: Paying the Price of Terror," by Gavin Hewitt.

This program is interspersed with clips of an interview with 'Arafat by Hewitt. The date and place of the interview portions are not specified.

The program begins with scenes of Palestinian refugees living in plastic covered make-shift shelters and a brief interview with the wife of an imprisoned PLO member. PLO Chairman 'Arafat is shown arriving for a "crisis meeting" among PLO leaders at his private office in Amman, Jordan. 'Arafat is seen meeting with Bishop Khuri and Muhammad Milhim. Abu Jihad, identified as PLO military commander, is shown with other unidentified men sitting around a table with 'Arafat.

Hewitt asks 'Arafat whether the policy of a gun in one hand and an olive branch in the other has failed. 'Arafat shakes his head in a negative response saying "No, no, I don't think so." When asked which is the real 'Arafat, he holds up two fingers saying "both of them because I am carrying the olive branch, and a gun to protect this olive branch."

Hewitt then gives a brief historical picture of the PLO with scenes in the United Nations, and their Beirut departure in 1982, which marked the PLO's collapse as a military force.

Back with 'Arafat, Hewitt asks him whether the fact that the PLO fighters have been "on the run" is not Israel's "success," in that they are effectively denying the PLO a base anywhere. 'Arafat responds that it is true the PLO lost their base in Beirut but Israel "lost the war." Being moved further and further from Israel is a "part of our struggle," 'Arafat says.

Hewitt then lists areas where the PLO has taken resident since Beirut: Tunisia, Algeria, Iraq, North and South Yemen and Sudan. This places the PLO farther away from the Palestinian refugees living under Israeli occupation whom they are supposed to be liberating.

Focusing on the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Hewitt turns to the Gaza Strip refugee camps. One woman says they have food and do not hope for a solution or "outside help" from the PLO. Hewitt broaches this with 'Arafat asking him how he would respond to such a refugee who asks why her land is being taken away. 'Arafat says, "I am also a refugee. When I became the president, ah, the chairman of the PLO, all my country was under occupation. So I am suffering like this woman."

Street scenes are then shown and Hewitt discusses daily Palestinian resistance to Israeli rule. Armed Israeli soldiers are shown walking along crowded streets. Hewitt explains that Palestinians are deported for being political inciters. They complain of daily humiliations. The "iron fist" policy applied in Lebanon is now being used in territories under Israeli rule. "The Palestinians can't win, but they make Israel pay a price," Hewitt says. He then turns to the Gaza Strip where Israeli settlements are expanding. A settler is asked whose land he is living on and he denies that it is Arab land. The Gaza fishermen are "victims of Israel's continuing battle against the PLO" because they are limited to work along the coast to prevent "rendevousing with any larger ships which might be carrying PLO fighters," Hewitt adds. Hewitt says that the fishermen claim that their boats have been impounded so their work can go to the Israeli settlers. Former Mayor of Gaza Rashad Shawaa comments on life in the Gaza Strip and the use of Palestinian Arabs to do menial labor in Israel.

Turning to Amman, Hewitt notes the number of PLO offices there. The PLO decided to step up its attacks against Israel to counter claims they were pursuing peace out of weakness. This was the "road to disaster" and Hewitt raises the 26 September attack on the Israeli yacht in Larnaca harbor which did "lasting damage to 'Arafat's credibility."

'Arafat responds to the Larnaca attack saying, "We have declared that we have no relation; it is true that they have, there are some, some news about that they were working in the PLO, but actually the PLO is not behind it." 'Arafat then again emphasizes that the arrested men "were" working in the PLO but not when they carried out the Larnaca operation. When Hewitt asks how it is possible for such an operation to be launched without his approval, 'Arafat says, "I have to ask Mr Reagan himself, that can he control all the Americans. He was in some time, a target for one of these extremists to kill him."

Turning to the Achille Lauro hijacking, Hewitt notes that here the PLO was seen "out of control" with 'Arafat evasive and defensive."

'Arafat says, "Instead of thanking the PLO, and thanking the Egyptian Government, because according to our coordination we succeed to safeguard 400-- the crew and the passengers of this ship, this Italian ship--they are making a big story because one of the passengers had been killed. We are against it."

Hewitt then continues the program by noting that this hijacking had played into the Israeli hands. It was followed by the Israeli attack on PLO

headquarters in Tunisia. Scenes of rubble with 'Arafat inspecting the damage are shown. Tunis was chosen over Jordan to "remind the Arab world of Israel's long arm" Hewitt adds. Then a short clip follows with General Ahud Barak, chief Israeli military intelligence explaining Israeli efforts to hit sources of terrorist activity wherever they may be situated.

As a result of the Tunis raid, Hewitt explains that PLO fighters are moving from their bases in Tunisia, North Yemen and Jordan to Iraq. In Iraq, the PLO has a base, but little to no freedom of action because of strict Iraqi regulations in which 'Arafat himself must inform the authorities before he can visit his own men. 'Arafat is shown arriving at his office in Baghdad, but Hewitt adds that security men then ordered his crew to leave. As they were escorted away, Hewitt said that Abu 'Abbas arrived, which confirmed that 'Abbas was in Baghdad, as well as retained in his position in the PLO after the Achille Lauro hijacking.

Following this, Hewitt says that his crew was invited to attend a PLO Executive Committee meeting with Abu 'Abbas "discretely absent." Shown around the conference table are Abu Iad, PLO military leader, Abu Jihad, military commander, among other unidentified men. Hewitt assesses the PLO attempt to prevent disintegration among its leaders, and then shows Egyptian President Husni Mubarak with 'Arafat in Cairo after the signing of the Cairo declaration that PLO attacks will be limited to territories under Israeli occupation. Hewitt says that 'Arafat himself made it clear that Israel itself remained a target. Hewitt then asks 'Arafat to explain what the Cairo declaration means as regards the armed struggle; where he thinks it is legitimate to carry out the struggle. 'Arafat responds "inside our occupied territories" and when Hewitt asks about Israel, 'Arafat says "I am speaking about Palestinian territories." When Hewitt repeats his question whether this includes Israel, 'Arafat again repeats that he is "speaking about Palestinian territories, it is clear and obvious."

Israeli patrol boats with soldiers and mounted weaponry are shown as Hewitt comments on Israel's war against the PLO. Israeli patrol boats are seen searching for small unidentified boats near Israeli shores. The shores, as well as borders are carefully guarded. Arabs who travel into Israel are shown being body-searched by soldiers who then meticulously search all luggage and clothing. Trucks coming into Israel from Jordan are shown being searched by soldiers.

Several exiled Palestinians who have been released from prisons for supporting the PLO are shown talking together. Hewitt explains that violence inside Israel is now originating from Arabs under Israeli occupation and that according to the authorities over half such incidents are "homegrown." Hewitt quotes a former unidentified Israeli minister that they are no longer dealing with isolated incidents but an epidemic--the new enemy is not across the border but "within." Further attacks and incidents are cited by Hewitt with scenes of settlers, streets, and villages. A scene shows an Arab mother atop her house in rubble after it was bulldozed by Israelis in retaliation for her son's activities. Former Gaza Mayor Shawaa tells Hewitt that

the Arabs in the occupied areas are resorting to their own actions out of frustration and that many of them are carried out on individual initiative not as part of PLO plans.

Showing street scenes in Jerusalem, Hewitt recounts recent attacks.

Back in his interview with 'Arafat, Hewitt asks if he is prepared to recognize Israel's right to exist. 'Arafat says, "Simple and clear, I am ready to accept all United Nations resolutions and international (?legality). I am not ready to offer these cards through one of these interviews." When pressed to answer the question "clearly" 'Arafat tells Hewitt "I have many cards; I have small cards; I haven't many cards to play with it." 'Arafat maintains it is not a difficult question to answer saying "but I have to look, I have to feel to be honest for the rights of my people I am representing--the aspiration of my people, I have to be honest with them."

Hewitt notes that if 'Arafat cannot control the PLO then, it may disintegrate to the benefit of the extremists. Next the program moves to areas being bulldozed by the Israelis with Arab women trying to stop the machinery. Israeli soldiers are present and the filming crew is asked to stop filming. Hewitt says that the problem comes down to the land, that the Israelis will exchange peace for more land. He then cites 'Arafat saying that they can do away with him, but the problem of the Palestinians remains.

/6662

CSO: 4400/70



9 January 1986

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

## KUWAITI PAPER INTERVIEWS FATAH'S ABU DAWUD

GF110848 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 9 Dec 85 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Muhammad Dawud, alias Abu Dawud, Fatah Revolutionary Council member, by Nabil Nammurah and Hakimah Shahin--place, date not given]

[Excerpts] Question: Where is the Palestinian revolution heading to now?

[Muhammad Dawud] I believe that the Fatah Central Council which met recently has no right to authorize or allow or justify recognition of UN Security Council Resolution 242 or any other resolution, because any recognition of such a resolution is a departure from the PLO charter. It is the PNC alone which is authorized to discuss any matter connected with the charter, and not any other intermediate or alternative body. Therefore, it is not the right of the Palestine Central Council to discuss this matter in the first place.

If we want to find a way out of the present dilemma we must approve a clear policy and make a thorough study of national unity and our alliances, so that there will be a wide scope for a firmer and more solid political action.

Question: How do you assess the results of the 17th PNC session that was held in Amman?

Dawud: The 17th PNC session has not consolidated anything. There is more talk about it than what actually happened at the session. I believe that the Amman session was merely to provide a quorum: that is, to consolidate Palestinian legitimacy by convening a PNC session. There were differences with some Arab quarters and the PNC session was held. It was merely a session for a quorum and nothing more. What happened after the session was illegal. For example, when 'Arafat's visit to Cairo was debated, only 63 out of the PNC's 450 members were presented and voted.

Question: Why did you not vote for the PLO Executive Committee?

[Dawud] In my view, some PLO Executive Committee members have no right to be major figures in the PLO because they do not believe in its charter. No one has the right to represent a body or a club if he does not believe in its aims. Some PLO Executive Committee members do not believe in some of the aims of the charter which constitutes the backbone of the PLO, therefore how can anyone who does not believe in the charter be a member of a committee that seeks to implement it?

Question: Abu Dawud is a member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council. Is it true that your membership has been suspended or rescinded?

[Dawud] It is true that I am a member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council. My membership is not suspended, but I refuse to attend the meetings of the Revolutionary Council. My membership has not been rescinded or withdrawn. I was asked several times to attend the council's meetings, but because of my views I refuse to attend.

Question: Do you not believe that your failure to attend meetings of the Fatah Revolutionary Council is a negative attitude?

[Dawud] At times, when one sees that correcting a situation is not easy one prefers to stay aside so as not to be party to a course of action in which one does not believe. Reform within Fatah requires the convening of a general congress in which all the issues and all the principles approved at Fatah's congresses are discussed and the extent of adherence to these principles is examined. If there is adherence to the principles when the bodies that are capable of implementing these principles will be formed, and if there is a departure from these principles the participants are given the option of renewing their commitment to the principles or go home. This is the radical reform for Fatah.

Question: It is being said that many of those who had supported the Fatah dissident movement--which proclaimed Fatah's reform as its principal aim--have toned down their support because they do not want to be accused of diversion, agency, or treason. How true is this?

[Dawud] There is some truth in this, particularly as the main motive of the brothers was to carry out reform. However, the course of events and circumstances have caused matters to reach their present state. There are many who are afraid of advocating reform within Fatah because they do not want to be accused of being dissident or of turning to a particular Arab quarter. I emphasize that he who believes in reform fears nothing and disregards any intellectual intimidation such as being accused of wanting to join an Arab quarter. For example, they had accused me once of working for an Arab quarter. That quarter has become their dearest friend: Let them go and ask it if it ever was its agent. They know very well that it is not true. They also know that I did not get close to this or that party so as to strike at the Palestinian revolution.

Question: What is your view of the Cairo declaration and its condemnation of terrorism?

[Dawud] I believe that the Cairo declaration was a great mistake, because we did not practice terrorism in the first place. We are defending our rights and our cause everywhere. The terrorist actions that have been committed are not attributed to us, so why should we bear the onus of denying them?

I also relieve that the Cairo declaration was made under pressure from the Egyptian politicians who are party to the U.S. settlement game.

Question: It was said that King Husayn raised a few questions to the organization's leadership and that he is awaiting their reply. What is the truth about these questions and their answers?

[Dawud] The questions concern the PLO's stance on resolutions 242 and 338 and that the PLO is supposed to approve them. I do not know if there are any other questions. I would like to point out that the February agreement died after King Husayn's visit to the United States and not, as some say, after the Achille Lauro incident, as King Husayn felt that Reagan would not give any role in the settlement to the Palestinians representing the PLO. Therefore, the King, who does not want to bet on a losing horse--the PLO--decided to bet on Syria. I would like to assure King Husayn and all the Arabs that Israel's nationalism guarantees that it will not make any concessions to the Arabs.

Question: Before this situation, what did the United States propose to Jordan?

[Dawud] The United States proposed Jordanian-Israeli participation in ruling the West Bank and Gaza Strip only, on the basis that Israel would assume the security and defense role and Jordan the administrative role. Jordan appears to have started implementing this, as it is being said that the activation of Jordanian establishments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has started.

Question: How do you see the future of Syrian-Palestinian relations after their long estrangement? What are the reasons for the differences with Syria?

[Dawud] I would first of all like to affirm the need for quick efforts by the revolution to restore relations with Syria in any way. Syria is a nation and land which are always with the Palestinian cause.

Regarding the reasons for differences with Syria, I believe that there are two differences and we both have made mistakes in them. First, there are formal or official differences between the two leaderships. Second, there are differences, which are basic, between the PLO and the Syrians with regard to the region's strategy, particularly after 1982.

The revolution looks at this strategy from a definite point and the Syrians from another. The differences started here, but there were similar differences between Syria and Jordan which have now been resolved. I agree that differences should be resolved according to the joint Syrian-Jordanian communique which stipulates nonacceptance of unilateral solutions, nor reconciliation or recognition of Israel, and approves the Fes summit.

If there is an opportunity to implement this plan between Syria and the Palestinian revolution, then why is one of the sides refusing? Unless they want to disregard the PLO, and this is not in the interest of the Syrians or the Jordanians.

Question: It is said that you contacted Zionist powers in Europe. Is this true?

[Dawud] Whoever spread this rumor knew nothing about my way of thinking. I am against any contact with the Zionists or the Americans. I believe that the only way to deal with the Zionists and the Americans is to fight them by force; this is my conviction, but I am not ready to discuss my point of view now.

I believe that if I want to see my cause live and reach a happy ending, then I must strengthen the political and military struggle against all Zionist and U.S. establishments anywhere that I can reach without giving names. I believe it is ridiculous for anybody to discuss this matter.

Question: During the current stage, do you think it is possible to convene a general conference for Fatah?

[Dawud] Convening a general conference in the current circumstances is difficult because there does not exist a desire and to convene it in light of insufficient interest is not acceptable. Despite the fact that such a conference was scheduled to convene this month and some optimists fixed its date, I believe it will not happen. The conditions may become conducive toward convening it after a few months.

However, we must refer to the fact that there have been revolutionary parties which have held conferences under enemy air raids and shelling. It is not necessary to make it a conference similar to the fourth Fatah conference which comprised a demonstration gathering the "movement's trivialities" and calling them conference members. The Fatah conference could be small to include the active cadres who can take resolutions and adopt a political trend. Those are the people defining the course of the Fatah movement.

Question: What is your position within Fatah and the PLO?

[Dawud] I have no position within Fatah or the PLO. Concerning my position within the revolution, I am merely a PNC member and no more. I have undertaken general activities which I feel are useful within the general framework of my Palestinian cause.

Question: What is the nature of your relations with Abu Nidal, Abu Musa, and the Naji 'Alush group? Are they organized relations?

[Dawud] My relations are not organized with any of them. I used to have relations with all of them including Abu Salih, Abu Musa, Abu Khalid, Naji 'Alush, Majid Abu Sharar, Abu Iyad, and Abu Mazin. Sometimes, we used to agree on certain issues. For example, I agreed with Abu Nidal on no liquidation and in 1974 we jointly rejected the stage plan. I used to concur with many of them on the political solution, but probably differed in its implementation. It is not necessary for political concurrence to follow organized or material work.

/6662

CSO: 4400/70

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

KUWAITI DAILY PUBLISHES MESSAGES BY FATAH DISSIDENTS

GF130452 [Editorial Report] Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic in its issue of 7 December on page 20 publishes the text of a 1,500-word message by Samih Abu Kuwayk, alias Qadri, former Fatah Central Committee member and secretary and information officer of the provisional leadership of the Fatah dissident forces, addressed to the Fatah "provisional council," describing the situation inside the Fatah "uprising movement."

In his message addressed to the members of the Fatah provisional revolutionary council, Qadri reminds the members of a previous memorandum which he sent to them in which he "explained what is going on inside the movement and pinpointing the nature of differences inside the provisional council." He says that in his first memorandum, he "affirmed that the movement is being jeopardized as a result of a destructive plot which is being implemented by a mentality which has no other objective than to usurp the movement." This, he adds, "has resulted in rendering true services to 'Arafat and his trend because the uprising has been scattered." He says that this "led to the uprising becoming completely unable to realize the goals for which it was staged--toppling the trend of deviation and its symbols and to continue the revolution inside and outside the occupied territories."

Qadri continues his message saying that out of his faithfulness to the uprising and to "our ambitions and the martyrs who have been killed in defending the dream of revolutionary change, this made me resist the plot and its destructive effect. That is why I rejected the coup measures which were said to be in accordance with the agreement of the provisional leadership in Tripoli. I rejected this out of my belief because I considered myself trusted for tasks which, if I conceded, will be a capitulation to the plot and the objectives of its owners."

Qadri draws the members' attention that "despite the negative effect this has had on the movement's unity as a result of these measures and the frustration and despair which the movement's strugglers have felt, I responded to the good efforts to find a solution, without any preconditions to stop the deterioration of the situation in the movement and to restore its unity." He adds that his positive response was met by "individual measures" in which "an individual elected a leadership and a revolutionary council and made



changes in tasks and positions, a thing which 'Arafat himself would not dare to do, even in the prime of his strength and autocracy." He explains that these individual measures were a "culmination of the plot which I warned against in my previous memorandum--controlling the movement."

Appealing to the members to stop these measures, Qadri calls on them "to shoulder their responsibility by abolishing these measures which contravene the simplest principles of democracy." He warns them that "failing to do so will make them responsible for the revolutionaries, masses, martyrs, and history."

The newspaper also publishes on the same page the text of an approximate 3,500-word letter by Palestinian writer 'Abd al-Qadir Yasin, one of the figures who joined the "Fatah uprising" from its beginning, addressed to Fatah dissident leader Colonel Abu Musa (Sa'id Musa Muragha). The letter is dated 20 September 1985.

At the beginning of his letter, 'Abd al-Qadir Yasin criticizes Colonel Abu Musa for accusing the four who were killed in 'Ayn al-Hulwah in southern Lebanon in July, of collaborating with Israel and expressing surprise over that. He defends the four of being true revolutionaries who were killed by a group of murderers who included "a drug smuggler and a coward who has fled in all battles with Israel."

Yasin goes on to accuse those who are in the Fatah uprising of "suppressing the people," and "carrying out arbitrary arrests, atrocities, robbery, and mistreating people." He accuses them "of carrying out a military coup inside Fatah, because they could not carry out such a coup while they were in the Jordanian army."

He then says that some practices inside the uprising have deviated from the original course of the movement and this led to a decrease in the number of its members because thousands of people have deserted the movement and the people began to oppose it. He reminds Abu Musa of the previous criticism he made against the movement and its practices as a thing "which angered you and your colleagues in the leadership because you are not used to such criticism."

Presenting his resignation from the movement, he says toward the end of the letter "that your repeated practices showed that you were determined to continue the wrong course and thus you lost the chance." He finishes his letter by "holding him responsible for the situation the uprising has reached."

/6662

CSO: 4400/70

9 January 1986

## SAUDI ARABIA

## PRESS VIEWS SAUDI MILITARY DEVELOPMENT

GF280909 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 28 Nov 85

[From the press review]

[Text] The newspapers AL-BILAD and 'UKAZ tackle the issue of the Saudi Armed Forces, which are based on the Islamic creed and adherence to the Koran and the teachings of the prophet. The papers state that trust is combined with well-planned and conscious steps whenever a new group graduates from the military colleges in our dear country.

AL-BILAD says: Before the Kingdom studied the policy of armament according to plan, it work to prepare young Saudi men to learn about weapons and acquire military sciences regardless of cost. The Kingdom established colleges and institutes of various specializations, and acquired the most modern equipment that technology can supply for use by young Saudi men, praise be to God, once they are able to understand and operate them with total confidence.

The paper adds: When King Faysal Air Force College celebrates the graduation of the 20th group of new pilots and technicians, among whom are a number of the nationals of fraternal Arab countries, it is actually a cause for pride for every Arab citizen, since this Saudi achievement is an achievement of Arab and Islamic power to defend its sanctities and dignity.

The newspaper 'UKAZ writes: Our dear country bolsters and develops its capabilities to uphold God's religion and word in a way that preserves for our people their religion, dignity, and pride, and supports the region's security and stability. Saudi Arabia has opened the doors of its scientific and military edifices to the sons of the GCC countries and the fraternal Arab countries, as a positive contribution toward boosting Gulf, Islamic, and Arab cadres and capabilities. It exemplifies the spirit of fraternity and cooperation among brothers. It is concerned with safeguarding the supreme interests of Arabs and Muslims, and with supporting the Arab and Islamic nations. This is represented by the existing coordination among the military colleges in the GCC countries.

The paper adds: By sincere efforts and confident steps, Saudi Arabia continues to boost and develop its intrinsic capabilities in defense.

The paper further says: The presence of a number of Saudi industry missions in a number of friendly countries, as part of the studies pertaining to the establishment of a munitions manufacturing plant in the Kingdom, proves that the country is concerned with providing that which is required to boost its capabilities and forces which constitute strength for Islam and peace. This also proves that we do not adopt merely formal decisions, but those decisions that accurate studies prove are practically useful within our comprehensive development plans in all spheres.

/6662

CSO: 4400/71

SAUDI ARABIA

'SECRET' ARMS DEAL TALKS REPORTED WITH BRAZIL

GF021452 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 30 Nov 85 pp 1, 24

[Report from Paris]

[Text] Well-informed Western diplomatic sources revealed to AL-QABAS that secret negotiations are currently being held between Saudi Arabia and Brazil to conclude the biggest tanks deal ever between any Arab and foreign country.

The sources reported that these negotiations, which are held in strict confidence by both sides, aim at reaching an agreement to sell 1,000 Brazilian Urutu heavy tanks. These tanks, which are considered progressive, modern, and highly effective, are supplied with 120 mm French guns. The sources revealed that the value of this deal is between \$3 billion and \$4 billion.

The same sources revealed that the negotiations between the Saudi and Brazilian officials will also deal with another important subject: The construction of a huge factory in Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with Brazil, to assemble parts for these tanks. If an agreement is reached this factory will be the only one of its kind in the Arabian Gulf region.

All this is part of the keenness of Saudi officials to establish a military industry in the Kingdom and a variety of arms sources. Well-informed Arab sources told AL-QABAS that for some time now Saudi Arabia has been planning to obtain developed and heavy tanks and that it held contacts and negotiations in this regard with four big countries before Brazil.

Saudi Arabia was interested in getting AL-1 tanks from the United States, AMX-40 tanks from France, Challenger tanks from Britain, and Leopard tanks from the FRG. But during these contacts and negotiations, various obstacles appeared, some were political reasons and some military and technical. As a result, Saudi Arabia turned toward Brazil and concluded an important two-part deal:

1. Buying 1,000 Urutu heavy tanks.
2. Constructing a huge factory in Saudi Arabia to assemble parts of these tanks in the Kingdom.

Has the final agreement been achieved between Saudi Arabia and Brazil on this deal?

The information that AL-QABAS has received from well-informed Western sources reveals that an initial understanding has been achieved now between the two countries, but no deal or agreement has been signed yet, even though negotiations achieved clear progress. These sources say that French officials support this deal as they have a share in it since the guns of these tanks are French-made. The sources added that nothing will be declared in both countries before reaching to a final agreement. Another case is revealed here. AL-QABAS has learned that the Brazilian officials at the highest levels are interested in the signing of this deal with Saudi Arabia, not only because of its big financial value but also because this deal might encourage other Gulf countries to purchase Brazilian tanks, particularly if a factory to assemble its parts is built in Saudi Arabia.

According to AL-QABAS' information, it seems that Brazil is also interested in convincing Iraq to purchase this kind of tank, particularly since Iraq primarily depends on Soviet tanks.

/6662

CSO: 4400/71



SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

UK CONSTRUCTION FIRMS TO DEPART--London, Nov 29 (AFP)--Two of Britain's biggest building firms, John Laing and George Wimpey, said last night they were pulling out of Saudi Arabia because of the deteriorating economic situation there. The withdrawal, involving repatriation of all expatriate staff, follows the non-payment of work carried out by the Liang-Wimpey-Alireza group and a local partner, spokesmen for the two British firms said. John Laing and George Wimpey have been established for about 20 years in Saudi Arabia, where they have built several hospitals and official buildings. A spokesman for John Liang said that since 1983 the firm had noted a deterioration of the business climate and economic activity in Saudi Arabia, which was faced with a recession due to a depressed oil market. The spokesman said there had been payment problems on "individual contracts". Over the past five years, the two firms have completed contracts worth more than 112 million pounds sterling (nearly 157 million dollars). [Text] [Hong Kong AFP in English 0051 GMT 29 Nov 85 HK] /6662

DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY INDUSTRIES--In its editorial, the newspaper 'UKAZ comments on the issuance of the royal approval of the internal law of the general institution of military industries. The paper says: Since we desire not to make merely formal decisions which are not in agreement with out actual needs or with our ability to implement such decisions, the process of building, boosting, and developing our defense capabilities is carried out in accordance with accurate calculations, conscious plans, and careful studies both with regard to preparing, qualifying, and training the members of the armed forces and with regard to armament and military industries. The paper adds: The issuing of the royal decree approving the law of the general institution of military industries, does not merely lay a strong foundation for these industries and their development in the kingdom, but also constitutes a practical beginning for cooperation and coordination among the GCC countries and is an effective start in this field within the framework of boosting the intrinsic capabilities of the GCC countries in consecration of the aims and principles from which the cooperation march has proceeded. Foremost among these principles and aims is that the defense of the region's stability and security must be the responsibility of its people. [From the press review] [Text] [Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 11 Dec 85 GF] /6662

FACTORY OUTPUT INCREASE REPORTED--Abu Dhabi, 15 Dec (WAKH)--'Abd al-'Aziz al-Zamil, Saudi minister of industry and electricity, has stated that the number of Saudi factories has increased to about 2,000 and that investments in 1985 totalled 60 billion Saudi riyals, while sales have topped 25 billion Saudi riyals. In a statement published today in the Abu Dhabi newspaper AL-ITTIHAD, Al-Zamil added that the Saudi industrial sector has maintained 10 percent average annual growth rate in recent years. It contributed 9 percent to local production last year, while this contribution has not exceeded 5 percent over the past few years. [Excerpt] [Manama WAKH in Arabic 0835 GMT 15 Dec 85 GF] /6662

PLANE MAINTENANCE AGREEMENT SIGNED--Riyadh, 9 Dec 85 (SPA)--His royal highness the second deputy prime minister, minister of defense and aviation, and inspector general, has told SPA that the committee of economic balance has concluded its initial discussions at the Secretariat of the Economic Balance Department in the Saudi engines complex to restructure and maintain engines of various types of planes. It is considered one of the projects of the economic balance program which have attracted the attention of his majesty the king and the crown prince. Following the meeting, the partners--General Electric Company, Pratt and Witney, Saudi Airlines, the National Production Company, and the Gulf investment establishment--signed the agreement of the joint project. It is worth noting that the capital of this vital commercial project exceeds 600 million riyals. The project will contribute to overhauling and restructuring plane engines in the region by the best technical means. [Text] [Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1850 GMT 9 Dec 85 GF] /6662

GCC ECONOMIC AGREEMENT APPROVED--The GCC Secretariat has received Saudi Arabia's approval to allow free export of livestock and agricultural products in conformity with paragraph A, Article I of the unified economic agreement among the GCC countries. The above article states that the GCC member countries will allow the free exchange of agricultural, animal, and industrial products, including natural products of the GCC states. The Saudi approval excluded the import and export of female livestock and Arabian horses unless a special permit is obtained. [Summary] [Jeddah Domestic Service in Arabic 1400 GMT 3 Dec 85 GF] /6662

CSO: 4400/71

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

PAPER URGES DRAWING UP OF PERMANENT CONSTITUTION

GF110906 AL-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 10 Dec 85 p 1, 21

[Editorial: "The Federation Is the Future"]

[Text] Drawing up the federal budget early and agreeing on how to finance it is a positive matter.

Tackling the economic situation and the recession is a positive matter.

Activating the federal government is also positive.

Developing federal services (schools, hospitals, roads, housing, and so on and so forth) is a positive matter.

These are the tasks whose accomplishment may result in the rejuvenation of federal institutions so that they become stronger and the federation becomes stronger. However, such a strength will only last for a time: Suffice to review the efforts to strengthen the federation and its institutions in the past 5 years to conclude that all the measures that were adopted had a temporary effect.

What is required is decisive solutions to the federation's problems. Temporary solutions have been tried and exhausted, and pose a real threat to our achievements, namely the popular merger and national loyalty to the federation. In the past we would find solutions to the problems facing the federation: The budget would be late, but eventually it would be announced. A recession would occur in the estate business, but funds eventually allocated to pay for estate debts. The federal government would fail to meet its commitments to contractors and importers, but another sum of money would be earmarked to meet such obligations. The schools would become too overcrowded, so the regulations for admission and registration would be changed. The fuel of a power station in one of the amirates would be used up, so it would be supplied with fuel at the very last moment. And so on and so forth. We always find a solution but at a high cost and at the expense of the federation, its strength, stability, security, its prominent role on the regional and Arab levels, and its aspirations and future.

Acquiescence to the present state of the federation and its institutions, and the continued reliance on temporary solutions when tackling problems, in effect means the gradual--and organized--abandonment of all the great achievements that have been accomplished, foremost among which is the federation itself.

There can be no alternative to radical and final solutions that turn problems or crises into ordinary technical matters that can be resolved within the framework of the legitimate federal institutions. National efforts must be concentrated to tackle the roots of the problems, not their branches. Our federal problems are structural, and any solutions that do not tackle the roots of the federation's structural problems will be a repetition of past experiments that failed to prove their usefulness for a lasting period. It will be a squandering of efforts, time, and opportunities for development and reform.

Foremost among the structural issues is the constitution. We are now at the beginning of the last year of the second extended term of the provisional constitution. Is the drawing up of a permanent constitution being considered? This should be our main preoccupation at present. The provisional constitution has regulated the measures for preparing the permanent constitution, and fixed the latest date for referring the draft of the permanent constitution to the Federal National Council. Article 144 of the provisional constitution says: "During the transition period the Supreme Council will adopt the necessary measures to prepare the draft of a permanent constitution to replace the present provisional constitution." Clause IV of the same article says: "The Supreme Council will call for an extraordinary meeting of the Federal National Council not later than 6 months prior to the expiry of the present provisional constitution. The draft of the permanent constitution will be discussed at the meeting." Thus, there is in practice 6 months to draw up the permanent constitution and to initiate contacts, discussion, and procedures. Will we act during these 6 months to draw up the permanent constitution, or will we do the same as we did on 2 December 1976 and 2 December 1981 when the term of the provisional constitution was extended?

The constitution does not only regulate the relationship between the people and their institutions, authorities, rights, and duties, but above all it regulates the relationship between the federation and the amirates and relations among the amirates themselves. These are active relations, relations resulting from a popular merger and a common loyalty, destiny, and future. These relations are interlinked and integrated in all fields, in authority, legislation, security, the economy, and all other aspects of human activity.

/6662

CSO: 4400/72

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

METHANOL PLANT PLANNED--The country's first methanol plant, heralding a new era in the production of petrochemicals is to be set up in the emirate of Sharjah next year. It would initially produce half a million tons of methanol, now in great demand in the industrialised countries. Informed sources at the Gulf Chambers of Commerce disclosing the proposed plan, said that the production of methanol would at least take three years and the first shipments are likely to be made in 1989. [Excerpt] [Dubayy KHALEEL TIMES in English 15 Dec 85 p 11 GF] /6662

CSO: 4400/72



AFGHANISTAN

ARTICLE DETAILS SOVIET CONTROL OF RURAL POPULATION

Paris EST & OUEST in French Nov 85 pp 14-16

[Article by Jean-Jose Puig: "Soviet Methods of Controlling the Rural Population"]

[Text] There is no longer hardly any doubt about Moscow's desire to eventually integrate Afghanistan into the Soviet bloc. The fiction of an independent state as a nonaligned country makes it possible at least to avoid concluding a process that none of the participants wants to complete yet, but it is now not enough to hide the USSR's objective.

This integration requires a policy strategy based on four partial objectives that have to be completed and not conflict with each other. Their relative importance is not always evaluated in the same way by the Soviet leaders, but the overall strategy is not affected. These four partial objectives are the following:

- Reduction to a "tolerable" level of the armed resistance;
- Preparation of the future leadership of this new "republic";
- Control of the rural population;
- A halt to the worsening of the USSR's image on the international scene.

The application of specific policies to achieve each of these objectives may produce incoherences and contradictions, and the harmful factor created by the indirect strategy makes it difficult to precisely judge the degree of real achievement. However, the Soviets are learning daily how to resolve the incoherence and eliminate the contradictions, or more precisely to turn them to their advantage. Their only solution is to dissolve them over time, in space, and in that semi-incomprehensible dimension of the segmentation of civilian societies of Afghanistan.

Hence, there is an extraordinarily great disparity of methods and results achieved, without the possibility, in each particular case, of evaluating the degree of irreversibility of the situation. The changes in rhythm in the alternation of brutal military operations and charm operations; the geographic multiplicity of contradictory policies; the dialectical variations in the

official line of Kabul, depending whether it is talking about Islam, socialism, progress or free enterprise; and the harmful favoritism enjoyed by the members of certain tribes--all this attests no longer to trial and error, but to a deliberate policy of confusion in order to achieve objectives that are "a priori" contradictory.

The complexity is such, sometimes, that there is a radical simplification in order to promote a particular objective. Thus, 1985 witnessed a reaffirmation of the importance and urgency of the primary objective (reduction of the armed resistance), while at the beginning of 1984 priority was given to control of the rural areas. However, the implementation of other objectives continues in the shadow of the priority objective of the moment (and often of the place), and it would be wrong to interpret this as a change by the Soviets in their original strategy.

Control of the rural population falls under an indirect strategy to the extent that the Soviets do not have "native affairs officers." They are thus compelled to entrust the application of their policy to the Afghans of the government.

The Soviets thus have a pacification apparatus and policy<sup>1</sup> based mainly on the colonial wars, the objective being to rally the rural population groups to the regime in Kabul by stirring up the latent conflicts. The various propaganda organizations--including the PDPA<sup>2</sup> itself--are not part of this apparatus (these propaganda organizations--Young Pioneers, the movement for emancipation of women, and trade unions--are only used with captive population, mainly in Kabul, in the context of "Sovietization").

The propaganda organizations do include:

- Khad (State Intelligence Service, the Afghan branch of the KGB);
- Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities;
- "Fatherland National Front."

1. The Khad, controlled directly by the KGB, is directed by Dr Najibullah, a Parcham member and a Pashtun<sup>3</sup>, who also heads the department of "qawm" and tribes in the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities.<sup>4</sup> Along with its secret police role, the Khad is charged with infiltrating the resistance and encouraging conflicts among rival groups. It is the Khad that sets the secret conditions for defections.

2. The task of the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities is to analyze the population elements based on the information from the Khad, study opportunities, and adapt methods to the local situations. Indeed, the department of the "qawm" and tribes plays the role of the Khad in the tribal areas south and east of Kabul. The Soviets are trying to implement a policy of nationalities in Afghanistan, as they did in the conquest of Turkestan in 1917.

3. The Fatherland National Front is a tentacled organization charged with direct contacts with the people in the country, with the goal of defections.

It is also assigned to recruit local personalities to use their influence on the local population and the resistance. To this end, it does not proclaim any ideology and generously compensates the notables, whom it succeeds in turning toward the government. Established at the end of 1980, after some early difficulties, it underwent some expansion until 1983. It is the sole possible intermediary between the rural people and the regime. Also, its role was confirmed at the end of 1983 to include the urban areas. It now includes the propaganda organizations. This causes problems, because there is a clear antagonism between old rural conservatives and young revolutionary citizens. However, despite their speeches, the Soviets hardly believe any longer in the "Revolution."

Thus, the pacification policy is developed by the KGB and the Khad, evaluated and adopted according to opportunity by the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities, and implemented in the field by the Fatherland National Front.

The policy implementation of the pacification process is relatively simple in principle: starting with a militia that establishes a security ring around a base, there is a nonaggression agreement between the militia and people in the concentric area around the security ring. In general, this area is held by the resistance, which, to avoid losing its logistical support, accedes to the pressures of the rural population to conduct its operations elsewhere.

When that is possible, the outside circle is integrated into the militia one, and the circle extended. However, that assumes a combination of favorable circumstances only likely in the plains or large valleys.

The establishment of the first militia group, which is to serve as the rallying point, is a crucial operation. In general, the militia that are subsidiary to the military posts are composed of the first beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, or displaced persons, or even mercenaries attracted by the appetite for gain: the wage of a militiaman is about 3,000 afghani.<sup>5</sup> These individuals are above all concerned to avoid the enemies, and their combativeness is commensurate with their personal commitment. Often, they are content with preventing the resistance from developing in their territory.

Another way of establishing a militia is to persuade entire resistance groups to change sides. It is mainly the infiltration work of the Khad that enables this kind of defection. The aggravation of local conflicts means that at any given moment there is always one of two adversaries in a position of inferiority. Though the Khad may often have been at the origin of the dispute, it is always present to offer its "disinterested" aid to the group in difficulty, in the form of arms, ammunition or money. The counterpart is secret winning over, and the defector group has to continue, for a time, claiming to be in the resistance. During this period, the conflicts multiply, and the Soviet troops come to strike at the fighters opportunely and very selectively. When the ground has been more or less cleared, the defecting secret group openly changes sides and assumes the status of auxiliary of the Afghan army ("opratifi").

Another variant of this method no longer relies on established armed groups, but on ethnic or religious minorities. This is the case in certain regions of northern Afghanistan, where the Pashtuns transplanted at the end of the last

century are not well integrated into the Persian and Turkish-speaking populations. This was the case also for certain Ismaelian minorities of Badakhshan.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, for the people who are hard to influence, the method is brutal and without subtlety: the villages are bombed, livestock destroyed, and harvests burned to bring the people to reason.<sup>7</sup>

The harrassed people end up by approaching the Fatherland National Front, which promises to try to intervene, but without guarantee. A calm period of varying duration (1 to 3 weeks) ensues, then the bombing resumes. At that point the village chief goes to the nearest administrative center, where he is offered the role of representative of the Fatherland National Front for his village. After a further respite, the bombing resumes. The village chief, who has come for information, learns that there are back taxes. This scenario continues, to persuade the young men of the village to go and join, etc.

Along with the work of establishing the militias, there is a large-scale work of disinformation. In the beginning, this was the task of the Khad, which used traveling agents. Thus, a very typical discourse took place in the inns, tea houses and bazaars. After condemning the ravages of the war and praising the courage of the resistance, these outsider orators regretted that there was not more understanding in order to avoid the accompanying misfortunes. It was very simple: the Afghans must work together; moreover, the Soviets were in a hurry to return home. Also, one should not confuse the state and communism. The present government, little different from the preceding regimes, had ended the communist excesses of Taraki and particularly Hafizullah Amin.

Though often suspected, these people were not concerned, because they took care to conduct themselves as good Muslims, and it was impossible to prove that they belonged to the government. However, their words did not have much impact, because as a result of the war these meeting places were frequented by people from very different horizons, and this disinformation work was not followed up or carried out in depth among a given people. Things have changed since 1983, with the expansion of the Fatherland National Front. The regime now has a locally based instrument that is able, along with this disinformation, to give concrete demonstrations of it. The line is tailored to suit the characteristics of a region, and the disinformation purveyor can, as proof of good faith, undertake to directly resolve matters with the government authorities, always under the guise of personal contacts.

The results of such a policy are difficult to measure, though it has indisputably won over several groups to the regime. Its effectiveness assumes a return to internal order and strengthening of the traditional society. However, Afghanistan has changed with the war, and this policy also involves serious shortcomings. The resistance members have changed attitudes, and their young commanders now share the power with the old nobles. Many of the latter have been discredited by going into exile or by trying to save their personal interests at the expense of those of their community. Moreover, the society has been politicized by the effort of the resistance leadership, and this factor is an obstacle to the pacification policy.

In addition, since it is an indirect strategy, the Soviets do not themselves control the relations between the representatives of the regime and the peasants. Thus, the militia are not well led and are little disposed toward excessive zeal. As for the prominent individuals in the Fatherland Front, they can decide to play their own game, which in fact becomes a double game between the resistance and the regime.

Finally, by definition, the tribal policy is reversible. The reconstituted and strengthened group defines its alliances in terms of its immediate interest. If the resistance scores some points locally, the group will return to the resistance. There have already been numerous examples of this.

- 
1. See: "The 'Pacification' Policy On-site," by Olivier Roy. DOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE No 4 785: "The Afghanistan War" and "The KGB: A New Policy in Afghanistan," by J.-J. Puig, No 10 of AFGHANISTAN-INFO.
  2. Afghan People's Democratic Party--in other words, the Communist Party.
  3. The "Parcham" is one of the two wings of the PDPA. The Pashtuns were the most numerous tribe in Afghanistan before 1980.
  4. "Clan" is a close, but improper, translation of "qawm," which refers to any solidarity group, whether religious, economic, vocational, mystical, family or tribe.
  5. About 300 francs.
  6. In the regions of Urugzan, Farah, Nimruz, and Samangan, the Soviets have even used bands of looters and highway bandits, armed and paid for their services, to force the people to call on the group for police service. This occurs where no resistance is present.
  7. These actions should not be confused with reprisal operations, for they are usually conducted in areas where there is no resistance activity.

9920

CSO: 4619/10



AFGHANISTAN

REFUGEES REJECT POSITION ON DRA

LD282223 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 2030 GMT 28 Nov 85

[Text] In a joint statement, the parties and Islamic organizations of Afghans living in Iran have strongly condemned the compromise reached on the problem of Afghanistan during the recent U.S.-Soviet summit. According to a central news unit report in this statement the said parties and groups referred to the Soviet Union's readiness to accept a political solution to Afghanistan's problem as a sign of this super-power's retreat and emphasized: It is clear to the Muslims of Afghanistan that despite their superficial differences, the two super-powers are equal partners in the ferocity of their hostility against the world oppressed and deprived.

In conclusion, the statement says: The Muslim nation of Afghanistan, while condemning the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan and the recent efforts of the summit to reach a compromise with the puppet regime of Kabul, once again reminds the leaders of the two blocs that despite their conspiracies the Muslim nation of Afghanistan will continue its holy war until the full eradication of sedition, and the Soviet Union will be left with no alternative but complete evacuation from the Islamic territory of Afghanistan. And the world-devouring United States should also realize that the nation of Afghanistan is well aware of the crafty goals of this super-power and the efforts of the United States and of its satellites to drag the justice-seeking struggles of the Afghan muslims into a compromise will bear no fruit.

/7358

CSO: 4640/94

AFGHANISTAN

FIGHTING RESUMES IN PANJSHER

LD291839 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 29 Nov 85

[Text] From the Central News Unit: Reports received from Afghanistan tell of new fighting between the joint Soviet-Afghanistan Armed Forces and the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries in and around Panjsher valley. According to these reports this fighting, has been stagnant since August as compared to the months before. After the strengthening of Soviet forces in Panjsher valley, the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries have reacted extensively; so much so that they have forced Soviet forces to deploy commandos and paratroopers there. The clashes, which generally begin with the attack of the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries against the bases and military columns of the Soviet forces, usually end shortly afterward with the bombing of the inhabited villages of the region by Soviet aircraft. Another IRNA report states: The attacks against the inhabited areas of the Afghan Muslims are not confined Panjsher valley and the regions surrounding it; during the middle of the present Christian month Soviet troops attacked the village of (Aghash), 40 km west of Jalabad in eastern Afghanistan, killing 50 villagers there. This report also states that it is still not clear whether the Soviet soldiers were embarking on a punitive operation or whether the villagers were just killed in the course of a routine battle. But this report notes that a very important road on which the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries carried out an attack recently against the military columns of the Soviet forces is located 2 km from (Aghash).

/7358

CSO: 4640/94

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

GOVERNMENT FORCES REPORTEDLY ATTACKED--Muslim Afghan revolutionaries fiercely fought the forces of the Soviet invasion and the regime ruling in Afghanistan on 14 December /date as heard/. During the battle which they fought in Luman Jaghuri in Eastern Afghanistan the Mujahidin killed more than 500 troops, including 2 high-ranking officers, and wounded a large number of the forces' members. IRNA has reported that the forces of the Soviet invasion and the Karmal regime were attacked by the Mujahidin while trying to occupy the (Jahoy) region using 900 tanks, armored military vehicles, fighter planes, and helicopters. They were forced to withdraw following heavy casualties and losses. During the battle, the Mujahidin destroyed 81 tanks, troop carriers, and tankers belonging to the forces of the Soviet occupation and the Kabul regime. /Text/ /Tehran International Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 11 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

WEAPONS, AMMUNITION CAPTURED--Muslim Afghan Revolutionaries have attacked a military column of the Soviet occupation forces and Afghan Government troops in the province in Badghisat in northwestern Afghanistan, killing approximately 90 of these forces and capturing 80 others. They also captured a considerable quantity of weapons and ammunition. Following the attack, Soviet aircraft bombed this area. The bombing results in the martyrdom of 130 Muslim civilians. /Text/ /Tehran International Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 13 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

MUJAHIDIN OPERATIONS REPORTED--Afghan Muslim revolutionaries last week attacked Qandahar Airport. They destroyed a cargo plane and a fighter plane belonging to the Soviet occupation forces. In the attack, they killed 15 Soviet pilots. The Afghan Muslim revolutionaries captured the strategic (Haji) camp belonging to the joint Soviet occupation and DRA forces in Paktia Province in eastern Afghanistan. This took place after a violent battle and a long siege. Reports have stated that the revolutionaries also killed Ahmad (Shiren), commander of the Karmal regime forces in the camp. Other reports have indicated that the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries foiled a large offensive launched by the joint Soviet and DRA forces on their positions in (Sakris) in Qandahar Province in southern Afghanistan. The Soviet forces were forced to retreat from the area, leaving 600 killed and wounded behind them. During these clashes the Muslim revolutionaries destroyed 11 helicopters and 90 tanks belonging to the Soviet invaders. /Text/ /Tehran International Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 15 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

INFLICTED LOSSES REPORTED--Afghan Muslim revolutionaries killed 14 of the joint government and usurpist forces and inflicted losses on them in operations carried out in the second half of the month of Aban [23 October-21 November]. According to reports received by IRNA, the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries attacked a security post near the (Sarpol) base, located 20 kms south of the province of Jowzjan, and killed six of the joint government usurpist forces. Another report states that the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries launched a missile attack on a military convoy of the joint government-occupationist forces in the vicinity of the Tagab city north of Meymaneh, the center of Faryab Province, and killed 8 of the joint enemy forces. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 29 Nov 85 GF] /7358

CSO: 4640/95

IRAN

TEHRAN COMMENTS ON SADDAM HUSAYN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

LD171603 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1058 GMT 17 Dec 85

/Station commentary/

/Excerpts/ Yesterday morning, /Iraqi president/ Saddam arrived in Moscow unannounced. He was accompanied by Taha Yasin Ramadan, and Tariq 'Aziz and General (Shumchel).

According to Soviet media, Saddam and his entourage conferred with foreign and defense officials, as well as the president, Andrey Gromyko, mainly about the various issues of the Middle East, and in particular the question of the war. These reports have the tendency of keeping the question of the war and related discussions in the background as against other Middle East issues.

It is noteworthy that this is Saddam's first visit to Moscow since December 1978, and his first visit to an non-Arab capital since the waging of war by the Iraqi regime against the Islamic republic. Saddam, during the 5 years of the war, has visited Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco.

Iraqi-Soviet relations in economic and military fields, since the beginning of the seventies, particularly after the signing of the 15-year friendship agreement in 1972, entered a new dimension, and Russian-made arsenals flooded Baghdad. Iraq, in return, made Um al-Qasr base and another garrison in northern Iraq, available to the Soviet military.

The reasons for such a visit--given the timing and the present situation--may have some connection with the glorious surge of our Karbala wayfarers toward the warfronts, defeats of Saddam at his own evil games, and the emergence of reasonable, practical tendencies among the Persian Gulf littoral states; in short, more defeats for the Iraqi regime in its battles against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Saddam presumed that by making Khark Island a target, and eventually depriving Iran of its oil exports, he might save himself from the self-made quagmire.

The Iraqi regime knows that military support offered by the great powers only delays its certain downfall. Those who are concerned with the regional security and who consider the war as meaningless must surely take more steps in the



direction of severing military and economic aid to the regime. The Islamic Republic of Iran, relying on the power of belief and the boundless support of the Muslim nation is determined to continue its just war, as it has shown in the past 5 years, until the final victory is gained and the source of intrigue is destroyed.

The support offered to Saddam will bear no other fruit than that of lengthening the war. As some foreign media have sporadically noted in recent times, the world must accept the reality of an Iraq without Saddam's regime.

/12228

CSO: 4640/118

IRAN

COMMANDER SPEAKS ON ANTISMUGGLING CAMPAIGN

LD041459 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 4 Dec 85

[Text] In an exclusive interview with the correspondent of the Central News Unit this morning, Colonel Sohrabi, the commander of Gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic of Iran, described the Gendarmerie's plans and activities. Referring to the recent clashes between Gendarmerie personnel and smugglers in the border areas of Sistan va Baluchestan which resulted in the martyrdom of 16 selfless Gendarmerie personnel, he said:

In these clashes two bands of international smugglers equipped with arms and vehicles were crushed; dozens of smugglers were killed, and nearly 90 arrested. In addition, more than three [as heard] weapons, over 45,000 rounds of ammunition, seven field vehicles and 12 motorcycles were recovered from them. Sohrabi added that air-supported efforts to hunt down and arrest the smugglers are continuing most vigorously in southeastern parts of the country. With the programs we have devised we shall turn the country's eastern frontier into a graveyard for smugglers, he said.

Sohrabi then referred to the activities of the Jondollah patrol teams, saying: Some 221 Jondollah patrol teams have engaged in outstanding activities together with Gendarmerie personnel. During the first 8 months of the [Iranian] year they have been able to seize more than 7,300 kilograms of opium, 947 kilograms of heroin, and 584 kilograms of hashish, and to arrest 2,907 people involved in narcotics trafficking. They have also uncovered more than 6 million packets of cigarettes, hundreds of meters of cloth, hundreds of suits of clothes, and more than 50 kilograms of smuggled gold, silver, and jewellery, resulting in the arrest of more than 6,000 people.

Turning to the Gendarmerie's fight against foreign currency smuggling, Col Sohrabi said: during the first 8 months of the year, Gendarmerie personnel uncovered 50 million rials' worth of smuggled foreign currency, precious commodities, gold, and jewellery. He concluded by thanking the Gendarmerie highway police for their round-the-clock efforts saying, during the first 8 months of the year, the Gendarmerie highways police imposed fines totalling more than 2.711 million rials on offenders.

/7358

CSO: 4640/98

IRAN

# FINANCIAL 'DISPUTE' HINDERS RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

GF081817 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 7 Dec 85 p 20

/"Exclusive" report/

/Excerpts/ AL-QABAS has learned from well-informed sources in Paris that France has told Iran that it refuses to return the down payment of a huge loan of \$2.5 billion which Iran is asking for. However, France has agreed to enter serious negotiations with Iranian officials to settle the financial problem, which is important from all aspects.

The sources affirmed that a French delegation visited Tehran last week and returned to Paris 2 days ago. The delegation informed Iranian authorities of the decision.

In fact, the financial problem is the main obstacle to improving relations between Tehran and Paris. It is the subject of secret talks between the two sides which have been going on for a long time.

The issue dates back to 1975 when the Shah of Iran gave France a \$1 billion /as published/ loan to establish the (Orodeve) Corp., which would treat uranium for peaceful purposes.

Early last week, a French delegation, which included a number of experts in nuclear and legal affairs, went to Tehran. The delegation held talks with Iranian officials in an attempt to reach an understanding in the dispute.

AL-QABAS has learned from well-informed sources in Paris that the French delegation affirmed the following points to Iranian officials:

1. The French Government is determined to reach an acceptable solution to the problem and that it is also eager to improve relations with the Iranian rulers.
2. France cannot simply give a \$1.5 billion /as published/ check to Iran as Iran wants because the issue is complicated. The French believe that Iran violated the agreement with France and the FRG by withdrawing from (Orodeve) and therefore Iran should legally pay financial compensation to the French.

3. Furthermore, France cannot return such a huge amount in one payment, even if the amount of compensation is deducted from it. In case an understanding is reached on the final amount, France is ready to settle it in installments and to sell Iran various French products or to reach an agreement on joint economic and trade cooperation between the two countries. However, the French side pointed out that it is not likely that France would sell Iran military equipment.

4. In view of these considerations, it seems that this case is very complicated and thorny. Thus it requires many sessions of negotiations and it cannot be settled quickly through a decree by the president or the premier.

In this light, the French side told the Iranian officials that it proposes appointing a prominent French personality to play the role of mediator, or more correctly, to hold contacts and negotiations with the Iranian authorities on this financial problem and other issues related to it in one way or another. The Iranian side welcomed the French proposal.

After the French delegation returned to Paris, the French External Relations Ministry announced the appointment of Jacques Martin to be in charge of negotiations with the Iranians, to be assisted by number of experts in nuclear, financial, and legal affairs. Martin is a senior official at the French Ministry of External Relations. He is 63 years old and for some time occupied the post of assistant secretary general of the ministry. He is an expert in nuclear affairs and has vast experience in negotiations on complicated issues.

Informed French sources speculate that Martin's mission will last a few months. They rule out that this financial dispute will be settled before the parliamentary elections scheduled to be held in March 1986, in which parties and groups opposing French socialist rule are expected to win.

Therefore, some say that the French officials intend to leave the settlement of this huge amount to Iran as a poisonous gift to the French opposition in case it takes over rule after the spring next elections.

/12228

CSO: 4604/15

IRAN

OFFICIAL UNDERLINES IMPORTANCE OF PORT

LD290157 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 2030 GMT 28 Nov 85

[Excerpts] The deputy of the Ministry of Roads and Transport and the managing-director of the Shipping Ports Organization, in an exclusive interview with a Central News Unit reporter in connection with the important role played by the Martyr Raja'i port [in Bandar Abbas] in unloading and loading commodities, and this big project's economic importance, stated: A top-priority program is in the process of being implemented which, by employing the facilities provided by this port, will reduce the problem of ships waiting period [to be unloaded] which reached a total of a 100 days during 1973-74.

This program will be observed until better results are achieved. In connection with the unloading of goods at this port, the managing-director of the Shipping Ports Organization, stated: the Martyr Raja'i port has the capacity for unloading up to 10 million metric tons of goods in a single workshift and use is being made of this capacity at present. He also referred to the length of the Martyr Raja'i port's jetty which is 4.9 km long, and which has the capacity of 60,000 metric tons and two oil tankers up to a capacity of 70,000 metric tons, and stated: this port will be connected with other parts of the country by means of asphalt-surface roads and 19 km of domestic railway line has been built in the port to speed up the delivery of goods, and which will be connected to the Bafq-Bandar-Abbas railway line.

/7358

CSO: 4640/101



IRAN

## RADICALS IN KEY POSTS

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 23-29 Nov 85 p 23

[Article: "Radicals Take top Oil Ministry Jobs"]

[Text]

Four radicals have been appointed to key posts in the Oil Ministry, indicating that Gholamreza Aqazadeh, the new oil minister, intends quickly to stamp his identity on national oil policy. Aqazadeh's own controversial appointment in the late-October cabinet reshuffle was opposed by President Khamenei, who is reported to have disliked his views on more public involvement in the running of the economy.

The new appointments closely reflect Aqazadeh's own views; three of the men worked with him at the Prime Minister's office, and the fourth has a reputation as a radical. The four are:

- ☐ Hossain Kazempour Ardebili, who moves from the Foreign Affairs Ministry to become deputy minister in charge of international and commercial affairs
- ☐ Seyyed Gholam-Hossein Hassan-Tash, who takes over the ministry's general secretariat
- ☐ Reza Mostajeran, who takes charge of *National Iranian Oil Company's (NIOC's)* commercial affairs
- ☐ Mohammad Sour, who is to head *National Iranian Tankers Company (NITC)*, and becomes adviser to the minister.

Aqazadeh has yet to specify any policy changes but now his advisers are in place, he is likely to act. In a 29 October speech to the majlis (parliament), the minister said he wanted to link the purchase of foreign goods to oil sales. He is believed to favour oil barter, which the former minister, Mohammad Gharazi, opposed.

/12851  
CSO: 4600/128

IRAN

#### OPPOSITION PAPER COMMENTS ON SUCCESSION

GF101301 London KEYHAN in Persian 5 Dec 85 p 6

[Editorial: "The Presence of Two Jurisconsultants in the Field"]

[Text] The announcement of Ayatollah Montazeri's appointment as the successor to Ayatollah Khomeyni in view of his position as a jurisconsult will not in itself surprise anyone. Montazeri, in fact, had won a majority of votes from the council of experts last year. We published the report on the same day in KEYHAN.

The matter which needs thorough scrutiny is the timing and the mode of the announcement. The council of experts held three secret meetings a fortnight ago. If the appointment of Montazeri was to be formally announced, it should have been announced at that time. It can be said that at least one group of the influential mullahs within the government did not wish Montazeri's appointment to be formally announced. However, their opponents, using a deviant maneuver, created a situation in which they could not help but formally confirm this news item.

Barikbin, (Friday 'imam of Qazvin) announced the news of Montazeri's place in the succession last Friday in that city's Friday mosque. It is obvious that he had done so at the urging of still more influential mullahs.

After a silence of 24 hours, while the rival mullahs busily tried to decide whether or not to deny the report, those who supported confirming the news won and Montazeri was formally given the title of "vali faqih". For at least the past 2 years Montazeri has come out as a leader of the moderates. Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Mahdavi-Kani, and Musavi-Ardabili have differences among them, but are all members of the same group. The rival group is untied. Khamene'i, Khoi'niha, and Meshkini, who likewise differ among themselves on several points, are united in their opposition to Montazeri.

The announcement of the succession of Montazeri is interesting in another way also. Khomeyni, in recent months, has watched whatever influence he still commands being threatened. Several clerics from top to bottom now compete to bypass the "imam's" commands. It can be convincingly stated that Khomeyni did not want Montazeri's succession to be announced before Khomeyni's own

death. However, he was placed in a situation in which he could not help but submit to the decision for the announcement. During recent weeks, Khomeyni has been trying to come to terms with the radical group (the opponents of Montazeri).

Let us now see what situation the presence of two faqihs at one time might create. It is quite possible that the radicals may continue to refer to Khomeyni as their religious authority, while their rivals go to Montazeri.

Ayatollah Khomeyni has thus created another innovation with respect to the "succession tradition".

Announcement of Montazeri's succession does not solve the problem of the power struggle. This battle will go on until the defeat or elimination of one of the parties.

/6662

CSO: 4640/113

IRAN

DISAGREEMENT SAID ARISING ON MONTAZERI'S SELECTION

GF131518 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 13 Dec 85

/Excerpts/ The London-based AL-DUSTUR paper comments on the issue of the approval of Sheykh Hoseyn 'ali Montazeri as the leader of the Islamic revolution, and writes that it will initiate a clash of wills and culminate into a /word indistinct/ and violent dispute. According to AL-DUSTUR, this selection will not be accepted by Iran's clerical body, and even some government mullahs will reject it.

Citing informed sources in Tehran, AL-DUSTUR writes: The selection of Sheykh Hoseyn 'ali Montazeri, who is considered a common and semiliterate seminarian, took place with the assistance of Hashemi-Rafsanjani so that he could wield the fulcrum of power under cover of Montazeri in the Islamic regime.

This weekly claims that the consensus of some members of the Council of Experts had been to set up a three-man panel, comprised of Ayatollah Najafi-Mar'ashi, Ayatollah Golpayegani, and Sheykh Hoseyn 'ali Montazeri, to jointly succeed Khomeyni. But this proposal was shelved due to Hashemi-Rafsanjani's pressure, and Montazeri became Khomeyni's successor even though he lacked the theological qualifications and social (?position). Despite the fact that the news of Hoseyn 'ali Montazeri's succession was greeted with silence among the Islamic regime's officials, this sudden selection continues to be a controversial topic in circles abroad. Sources close to the Islamic regime state that Montazeri was selected in Khomeyni's lifetime as his successor, contrary to the regime's constitution, because all the regime's officials are aware that this action is bereft of democratic (?license) and so no one will support him. It was in this context that Fakhreddin Hejazi, the Majlis deputy, warned that if Montazeri is not imposed on the people beforehand, Iran will be transformed into Beirut and a civil war will engulf the country. The utterances of Fakhreddin Hejazi and Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who say that the Council of Experts took such a step to protect the leadership from downfall, is evidence that they were positive that following Khomeyni's demise, Montazeri will not be favored by the majority of the people and will not even enjoy the support of most governmental mullahs such as Khamene'i, despite the constitutional predictions. These sources explained that one factor which exerted pressure on the Council of Experts was that Hashemi-Rafsanjani knew that the council would not approve the selection of Montazeri in the event of Khomeyni's demise. Our correspondent in Tehran has just informed us that in today's Friday sermon at

Tehran's congregation in Tehran, Hashemi-Rafsanjani spoke on Montazeri's selection, but it was censored by the government radio and was not mentioned in today's newscast.

We have another report on the same subject and to which we draw your attention: Since last week the wave of opposition to Ayatollah Montazeri's selection has been rising in the seminaries at Qom, Hashhad, Esfahan, and Tehran. Two hundred Majlis deputies sent a letter to Ayatollah Khomeyni to counteract this opposition and have expressed hope for his longevity and have congratulated him on Montazeri's selection. According to informed sources in Tehran, these deputies have sent the above letter as a result of instructions and duress from Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

The Sunni clerics of Iran also believe that Ayatollah Montazeri is not a fullfledged source of emulation and cannot claim any credit for carrying the Islamic revolution to fruition.

/12228

CSO: 4640/114



IRAN

NVOI NOTES SUSPENSION OF TUDEH PARTY OFFICIALS

TA102125 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 10 Dec 85

[Unattributed commentary: "Effort Doomed to Failure"]

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots: NAMEH-YE MARDOM, central organ of the Iranian Tudeh Party, in issue 78, dated 28 November 1985, published a long and interesting article titled "A Talk About Organizational Problems and Party Principles," which listed specific violations of party principles and standards stipulated in the constitution by the three-member group comprised of Messrs Babak Amir-Khosrovi, Fereydun Azar-Nur, and Farhad Farjad. These violations were the main reason for their suspension from membership in and from their positions as advisors to the central committee in accordance with the decision by the Iranian Tudeh Party Central Committee Politburo. The article embarked on a review of the views of this group and disclosed its clear distortions, unreliable quotes, and its baseless harmful accusations. The article also embarked on a theoretical review of the country's social, political, and economic situation. We draw the attention of our dear compatriots to parts of this lengthy article.

NAMEH-YE MARDOM writes: The country's social, political, and economic situation is deteriorating. A crisis has engulfed the entire society. Power struggle, which began between various wings of the leadership the day after the revolution's victory, is continuing with increasing intensity. The regime's policy in defense of the interests of major capitalists and landlords faces widespread opposition from the deprived people. The million-strong masses of toilers, who are fed up with the war, high costs, unemployment, poverty, and lack of housing, are increasingly turning away from the regime of medieval despotism. General discontent is rising. This is a fact which the regime's authorities, too, cannot hide. Leaders of the Islamic Republic regime do not shrink any crime to crush the resistance of the masses. They harshly suppress opponents of the destructive war and throw striking workers into dungeons without any legal justification. The suppression of members and followers of national progressive organizations is continuing. The torturing and murdering of political prisoners has been transformed into the regime's daily policy. In other words, the regime is resorting more than ever to terror and repression in order to safeguard its shaky foundations.

NAMEH-YE MARDOM, addressing members and followers of the party, writes: Under such conditions a grave duty faces members and followers of the party, who are continuing their clandestine activity amid difficult conditions and under the constant blows of suppressive organs. The escalation of political disclosure by taking the party's programs and demands directly to the masses, with the aid of mobilizing antiregime forces, is one of the main duties of all party cells. The party's members and followers should exploit all opportunities to consolidate links and unite with the toiling masses, foremost of which the working class. One should support with utmost power the economic and political demands of workers and other toilers. Propaganda and publicity work should, in the first stage, be transferred to factories and labor districts.

NAMEH-YE MARDOM, referring to the forced emigration of a large number of the party's members and followers to all parts of the world, and to the fact that this forced political emigration has under no circumstances prevented, nor can it prevent, the continuation of resistance, writes: The decisive majority of our comrades abroad, each in his own way, are continuing the struggle. Naturally, the aim of activity by the party's members and followers abroad consists of aiding the party cells within the country.

NAMEH-YE MARDOM, then writes: Unfortunately, it should be stated that a handful of individuals abroad engage in acts that violate the accepted principles and standards of the working class party. Our objective is the three-member group of Babak Amir-Khosrovi, Fereydun Azar-Nur, and Farhad Farjad. Some time ago the announcement of their suspension from membership in and from their positions as advisers to the central committee was published in NAMEH-YE MARDOM.

NAMEH-YE MARDOM then reviews in detail the specific violations of party principles and standards by this three-member group, its resort to the most unpleasant method contrary to communist ethics in order to exculpate itself, thus openly abusing the party's members and followers; its resort to various ploys in order to cover up its antiparty deed, distorting the party's history and disclosing party secrets, thus inevitably placing party secrets at the disposal of the party's enemies; and its lack of understanding of the difference between various approaches and views that constitute democratic centralism.

At the conclusion of this very lengthy article NAMEH-YE MARDOM writes: In its activity our party relies on the masses. Unity with toilers as well as their class education and their preparation for a revolutionary struggle was and remains the most important task of the party since its establishment. It is precisely for this reason that we have always been the target of the most severe attacks by foes of the working class. Our party places on the current agenda the ability to guide toilers, the need to struggle with any sort of deviation by anyone, irreconcilability with accusations and slander, and false imaginations and rumors.

/6662

CSO: 4640/111

IRAN

#### FORMATION OF 'FREE CLERGY SOCIETY' REPORTED

GF041940 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 4 Dec 85

[Text] A group of clergymen, Friday imams, and seminarians who are against the Velayat-e Faqieh, Khomeyni's Islam, and the Islamic Republic, have established a group called the Free Clergy Society. In their first statement this group has said that the activities of Khomeyni's regime have brought nothing but the destruction of the nation and the country. The statement of the Free Clergy Society recognises Montazeri's election as successor to Khomeyni as an insult to the clergy. The statement says: Montazeri, an ordinary tutor of the Qom seminary, wants to become the guardian of 40 million Iranians and the guardian and source of emulation for Islamic 'ulema after Khomeyni, while the Velayat-e Faqieh is itself fictitious and is unknown in all religious books and in Oslam. In this statement the society described the constitution of the Islamic Republic as invalid and against the spirit of Islam. They have said that Khomeyni does what he wants in the name of Velayat-e Faqieh, and tomorrow Montazeri will carry on the same method. The Koran prohibited the prophet from forcing the religion on people, so how would it allow a person who is dependent on the point of a spear, murder, and torture, which are all against the commandments of Islam, to impose on millions of people as the Velayat-e Faqieh?

The statement of the Free Clergy Society adds: Khomeyni's regime has transformed Islamic Iran and the proud dear Iranians into a poor, helpless, and nameless people, and has pushed the country's culture to a corner of isolation and forgetfulness. They have placed the respectful Muslim 'ulema under house arrest and have planted the seed of conflict and animosity amongst the Iranian Muslims and Muslims from other countries. The statement condemns the Islamic revolution and describes Khomeyni's regime as a warmongering one which is the cause of bloodshed and killing. At the end of this statement, addressing the clergymen and religious sources, it says: If you do not break your silence, if you do not announce your judgment, if you do not inform the people of their responsibilities during these sensitive and difficult conditions, tomorrow you will be [words indistinct] under the clergy-looking turbaned men and Muslim-looking communists, and the so-called Islamic Republic will start a war against Islam, Muslims, and the Koran. Then there will be no sign of purity.

/7358

CSO: 4640/100

IRAN

RADIO REPORTS ATTACK ON BASE

GF221522 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1300 GMT 22 Nov 85

[Text] The mobilization base of the Guards' Corps in Jiroft in the village of (Vehkolut) was the target of a lightning raid by the tribal Baluchi combatants, (?party) of Shapur Bakhtiar, the leader of the National Resistance Movement of Iran. All the arms and ammunition, as well as six automobiles, were seized.

A communique issued by the Baluch tribesmen stated that this attack took place on the night of 10 November. Sixteen armed officials of the regime were killed. We draw your attention to the text of the communique issued by the Baluch tribesmen:

On the night of 10 November 1985, the mobilization base of the Guards' Corps in Jiroft in the village of (Vehkolut) was besieged by the combatants of the Lashari and Bameri tribes under the command of Bahram Mir-Lashari and (Asa) Bameri, and 16 guards were killed in the blitzkrieg while a large number were wounded. The base fell after the lightning onslaught and all the arms and ammunition and all the vehicles there were seized undamaged. With the grace of God, all the Baluch tribesmen returned unharmed to their mountain base. The (Vehkolut) base was set up to resist the nationalist Baluchis.

With blessings to the wise leader Shapur Bakhtiar, with salutations to the self-sacrificing ones in the path of the liberation of Iran.

[Signed] Baluch tribesmen.

/7358

CSO: 4640/101

IRAN

# OPPOSITION PAPER WRITES OF PLANS FOR ARMY

GF050416 London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Nov 85 pp 1, 14

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] The plan to change the entire organization of the Iranian Armed Forces, to lower the credibility of the regular Armed Forces in order to raise that of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps [IRGC], will be implemented as of next March.

According to Seyyed Reza Karami, the spokesman for the Majlis Defense Committee, the plans to change the Armed Forces' organization will be reviewed again by the Majlis Defense Committee, after which it will be sent for approval to the Supreme Defense Council, then back to the Majlis for a final endorsement. This includes plans to create air force and navy units within the IRGC to match those in the regular Armed Forces.

Akrami disclosed that the plans would turn the Armed Forces upside down, and that implementing them would start in March at the latest.

The spokesman for the Majlis defense committee spoke about the new organizational plans for the Armed Forces. He said: Our aim is to undertake a whole new change in the Armed Forces. This plan must totally rennovate the Armed Forces.

Akrami responded to the rumors which circulated soon after Ayatollah Khomeyni ordered the formation of an air force and a navy within the IRGC, which in effect meant the total destruction of the Armed Forces. He said: These rumors are not true. Our aim is to increase the power of the IRGC to equal that of the Army so that the Army can defend the borders of the country and the IRGC, in addition to defending the borders, would also be in charge of security within the Islamic Republic. There were air force and naval units in the IRGC before, but our goal is to raise this capability to that which the regular Armed Forces have now. Thus the Army could be stationed on the borders, with a free hand to defend the Islamic Republic, knowing that the situation is secure along the border inside the country as well.



We remind you that Ayatollah Khomeyni's message to the IRGC commander, Mohsen Reza'i, caused a great deal of concern among Armed Forces personnel. In the end Khomeyni was forced to clarify his statement and to praise the Army. Akrami also spoke on this and said: The army must never think that, God forbid, we want to dismantle the Army, because the imam has always been in favor of the Army.

/7358

CSO: 4640/102

IRAN

BRIEFS

ARMS TALKS--Tehran, 17 Dec IRNA--Iraqi ruler Saddam Husayn paid an unexpected visit to Moscow Monday. Political analysts say that Saddam's trip to Moscow was made with great reluctance and was shrouded in secrecy because of the likelihood of a possible coup in his absence. Analysts also say that the unannounced trip show that the Iraqi ruler is facing serious problems at home and in his imposed war against Iran. Soviet Union is Iraq's main arms supplier. Saddam is accompanied in his trip by his Defense Minister 'Abd al-Jabbar who was the chief of the Iraqi joint staff headquarters until recently. Saddam Husayn has visited the Soviet Union seven times between 1970 and 1978 but this is his first visit to Moscow in the capacity of the President. Due to the war, Saddam very rarely leaves the country. Since late 1983 he has only visited Saudi Arabia and Jordan and attended the Arab summit in Morocco. /Text/ /Tehran IRNA in English 0720 GMT 17 Dec 85 LD/ 12228

MAGNESIUM ORE DEPOSITS--Yazd, Yazd Province, 9 Dec IRNA--The exploitation of "Narigan 1" magnesium ore mine in the region of Bafq, Kerman Province, with 800,000 to 1 million tons of oxidised reserves is underway, the managing director of Iran's Central Ore Co. said here Monday. He said that the mineral has an alloy content of 35 percent iron and 6 to 7 percent of magnesium. A total of 17,000 tons of magnesium ore have been exploited since late March and another 35,000 tons will be extracted by the end of the year, the managing director said. /Text/ /Tehran IRNA in English 1445 GMT 9 Dec 85 LD/ 12228

COPPER MINE DISCOVERY--Zahedan, Sistan-Baluchestan Province, 7 Dec IRAN--A rich copper mine containing an estimated 15 million tons in deposit has been discovered in Sistan-Baluchestan Province. Acting minister of mines and metals, Mohammad Motevalian /IRNA spelling/ further said at the end of a 2-day seminar of directors and officials of mines and metals departments of the country held here that the province has rich unexploited mineral resources. He added that since the victory of the Islamic revolution, 849 small and large mines of various kinds of metals, phosphates, aluminum, asbestos, and construction materials have been identified and more than 70 percent of them were put at the disposal of public and private sectors and cooperatives for exploitation. Motevalian said that there are between 800 to 900 active mines in the country and during the current Iranian year (starting 21 March 1985) about 500 million rials (dls. 5.7m) were put at the disposal of the various departments for discovery and exploitation. This credit excludes the discovery budget of the companies affiliated to the ministry. /Text/ /Tehran IRNA in English 1538 GMT 7 Dec 85 LD/ 12228

OPPOSITIONIST TAKES ISSUE--In the issue of your newspaper dated 9 November the interview I granted carries the headline: "I, Madani, Khomeyni's Enemy." I consider it necessary to explain that these words cannot be attributed to me, inasmuch as they are contrary to my beliefs. In fact, my efforts are aimed at alleviating conflicts, because I believe that the Iranian society of tomorrow needs peace and friendship, not hatred and rancors. I am also quoted as saying that "The powers which Khomeyni assumed were not those envisaged by the constitution." Here too I must specify that I have never made such assertions. I said that I refused to vote for the article of the Islamic constitution that grants Ayatollah Khomeyni the powers of a "Velayat-e Faqih." [Letter from Iranian oppositionist Admiral Ahmad Madani: "I Am Khomeyni's Friend"] [Excerpt] [Roma LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 30 Nov 85 p 8 PM] /6662

BAZAARIS REPORTEDLY PROTEST RECENT TAX INCREASES--The bazaaris have protested at the recent decisions of the Musavi Government. The inefficient country decided to impose (?trade) taxes in order to mitigate its dwindling income. This plan, which increases the brunt of financial pressure on the feeble fabric of the national economy, has encountered the opposition of traders, bazaaris, and store owners and managers. We have a report on this: /begin correspondent's recording/ The Islamic Republic regime has increased the scale of direct and indirect taxes in order to compensate for the decrease in its foreign exchange income due to the reduction of oil exports. The annual taxes which have risen dramatically have aroused the furor of the guilds' merchants. Most of them say that their annual income does not permit them to imburse 150,000 to 1 million tumans in annual taxes. Some of these taxes will be imposed definitely and (?at a flat rate) and none of the bazaaris have the right to object, without any regard to regulations or scale of income. A group of bazaaris visited the Finance Ministry's revenue department to protest against taxes on income and said that they have to pay income tax as well as (?municipal) taxes and our position is quite clear. The income tax officials are able to assess the actual scale of taxes, but most of these taxes are not imposed on the basis of the regulations. Besides, the scale is (?30) times more than before 1978, and they are unable to pay this amount. The protest by the bazaaris on the increase in the taxes remains unanswered. /end recording/ /Text/ /((Clandestine)) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 13 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

EXECUTIONS REPORTED--According to the Voice of Liberation of Iran correspondent in Tehran, over the past 3 days 160 persons were executed in 3 prisons-- (Gowhardasht), Evin, and Qezel Hesar. However, we have received nothing about their identity or any particulars thus far. We have come to know through sources close to the revolutionary courts that out of the persons executed, six were from northern areas connected with the jungle resistance movement. Two were Tudeh members, 7 were Mojaheds, 12 were monarchists, several held lower ranks in the navy, 2 army captains and 1 pilot. /Text/ /((Clandestine)) Voice of Liberation of Iran in Persian 0300 GMT 14 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS REPORTED--The members of a French delegation who had gone to Tehran to find a possible way to release the French hostages in Lebanon seem to have left Tehran without any results. In Tehran, Reza Mo'ayeri, Ahmad 'Azizi, Badel Harandi, and Larijani met with members of the French delegation. It is rumored in the capital that there is a severe difference of opinion among the regime leaders with regard to finding ways to improve relations with France. In articles printed in Tehran newspapers last Sunday, France has been called an American puppet who is supporting Iraq upon the orders of the United States. It is not certain, if that is the case, why and how come this delegation was invited to Tehran. [Text] [(Clandestine) Voice of the Liberation of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 18 Dec 85 GF] /6662

WHEAT ORDER CANCELED--An estimated \$300 million-a-year contract to import wheat and agricultural products from Argentina has been cancelled. The Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires says the decision was due to Argentina's refusal to buy Iranian oil and raw materials. But Argentinian diplomats have implied that the real reason may have been the recently finalised sale of 20 Pucara ground-attack aircraft to Iraq (MEED 16:11:85, Iraq). The cancellation is a severe blow to Argentina's agricultural exports and foreign currency earnings. In 1984 Iran was Argentina's third-largest grain buyer, importing 1.2 million tonnes of wheat, corn, oilseed and rice, valued at some \$400 million. It is unclear whether the move will affect an agreement to supply 5,000 tonnes of meat, with an option for another 5,000 tonnes, that was close to conclusion (MEED 6:7:85). Iranian agricultural imports last year were estimated at roughly \$2,000 million; wheat imports rose by 20 percent to 5.5 million tonnes in 1983/84, because of drought in the western region. The government expects a bumper crop this year and announced that it intends to cut 1985's agricultural import bill by \$500 million, with wheat imports to be reduced by 700,000 tonnes. [Text] [London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 23-29 Nov 85 p 23] /12851

EXPLOSION IN KARAJ--According to a report by our correspondent, during a bomb explosion in Karaj on 7 December, the daughter of Mohammad Barezani was killed. Our correspondent reports: On 7 December in 'Azimiyeh in Karaj, as a result of a bomb explosion near the house of Sheykh Mohammad Barezani, the brother of Mostafa Barezani, Sakineh, Mohammad Barezani's daughter, was killed, and Mohammad Barezani was severely injured and transferred to Tehran for treatment. At the time of the explosion, a wedding ceremony was taking place in Barezani's house. An unknown person was also injured by the explosion. The walls of Barezani's house were destroyed. [Text] [(Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 11 Dec 85 GF] 12228

OPPONENTS ARRESTED--The Islamic government has arrested 39 members of Fada'ian-e Eslam as its first reaction against opposition to Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri. [Text] [(Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 11 Dec 85 GF] 12228

CLANDESTINE ON LEBANESE DELEGATION--The Islamic Republic's embassy in Beirut announced that a delegation consisting of a Lebanese Hizballah group and members of the Paramilitary Shi'ite Amal group left Beirut for Tehran yesterday. In a communique issued by the Islamic Republic of Iran's embassy in Beirut, it was stated that this delegation will confer with the Islamic Republic's officials on ways and means of expanding ties with Islamic elements in Lebanon for the purpose of foiling the actions of the enemies of Islam. This delegation includes two noncleric members: Mustaf Jirani and 'Ali al-Husayni; and two clergymen; Shaykh Adib Haydar and Ibrahim al-Amin. Political observers in Beirut said that the real reason for the visit by this delegation which includes some religious terrorists is discussions regarding the fate of French hostages in Beirut and a plan for fresh acts of terrorism in the Lebanon and the region with the connivance of the Islamic Republic's officials. [Excerpt] [(Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 6 Dec 85 GF] /6662

ARMS SUPPLY--The protracted Iran-Iraq war has assumed fresh dimension. Based on [foreign press] reports, Shaykh Muhammad, son of the amir of Dubai and who was for a time minister of defense of the UAE, has, as an arms dealer, bought millions of dollars worth of arms for the Islamic Republic. Since some of the arms-producing countries were not willing to sell arms to the Islamic Republic, he apparently purchased the arms for the UAE, then shipped them by boat from Dubai to Bandar 'Abbas. It must be stated that Shaykh Rashid the amir of Dubai, who has close relations with the former regime of Iran, has been confined to bed for the past 4 years with a serious illness. His two sons have practically taken over all power in Dubai. The step taken by Dubai to hand over the Iranian pilots to Iran was condemned by a large number of Arabic language papers and according to the Egyptian paper AL-SHA'B: "Dubai's action was anti-Islamic, immoral, and inhuman. Even the Arab bedouins do not hand over refugees." The Islamic Republic, while applauding the step taken by Dubai, has formally conveyed its thanks to the UAE authorities. [Excerpts] [London KEYHAN in Persian 5 Dec 85 p 14 GF] /6662

MICROWAVE CIRCUITS FOR MILITARY--The Engineering Department of the university jihad of Sharif Technical University for the first time has planned and built microwave circuits. One of the designers of these circuits said in an interview with a Central News Unit correspondent: One of the advantages of such circuits is their small size and their greater accuracy compared with old-fashioned systems, and they play an important role in electronic defense and communication systems and communication relay stations. He added: As microwave circuits play an important role in advanced military and communication equipments such as radars and relay stations, and in view of the war and the great need of military establishment for that equipment, the engineering department of the university jihad of Sharif Technical University started studying and planning some microwave equipment such as decoders [ashekarsaz] and boosters and has succeeded in manufacturing parts of the microwave circuit complexes by using thin films [laye-ye nazok] technology. In conclusion he said: These days the use of microwave parts of small size and weight and with a high quality has enabled the ever-increasing use of microwave frequencies in modern military equipment such as guided missiles. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 4 Dec 85 LD] /7358



INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS REPORTEDLY UP--The industrial exports of the country during the past 7 months of this year, showed an increase of 37.9 percent in value compared to the same period last year. One of the deputy commerce ministers, in an interview with the Central News Unit correspondent in Kashan said: Following the government policies about increasing nonoil exports as well as reducing reliance on oil, during the past 7 months of this year, the exports of the country have increased 167.64 percent in weight and 17.66 percent in value compared to the same period last year. Noting the nature of nonoil exports and the Commerce Ministry's plans for concentrating maximum efforts on expansion of nonoil exports such as agricultural, industrial, and mineral goods, he said: Agricultural exports during the same period show an increase of 63.7 percent in weight and 9.5 percent in value. During the month of Shahrivar exports of fruits increased 12-fold compared to last Shahrivar.  
/Text/ /Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 2030 GMT 6 Dec 85 LD/ 12228

DISAPPROVAL OVER MONTAZERI--Shi'ite sources of emulation and 'ulema in Qom, Mashhad, and other seminarians are disagreeing with the election of Montazeri as deputy of Faqieh. According to reports by the Free Voice of Iran correspondents, in Tehran, Mashhad, Qom, Esfahan, and Tabriz, the majority of Shi'ite sources of emulations have expressed their disagreement with the recent decision by Khomeyni and his mullahs in electing Montazeri as the deputy of Faqieh, and have prohibited any religious consultation with Hoseyn 'ali Montazeri. The 'ulema and grand ayatollahs have condemned the announcement of Montazeri as the highest Faqieh and have recognized such election as contrary to the [word indistinct] (?custom). According to reports, some Qom seminarians have been arrested for disagreeing with this election. According to other reports, there has been demonstrations in Qom, Esfahan, and Mashhad against Montazeri. Some of these demonstrations have taken place [words indistinct] against the Hezbollahi agents of Khomeyni. There is no further information on these clashes.  
[Excerpt] [(Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 5 Dec 85 GF] /7358

CSO: 4640/100

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS HAQ-GANDHI MEETINGS

GF041500 Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 22 Nov 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Just a Handshake Is Not Enough"]

[Excerpts] President Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi recently met in Oman, where it was agreed that President Ziaul Haq would visit India next month for another meeting with the Indian prime minister.

Whenever these two heads of state meet it is said the meeting are very successful. They discussed this or that and made progress in thawing relations. It is usually said after similar meetings that the dust had settled and many apprehensions and misgivings had been removed, or that Pakistan and India will now form closer relations.

President Ziaul Haq, after his return from Oman said now familiar words, that he had a very agreeable meeting with Rajiv Gandhi and that the recent statements of Rajiv Gandhi would prove the success of his talks with Gandhi.

However, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made no statement after arriving from Oman. He made one statement on 13 November, though, which sounded slightly positive.

President Ziaul Haq has often said that he is conservative by nature, hence he is an optimist. That is why he paints an optimistic picture on such meetings to the nation.

It is good to be friendly with your neighbors. We also believe in having good relations with our neighbors. However, for example, we have noticed that when the occasion for indirect talks between Pakistan and the Karmal administration comes nearer, Afghan violations of our airspace increase. On the other hand, whenever Pakistan extends a hand of friendship to India, or holds high-level talks with India, Indian statements about Pakistan become harsh and more acetic.

Now once again, President Ziaul Haq assured the public of the good talks he held with the Indian prime minister in Oman, which in our opinion is an overstatement; the very day the president was being optimistic about his talks in Oman with Mr Rajiv Gandhi at a press conference in Islamabad, the Indian

foreign minister was speaking the Indian Parliament--in the presence of Mr Rajiv Gandhi--about his doubts over the peaceful purposes of Pakistan's atomic energy program. What is more, he said with some finality that Pakistan had enough material to produce five atomic bombs. On this occasion Mr Rajiv Gandhi was also interjecting his remarks and answering certain questions raised in the Indian house. When the Indian foreign minister remarked that several countries were helping Pakistan in its atomic project, he was asked by the members to name those countries. At this point, Mr Rajiv Gandhi said that the names of those countries could not be mentioned in the parliament. He said any member interested in those names could call on him personally and find out. [passage omitted on further details of the question-and-answer session in the Indian parliament]

These series of accusations leveled against Pakistan clearly show that the Indian leadership is not sincere in its claims of friendship with Pakistan. If it were sincere the campaign of maligning Pakistan would have somewhat ceased or abated.

We are not ready to accept that the last meeting between President Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, or any other previous meeting, has had any result. Until the real meeting of minds is achieved little should be expected. Just a handshake is not enough.

/7358

CSO: 4656/28

PAKISTAN

SPEEDIER RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY URGED

GF061316 Lahore NAWA-E WAQT in Urdu 29 Nov 85 p 3

[Editorial: "A Conducive Atmosphere for Restoration of Democracy"]

[Excerpts] Legal and administrative preparations to bid farewell to martial law are in the final stage but the series of simultaneous restrictions imposed on political leaders and a ban on their movement from one province to another has created grounds for discontent and complaints. It is antithetical that preparations for the restoration of democracy should take place alongside such undemocratic actions which were routine during the tenure of martial law in the country. This creates the misgiving that when democracy is restored it will merely be martial law in disguise. A positive answer to this state of affairs would be for the government to meet its opponents in the political fields and not depend on bans and restrictions.

The recent statement by Federal Minister of Information and Broadcasting Hamid Nasir Chatha that "we will meet our opponents on the political arena because we are certain that the people will be with us rather than with the MRD because they have actively participated in the polls and given us a vote of confidence for 5 years" is very heartening and appropriate.

We are now passing through a transitional phase from the political point of view and whatever the intentions of the democracy-loving politicians may be, the fact is that democracy has not yet been restored, nor has martial law been lifted. This inchoate democracy is analogous to the setting of a fractured bone which is still in a plaster cast. Hence, it is necessary to be cautious in every step we take.

In his speech at the inaugural session of the National Assembly, President Ziaul Haq said that "it is better to cool the food before eating it." Even though this was addressed to the newly-elected National Assembly members it also implies that the politicians should not be hasty and should not do anything during the transitional period which might jeopardize the restitution of democracy or hamper the process. It is no wonder that, after 8 and 1/2 years of martial law, the cup of their patience is brimming over but the conditions at home and the external dangers looming overhead are such that any untimely or impatient step by the politicians could ruin the process.

As far as the implications of the "encounter in the political arena" are concerned, those who were unsuccessful or did not participate for one reason or the other could not participate in the elections should wait for the next elections and should endeavor to work for their success. This does not mean merely to hold meetings or raise slogans but to do some "homework" and assess the nature of problems confronting the country and this kind of perspicacity has been lacking in our politicians throughout these years. We have numerous political parties and we hear the echoes of their slogans but we do not see that acumen, that insight, which are the demands of solid democratic institutions and concerted planning. This is that fundamental weakness that does not allow the struggle and sacrifices for democracy to achieve success and bear fruit. We have become the kind of nation which considers martial law the only path to salvation and the struggle for democracy under the aegis of martial law seems our only achievement.

The imposition of martial law for over 8 years is no minor tragedy but now that the path is being prepared for the restoration of democracy, the politicians should not be whetting their knives, but preparing to dress the wounds of the past which were inflicted in the period when there was a vacuum instead of democracy. Hence, they should give a chance to the bedridden chronic patient to recuperate and grow healthy.

/7358

CSO: 4656/28



PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

GF081337 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Nov 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Role of Political Parties"]

[Text] Syed Fakhar Imam, the speaker of the National Assembly, has once again emphasised the vital importance of political parties for long-term working of the democratic system. He said, since ultimately the political parties have to emerge in our system, the shorter the interim period the better it would be. The timely observations of the speaker are pertinent to the issue with which the current session of the National Assembly would be preoccupied. The proposed law will not only determine the process through which the parties are to be restored but will also define their role in the new political set-up. For the past eight years political parties have been viewed as rival contenders for power and efforts have been made either to isolate them or by-pass them. It seems that despite the initiation of a democratic process and induction of civilian institutions, there is still some reluctance to accord legitimacy to the political parties. The times have changed and the realities of the new situation warrant re-orientation of attitude towards the role of political parties.

It seems that in some circles the parties are associated with chaos and instability. There are apprehensions that as soon as the parties are revived they will indulge in irresponsible agitational activities. The envisaged phased programme of the revival of political parties is indicative of such a frame of mind. With the induction of the democratic system the perception of political stability and law and order should also change. Democracy must tolerate divergence and dissidence, and articulation of grievances through mass mobilisation should not be considered an attempt to disrupt unity or stability. The parties should be recognised as an essential and integral part of the democratic system and no attempt should be made either to limit their role or prolong the interim period. Hopefully, the proposed parties act will not be perceived as one of the ad hoc measures which in the past have created a great deal of confusion and uncertainty. It should be aimed at creating a durable political system in which political parties are accorded their legitimate position.

/7358

CSO: 4600/131

PAKISTAN

ALLEGED PLANS FOR STATE OF EMERGENCY OPPOSED

GF131459 Rawalpindi HAIDAR in Urdu 6 Dec 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Muslim League, A Government Party"]

[Text] A paper has reported that Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo is in favor of making the Muslim League a government party, and that prior to lifting martial law and declaring a state of emergency, he wants to have his party established. It is believed that a large number of National Assembly and senate members will join this party.

Like others, the prime minister undoubtedly also has the right to set up his own party under any name. The National Assembly members or the senators have the rights to participate in the prime minister's party, or in any other party for that matter; this right cannot be challenged. However, the news that is very upsetting is that the prime minister intends to set up his party soon after lifting martial law and before declaring a state of emergency. If this news is correct, then it would mean that a state of emergency in the country is to be declared as soon as martial law is lifted. The people who know the hidden meanings of such declarations also know that clamping a state of emergency on a country amounts to depriving the citizens of their basic rights.

Basic rights are suspended even now due to martial law. People have been waiting for the lifting of martial law for the last 8 years because they wanted restoration of their basic rights. If a state of emergency is declared soon after lifting martial law then it would mean the death of people's hopes and aspirations. In such a case, the nation would be justified in raising its voice in an orderly way to protest. We pray that the civilian government may not commit the error of declaring a state of emergency. If the civilian government insisted on committing this mistake the responsibility for any unpleasant consequences would fall on the shoulders of the prime minister and his colleagues.

/8309

CSO: 4656/29

PAKISTAN

OIL PRODUCTION SITUATION REVIEWED

GF121842 Lahore JANG in Urdu 9 Dec 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Growth in Oil Output"]

[Text] Federal Minister of State for Natural Resources Dr Muhammad Asad Khan in a question-answer session in the National Assembly said that during the last 2 years there has been a 96-percent increase in oil output in the country. During the same period a sum of 6.464 billion rupees worth of foreign exchange was saved. Due to the efforts of the present regime, there has been a growth in the production of oil and gas in the country. The average of drilling of experimental wells has also been much more than that of the past regimes. The energy crisis in Pakistan has resulted in stepped up efforts in locating oil and gas reserves in the country. It is a matter of satisfaction that the sector of oil and gas exploration has been handed over to a technocrat who is fully aware of the land of our country. He is also internationally well known in this line. It is due to the present regime that it has selected appropriate personnel for the various jobs. Drilling is going on at the coastal areas close to Karachi. The experience thus gained will be useful in exploring offshore oil deposits. Another happy event in the country is that oil drilling rigs are now being made in the country. The first rig with 90 percent of its parts made in Pakistan, is already in use. A sum of 1.315 billion rupees has been earmarked by the government in the current financial year for the oil and gas exploration sector.

A separate item of 630 million rupees has been set aside by the government for providing facilities in the petroleum sector. The private sector is also being encouraged to invest in this line. It is hoped that these efforts will help the country to overcome the oil crisis. We would also invite the attention of the regime toward economizing in oil. Car imports should be restricted. Unrestricted use of imported cars should also be banned. The petrol thus saved would mean less expenditure in our foreign exchange.

/8309

CSO: 4656/29

END

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

27 January 1986

